"As an icebreaker, [telecommunication operators] were asked if they thought the Chinese could eavesdrop through “backdoors” in Huawei equipment. Every single hand went up. One of the bankers then asked, for balance, if they thought the US could access communications through key Cisco equipment. “All the hands went straight back up without hesitation”
WHY HE WAS EVEN ASKING ??????? What is wrong with suits ?????
Retoric of course. But wrong is that they work in managing things. Not technicaly improving/creating/replacing things. So any action is just manage, risc ma^H^H ditching.
We need to replace our managers with technology peoples.
PS. Still US is preffered option. PPS. Avoid Cisco at all costs !
Through in both cases both powers most times don't need to use any backdoors or similar as they can just influence the companies in questions directly. Like don't forget the currently ongoing law suite against a (Chinese) Zoom executive or how they repeatedly successful pressured Apple, to erode how much apple users can go against the CCP... (e.g. removing disliked censor resisting Apps and similar).
And lets be honest for most (but not all) people neither power would ever bother targeting them directly, but the side effects of targeting which isn't against them directly still has a good chance of long term degrading their live quality (IMHO).
> Huawei’s says it never acted inappropriately by abusing its position in the Netherlands.
I believe Huawei (as company) never did so, and the IMHO most likely existing Huawei employed which might do so anyway also likely didn't do so because they had no reason to (as far as I know). The think about people you install somewhere is you don't us them until you necessary. Because then they likely won't get caught.
Isn’t this basically the position that Ubiquiti took in the last few weeks?
What’s this called? Plausible deniability?
It was a "bug", something a dev forgot. Sorry for that.
I am french and have zero trust in Chinese or US equipment but since we do not have our own (at least style that makes sense) I use theirs and hope for the best.
The original Capgemini report would definitely be interesting reading, but I don't expect that to become public.
[1] https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/huawei-kon-alle...
Given the prevalence in enterprise networking equipment of undocumented admin accounts, you need to manage the risk when the vendor itself is the one getting direct manager service access.
The lack of technical layer logs is a concern, but these logs also need to be independent and generated by equipment from a different vendor - it would be easy to (for example) not log any received command packets with the TCP evil bit set. An external logging system from another vendor would detect this.
Unfortunately mobile core networks are often relatively limited in vendor diversity, so it's possible you won't have this in place.
Such audit logs are very much dependent on the integrity of the system generating them, and the vendor themselves is certainly in the best possible position to compromise that integrity.
I suppose that switching from a vendor-operated system to an independently-operated system would simplify the implementation of trusted audit logs for mitigating the remaining insider threats, though.
Ultimately, you'd need to log every packet in full if you don't trust the core vendor - a control packet could contain an undocumented field like 'cmd', whose value is executed by root...
That's the kind of threat you'd be looking to catch. That means you'd need to terminate transport layer encryption on this "firewall/log" system, so that you can see and log the content of control messages.
Ultimately, you'd need the cooperation of the vendor to actually build a system that could meaningfully understand these control/management messages, and therein lies the problem!
it can be a minimal requirement, more so if it is such a sensitive system.
Just look at what happened to J&J last week. The damage is done, no one will want it if it turns out to be safe.
That is intentional, probably a lot of money is spent by governments to create a narrative, then later they can justify different actions based on fantasies.
You can run a mobile network with minimal external access, but the economics are such that few want to - in an era of outsourcing and managed services, it's less about what can be done, and more about what is done in reality.
Managed service providers have significant levels of access into mobile networks, beyond what many are aware.
For me as a private citizen of the UK the Chinese having access seems less likely to impact me than USA having that access.
How about "no" to all of that nonsense?
I agree, but I'm not sure if we can stop it.
I think it's desirable to ask them to be transparent about it though. Knowing what's is place and how it works seems like a basic right.
This is what made me think that this is at its heart not about security at all and more about just isolating Huawei.
I assume they had some contract to spell out the legal level of access that Huawei had... the level of technical access would presumably have been exactly the same had they outsourced the maintenance to a western company, the legal protections would presumably just have more weight in that situation.
The worrying part is that the owner of the network apparently lacked audit logs of any such technical level access. That's still just as much of a problem with insider threats if the company manages the network themselves?