{ .... }
I apologize the readers for the rant but this whataboutism is so demeaning of the multitude of very inteligent people working in the field, and creates negative valued divides between the low level people and the userspace/web people with huge mutual distrust as shown in the parent and in mine.
Something similar to Wuffs[0] (posted on HN very recently), which compiles down to C, might be a good compromise between portability and safe languages. (There may be some contorted way to have Rust emit C, too.)
I wonder if an LLVM backend that issues a very simple and predictable subset of C would be a viable way to support exotic old architectures which only have a C compiler. LLVM-cbe is a thing: https://github.com/JuliaComputing/llvm-cbe
https://medium.com/swlh/build-and-use-go-packages-as-c-libra...
Naturally the runtime also comes along, but that is another matter.
I advise you to read his Turing award speech from 1981.
There was also failure in prediction, in estimation of program size and speed, of effort required, in planning the coordination and interaction of programs, in providing an early warning that things were going wrong. There were faults in our control of program changes, documentation, liaison with other departments, with our management, and with our customers. We failed in giving clear and stable definitions of the responsibilities of individual programmers and project leaders,--Oh, need I go on?
What was amazing was that a large team of highly intelligent programmers could labor so hard and so long on such an unpromising project. You know, you shouldn't trust us intelligent programmers. We can think up such good arguments for convincing ourselves and each other of the utterly absurd. Especially don't believe us when we promise to repeat an earlier success, only bigger and better next time.
And indeed "the system is to blame" in that it's hard to get drivers using safe techniques into the Linux kernel, and Linus is famously anti-security. But I think for the individual programmer, they still end up choosing one of the above 3 mental models.
So I still think it would be interesting to know how people think about security when writing parsers in C in ring 0 for Linux drivers that exposed by default in billions in devices.
It's not like NASA sent a rover, written almost fully in C, to Mars. It's not like billions of cars and even more billions of their ECUs are written in C. It's not like the firmware of the keyboard you're writing your comment on, or even the OS/browser you're using is written in C. C bad, Rust good.
Re Rover code and ECUs - this is the difference between safety critical code and security critical code at the attack surface.
The first kind deals primarily with "don't keel over or go crazy when natural phenomena throws unexpected circumstances at you", the second deals with inputs crafted by intelligent adversaries who can see your code and test & iterate attacks to exploit any flaws they uncovered through analysis or experimentation against your implementation. (Of course if we nitpick, an intelligent attacker is a natural phenomenon.)
Those have tons of exploitable bugs!!
NASA rovers and car ECUs have minimal people looking to exploit them, so I'm not overly convinced they're exploit free either.
I'm not a Rust evangelist or even a user, but the current paradigm of "THIS TIME, we'll write safe, complex, performant C/C++ code properly" isn't the solution, nor is manually squashing bugs one by one.
The solution seems to be a combination of improving the tooling around existing C\C++, and starting new projects in safer languages when possible.