Does it? From the flatpak state you have a far more clear path towards a sandboxed destination.
The only real problem is that the Gnome Software program lists these programs with a green "Sandboxed" badge when the app may have anywhere from full sandboxing, to literally no sandboxing. I am certain this is not an intentional misleading feature because Gnome Software is hardly functional and need serious work across the entire program.
I use it to find software and read reviews, but never install. I always use the terminal for that.
1. Gnome Software does not tell what the package name is for deb, flatpaks, snaps etc
2. Gnome Software does not say what type of package it is (deb, flatpak, snap etc) except when it’s multiple choice.
3. No overview of dependencies.
4. No information what is happening during install.
5. Buggy installation, common case, click on Install, nothing happens, click on Install again and get warning “hey it is already installing you fool!"
Not everyone is comfortable to use the terminal, fixing Gnome Software should be a high priority for distros.
The current mockups[1] for a UI refresh of GNOME Software have the “Sandboxed” badge and the permission details replaced by a context tile giving an overall “Safe”, “Potentially Unsafe”, or “Unsafe” rating, with additional indications and a safety dialog giving the full information. The ratings are determined from the permissions as well as license, whether the runtime is no longer supported, and whether the source is known.
[1]: https://gitlab.gnome.org/Teams/Design/software-mockups/-/raw...
The flatpak portals are trusted system components, that work outside the sandbox and can present some choosers, where the user picks what will eventually become accessible inside sandbox, if the user agrees (whether files via file choosers, microphones, cameras, desktop sharing, whatever). The sandboxed processes talks to the these portal via IPC (dbus, normally).
The thing is, that outside of standard gtk3 and qt5 apps, nothing else uses portals yet (and gtk3 with qt5 do that at framework level, so it's transparent for the apps). You cannot sandbox random electron app, for example, and expect that it will work just like it worked when it was installed via deb or rpm. And with files, it is just not single files (document apps are relatively easy), but imagine opening project file inside IDE or playlist inside media player: the project or playlist was picked by the user and can be opened by the app, but it contains references to other files, potentially hundreds of them. Can you imagine asking the user to confirm opening each and every one of the hundreds of files?
And then there were people complaining that their locally installed SDKs cannot be used from sandboxed IDEs. Sigh, that's kind of the point...
"Enhanced Sandboxing (Warning: This feature is experimental, and may cause issues for some apps.)" or something of the sort.
See also threads bellow; people complaining that the Signal client can save only into ~/Downloads.
If you learned something that is interesting or useful to you, then great.
Most people here comment on something they have exactly zero idea about how the security model works, how the transition (i.e. holes in the sandbox and the reasoning behind them) works and what is the intended end-result (portals).
Same underlying reason, except it is worse, because it is in the quadrant "they think they know, and they really don't".
No, and expecting that to work is obviously ridiculous. This type of problem needs to be solved in a way which requires no changes at all from developers, or it will almost certainly go nowhere.
The current strategy seems to be having outsiders packaging all the desktop software in to flatpak while disabling any sandboxing that gets in the way. This brings you to the same state as traditional package managers with little security, but it boosts the flatpak ecosystem and makes it ready for the average person. At that point app devs will be more aware of it and can build their apps to tolerate missing access to things and prompting for access.