Today the threats are much more real. Ransomware, cryptocurrency miners, even state actors.
An enormous point of weakness in modern software is the supply chain - many projects now have thousands of nested dependencies.
Most of those dependencies represents at least one human being who can be threatened with a crowbar and forced to ship an exploit, which can then infect vast numbers of production applications.
So yes, for me this is a very real concern!
If reviewers can build up a reputation anonymously, that will make it harder to find the human who needs to be crowbarred, but I'm not sure how you prove you are a good reviewer in a way which isn't gameable.
Alternatively, the reviewers could be well known teams in multiple jurisdictions, such that an attacker would need to buy multiple crowbars and multiple plane tickets.
This seems focused on signing binaries / build artifacts.
IMHO it seems like if you have the threat model of "crowbared maintainer forced to insert backdoor" you probably don't trust sources let alone binaries and need to vet your dependency sources and then compile your own binaries from them.
Many open source dependencies will not have a jurisdictionally diverse review team, or any review team at all (single maintainer).
I agree that the threat model should include the threat of untrustworthy source code, because we want the countermeasures to work equally well against backdoors, "bugdoors", and genuine bugs.
I suspect for a lot of projects reproducible builds are themselves a bit of a hurdle and not being verified in the rarer case that they already exist, but the point of reproducible + signed builds as indirect source-signing stands.
"Most of those dependencies represents at least one human being who can be threatened with a crowbar and forced to ship an exploit, which can then infect vast numbers of production applications."
Security is layered so there is no one thing to just secure it. With that in mind, how do you control which revision of something is deployed? Do you use the hash? What if someone pushed a different version to your container repo? Could that be somehow run somewhere? It may require someone gaining privileges but that is not an uncommon situation. This is why multi-layered security is useful.
If something is signed and verified you can know WHO it came from. Someone with access to sign it. In the situation where a bad actor pushed something to a container repo the verification step would fail and you would catch it.
This is just one example. There are many others.
not necessarily endorsing the need for this, but one reason is that if the hash and file are hosted by the same site an attacker who compromised the web server can trivially change the hash to match their payload. With this system, they would have to compromise both the web server and the signing server.
You can also leverage this to trust a binary even from an unknown source because the signature will match and confirm authenticity regardless of how trustworthy the source of the binary is.
If the vendor itself is compromised, then I can understand such a system.
a) check a signature on the hash (current method)
b) check with a central authority if the hash is ok (now that's central control)
c) somehow discover the hash from some other source - possible, but not something users will generally manually verify, and the question of how to trust that hash again quickly comes down to signatures or authority.
Figuring out the correct hash is different from knowing that the software you got is from who you expected it to be from. If you sign 100 versions of something and you verify what you got... you'll know they came from who you expected (rather than a bad actor) but you might not know which version to run from that.
How is telling you "don't trust this hash" any less "Apple-esque control of remotely disabling the ability for softwareto run" than something saying "don't trust this certificate after $date"? (E.g. the recent-ish Apple outrage was that they switched to uploading hashes over just verifying signatures)
It could be useful for software distributors to have their version history memorialized somewhere outside of their own control, for example to reduce the attractiveness of governments trying to compel them to secretly tamper with some users' versions of a program, or to make it meaningful and more straightforward to check later on whether they published what they thought they published.
Edit: I misread the latter portion of your post. I see now. Thanks.
Maybe the list is digitally signed by the publisher, but then often the signing key is also distributed in the same place as the software itself (and also often used on the same infrastructure that the software was compiled on).
Also, if the list of hash values is distributed only by a software publisher, the software publisher will get the ability to secretly backdoor some users, but not others, by creating two or more different versions of that list. Then it can deny the existence of the backdoored version to the public (or to itself, if the backdooring was done by an unauthorized insider!).
There's a real vulnerability where users get a compromised package and a matching hash from the same compromised repository.
This is an idiom borrowed from certificate transparency. You kind of want the badly signed certs to be recorded, as they can be monitored and audited for. Everything is out in the open in the plain light of day.
However it opens up the possibility that the artefacts can be tampered with on the server. Signing confirms their authenticity. In a (cryptographically secure) hash, there is no 'key' and so anyone can create a valid one for their modified bundle.
Ditto for containers, Android Apps, and just about anything else we use.
I have never heard of a good argument for this besides the Apple-esque control of remotely disabling the ability for software to run based on certificate authority, which is not a feature I'm interested in.
Further, I'd like to not see this as possible, since year after year more and more software companies seem to think they're entitled to more and more.