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Re:Sigstore – A new standard for signing, verifying and prot... by dane-pgp on Monday August 09, 2021 @05:45PM (#28122702)
With reproducible builds, the difference between signing a binary and signing the source code from which it is built should be meaningless.

I agree that the threat model should include the threat of untrustworthy source code, because we want the countermeasures to work equally well against backdoors, "bugdoors", and genuine bugs.

Re:Sigstore – A new standard for signing, verifying and prot... by BenTheElder on Monday August 09, 2021 @05:59PM (#28122848)
Good points.

I suspect for a lot of projects reproducible builds are themselves a bit of a hurdle and not being verified in the rarer case that they already exist, but the point of reproducible + signed builds as indirect source-signing stands.