"But it only impacts iCloud Photos". Valid! So why not run the scanner in iCloud and not on MY PHONE that I paid OVER A THOUSAND DOLLARS for? Because of end-to-end encryption. Apple wants to have their cake and eat it too. They can say they have E2EE, but also give users no way to opt-out of code, running on 100% of the "end" devices in that "end-to-end encryption" system, which subverts the E2EE. A beautiful little system they've created. "E2EE" means different things on Apple devices, for sure!
And you're ignoring (or didn't read) the central, valid point of the EFF article: Maybe you can justify this in the US. Most countries are far, far worse than the US when it comes to privacy and human rights. The technology exists. The policy has been drafted and enacted; Apple is now alright with subverting E2EE. We start with hashes of images of child exploitation. What's next? Tank man in China? Photos of naked adult women, in conservative parts of the world? A meme criticizing your country's leader? I want to believe that Apple will, AT LEAST, stop at child exploitation, but Apple has already estroyed the faith I held in them, only yesterday, in their fight for privacy as a right.
This isn't an issue you can hold a middleground position on. Encryption doesn't only kinda-sorta work in a half-ass implementation; it doesn't work at all.
I am wondering what hashes are now and will be in this database. Or combine Pegasus exploit , put a few bad images on the journalist/politician iPhone, cleanup the tracks and wait for Apple and FBI destroy the person.
I kept the lineage phone in my back pocket, confident that it would be a good 4-5 years before they shipped something that violated their claims. I figured, the alternatives would be stable and widespread.
My timing was off.
This of course gets into 'what even is harm?' since that's a very subjective way of classifying something, especially when you try to do it on behalf of others.
For CSAM you could probably assume that "everyone this code takes action against would consider doing so harmful", but _consequences in general are harmful_ and thus you could make this same argument about anything that tries to prevent crime or catch criminals instead of simply waiting for people to turn themselves in. You harm a burglar when you call for emergency services to apprehend them.
> This isn't an issue you can hold a middleground position on. Encryption doesn't only kinda-sorta work in a half-ass implementation; it doesn't work at all.
This is the exact issue that the U.S. has been entrenched by - thinking that you can't disagree with one thing someone says or does and agree with other things they say or do. You can support Apple deciding to combat CSAM. You can not support Apple for trying to do this client-sided instead of server-sided. You can also support Apple for taking steps towards bringing E2EE to iCloud Photos. You can also not support them bowing to the CCP and giving up Chinese citizens' iCloud data encryption keys to the CCP. This is a middle ground - and just because you financially support Apple by buying an iPhone or in-app purchases doesn't mean you suddenly agree with everything they do. This isn't a new phenomenon - before the internet, we just didn't have the capacity to know, in an instant, the bad parts of the people or companies we interfaced with.
I've seen the "right to unreasonable search and seizure" Americans hold quoted a bit during this discussion. Valid, though to be clear, the Constitution doesn't apply for private company products. But more interestingly: what about right against self-incrimination? That's what Apple is pushing here; that by owning an iPhone, you may incriminate yourself, and actually it may end up happening whether you're actually guilty or not.
The biggest issue with this is, of course, that Apple's accusation is most certainly going to be enough evidence to get a search warrant, meaning a search and seizure of all of your hard drives they can find.
0: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2252A#:~:text=(d)...
Um. No?
I would be very surprised if more than 10% of people in possession of sexual images of under 18s molested (pre-pubecent) children.
However, this is NOT the use case being applied for here. Holding those images, which are not part of known CP, will not be an issue, brining it up is a red herring. ~The issue most people have fruitfully started discussing is the scanning of content on your own phone.
Secondly - the correlation between holding known CP and child molestation IS, sadly, high.
I prefer not having my door busted in at 6 am and my dog shot in the head because of a hash collision
https://www.aclu.org/gallery/swat-team-blew-hole-2-year-old-...
PS. On a personal note, Apple is done for me. Stick a fork in it. I was ready to upgrade after September especially since I heard touch-ID is coming back and I love my iPhone 8. But sure as hell this sad news means i8 is my last Apple device.
This seems fine as it's (a) being done on iCloud-uploaded photos and (b) replacing a server-side function with a client-side one. If Apple were doing this to locally-stored photos on iCloud-disconnected devices, it would be nuts. Once the tool is built, expanding the database to include any number of other hashes is a much shorter leap than compelling Apple to build the tool.
> it seems easy enough to clear that one up
Would it be? One would be starting from the point of a documented suspicion of possession of child pornography.
Ive actually witnessed someone go through this from someone else getting caught with these types of images and attempting to bring others with him. It’s not easy. It took him over a year of his life calling constantly asking when the charges will be dropped. They even image your devices on the spot yet still take them and stuff them in an evidence locker until everything is cleared up. You’re essentially an outcast to society while this is pending as well as most people assume if you have police interest related to child pornography you must be guilty.
I’d be happier if Apple wasn’t doing this at all. I’m not defending them necessarily but I am calling bullshit on your scare tactics. It’s not necessary.
There’s two functions here. Both client side.
First, machine learning to detect potentially inappropriate pictures for children to view. This seems to require parental controls to be on. Optionally it can send a message to the parent when a child purposefully views the image. The image itself is not shared with Apple so this is notification to parents only.
The second part is a list of hashes. So the Photos app will hash images and compare to the list in the database. If it matches then presumably they do something about that. The database is only a list of KNOWN child abuse images circulating.
Now, not to say I like the second part but the first one seems fine. The second is sketchy in that what happens if there’s a hash collision. But either way it seems easy enough to clear that one up.
No father is going to be added to some list for their children’s photos. Stop with that hyperbole.