Unfortunately, the purpose here will be to use the fact that most users use a non-free OS to turn these TPMs against the user in order to make DRM harder to break.
Stallman[1] and others[2] have talked about just this issue for over a decade now.
I think the last 30 years have shown that, in some sense, even competent computer users can’t really be trusted to keep their systems secure. I’m not saying that the only solution is to have a totally locked down system, but I’m also not saying that having an HSM is a bad thing.
I understand that the M1 Macs get improved security from the more iPhone-like architecture but that the system is still somewhat hackable (eg there is a possibility of running Linux). So it would appear that one can have one’s cake and eat it. I think hardware security modules are mostly orthogonal to having a hackable system and companies like apple must be persuaded somehow to leave systems openable through other means.
[1] https://ftp.gnu.org/old-gnu/Manuals/coreutils-4.5.4/html_nod...
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerabilit...
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerabili...
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine#Securi...
4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMD_Platform_Security_Processo...
Boot time security sounds kind of useful, but I don't have time or desire to audit and sign everything I run, and Microsoft doesn't either; they have historically signed all sorts of garbage that undermines the system security, and I expect that will continue.
Trusted Platform Module, or TPM, is a unique hardware-based security solution that installs a cryptographic chip on the computer's motherboard, also known as a cryptoprocessor.
This chip protects sensitive data and wards off hacking attempts generated through a computer's hardware. Each TPM holds computer-generated keys for encryption, and most PC's nowadays come with TPM chips pre-soldered onto the motherboards.
In this case I guess TPM causes telemetry?
Trusted Platform Modules can be used enforce app DRM, ensuring that only "approved" apps are able to run on a system.
That's already the reality for iPhones and iPads. We see desktops converging on this reality with systems like Apple's M1 which won't run unsigned binaries at all, and makes it difficult to nearly impossible to run apps that weren't first approved by Apple through their notarization process.
Is an open and flashable TPM something rights holders would be comfortable with? Or would they treat it like SafetyNet treats an Android phone with an unlocked bootloader?
About every time something like this is placed on a consumers product, it is to exploit the consumer some way, so, no it's just bad.
There is the very rare exception of it being a product intended for the owner to lend it to other people, and the very common exception of it being disabled by default, but being cheaper to include on every product than just the business ones. But well, Windows 11 Home edition computers are neither of those.
1. Using something not too dissimilar from blockchain/git repo hashes to attest to the the execution stack (BIOS, bootloader, kernel, userspace). 2. Providing cryptographic primitives that are only unlocked when the stack exactly matches a particular value.
It's a handy tool for avoiding spyware, as any change in the attestation chain gets immediately flagged. It is also, in principle, useful for tying DRM keys to a particular execution stack that's known to be trusted... although it's very worth noting that the TPM's threat model does not include an attacker having physical access to the hardware.
The only check the TPM does when deciding whether to allow the key in one of its registers to be used is whether the stack is in a particular configuration. The TPM doesn't (and in fact can't) directly require passwords (since it has no direct line of communication to the user). However, the BIOS, bootloader, kernel, etc... can all be configured to mix user-provided information like a password into the hash they push into the TPM.
You can in fact put passwords on most TPM internal objects. See this example https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/blob/master/man/...
That is the argument I suppose OP was making. The secure boot locking is hypothetical, but it is often feared. I get why, because it seems like something Microsoft would love to do.
It doesn't block you from running anything.
I figured the TPM was part of secure-boot validation. But given some extra thought, it is clear that verifying a signature does not require any secrets.
Yet
Note: I have no idea what TPM even is.
They were controversial because it was originally thought they would be used to lock parts of your computer away from you, being used to do DRM and the like. At the end of the day the chips were hard to use, slow, and flaky enough that it didn't really pan out. A lot of the braindamage came from a secondary feature where you could theoretically create "secure enclaves" where the entire execution chain down to the bare metal was signed to prevent viruses and rootkits from executing. In theory this is neat, but in practice it's basically impossible on PC hardware and caused a lot of problems. This functionality is the reason BitLocker had the reputation for randomly locking you out of your machine, even though it doesn't use the feature directly. The configuration registers were maybe a mistake.
("TPM is an international standard for a secure cryptoprocessor, a dedicated microcontroller designed to secure hardware through integrated cryptographic keys." - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module)
And I don't think a fully-secured future for PC's is as impossible as you think. The primary reason this is impossible right now is because TPM's aren't ubiquitous (none of my machines came with one installed). That problem will be solved by Windows 11.
Unless they're willing to allow the end user to override the wishes of the vendor (and without any diminished functionality), TPM is just another way to turn computers into appliances.
If your computation is quick you might be able to get away with this sometimes, but the potential for problems is almost unlimited. The fact that the TPM itself is pretty slow throws another monkeywrench into the plan.
In order for it to work the whole system needs to be designed from the bottom up to support it, which means you need to touch every layer of the PC stack. It's a lot of work. It is a lot easier on something like a cellphone where you can control the hardware from top to bottom and don't have to consider the case where someone installs additional hardware to suit their needs.
These things are very useful for authentication and have been on business laptops for this very reason forever.
> In support of the Windows 11 system requirements, we’ve set the bar for previewing in our Windows Insider Program to match the minimum system requirements for Windows 11, with the exception for TPM 2.0 and CPU family/model.
I want the old Windows back, couldn't Microsoft just stop making OS and support Windows 7 forever? The last Windows version that just worked, buy a license and use it, no updates every 6 months, no requirement for secure boot, TPM and stupid stuff, no apps, or whatever other stupid thin they invented.
Yes, if you do not have TPM hardware you will not be able to run Windows 11 when it is released.
> (or if I don't want to enable it for not loosing the possibility to dual boot Linux)?
TPM does not prevent you from installing or running Linux.
And newer computers are also better locked down to allow better surveillance.
So, the older ones can't break down fast enough!
You don't want a repairable computer so creeps install, like, a Linux distro. You want disposable TPM machines with Windows 11 Home Edition and unstoppable "telemetry".