Re:Sigstore – A new standard for signing, verifying and prot...
by mfer on Monday August 09, 2021 @04:33PM
(#28122018)
> How do you know which hash is the correct one?
Figuring out the correct hash is different from knowing that the software you got is from who you expected it to be from. If you sign 100 versions of something and you verify what you got... you'll know they came from who you expected (rather than a bad actor) but you might not know which version to run from that.
Re:Sigstore – A new standard for signing, verifying and prot...
by andrewmcwatters on Monday August 09, 2021 @03:53PM
(#28121578)
That's not control.
Re:Sigstore – A new standard for signing, verifying and prot...
by detaro on Monday August 09, 2021 @03:55PM
(#28121606)
At least as much as a signature check, and if you send a hash to somewhere to look it up it reveals more about your system than the signature verification does. If you fetch a list of trusted hashes, the source can customize it more precisely to what to tell you is ok than if you verify a signature.
How is telling you "don't trust this hash" any less "Apple-esque control of remotely disabling the ability for softwareto run" than something saying "don't trust this certificate after $date"? (E.g. the recent-ish Apple outrage was that they switched to uploading hashes over just verifying signatures)
Re:Sigstore – A new standard for signing, verifying and prot...
by andrewmcwatters on Monday August 09, 2021 @04:00PM
(#28121652)
I see now.
a) check a signature on the hash (current method)
b) check with a central authority if the hash is ok (now that's central control)
c) somehow discover the hash from some other source - possible, but not something users will generally manually verify, and the question of how to trust that hash again quickly comes down to signatures or authority.