Absolute game changer for reverse engineering. It was like leveling up three levels instantly.
Oh man... +ORC, +Fravia, +HCU, it really was a simpler time back then!
Now it is the norm.
RLM is a slightly more modern alternative to FlexLM which some software has moved to over the past 10 years from FlexLM.
Additionally, the potential users that can pay have much bigger legal exposure using the pirated version and just wouldn’t risk it.
[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20010424155417/http://www.woodma...
I still remember a working Starcraft CD key (though it later turned out that something on the order of 01234566789 worked).
Or home users, in which software doesn't expire, just updates and support does. More a terminology aspect in that way.
Today more things are subscription level, but mostly for content to drive that software.
Seems so quaint to think of that as a privacy concern.
We overestimate the change over the course of a year, but seriously underestimate it over a couple of decades.
The primary privacy protection for communications in 1999 was legal, not technical:
1. Police needed a warrant to listen on your communications (or, if they only wanted to know who you were calling, no warrant was needed)
2. Private wiretapping would land you in jail, and required covert access to someone's house, making it riskier to pull off
3. Analog telephone systems (already out-of-date) were entirely protected by a law that made it illegal to provide consumer-grade equipment that could be easily modified to tune to 800mhz. This is still law today, despite the frequencies being unused for analog, and is a thorn in the side of amateur radio.
This could be summed up as "we promise not to spy on you if you promise not to resist us if we change our mind".
An interesting expression of this idea happened with the whole NSA Clipper Chip debacle. Effectively, the US government wanted to move from unencrypted everything to key-escrow encryption, where private citizens would be technically prevented from wiretapping your phones, but law enforcement could still do so. It failed so hard that the US government just stopped regulating crypto export and the NSA retreated to slipping vulnerabilities in crypto standards (e.g. Dual_EC_DRBG, TLS Extended Random).
The actual legal protections I mentioned above melted away under the heat of the War on Terror. The US government adopted a classified interpretation of wiretapping law that boiled down to "if we aren't listening, we haven't spied on you". Effectively, the NSA would wiretap everything and store it securely, and then once they had legal justification to actually wiretap you, they'd open up what they had already recorded. In theory, this is just turning a wiretap order into one issued about 30 days ago. In practice, the "legal justification" part was someone filling out a form in XKeyscore and clicking a button, with no further verification in the vast majority of cases.
It was only after much of this leaked - twice, I might add - that people outside of encryption enthusiast communities actually started taking technical privacy protections seriously. Things like end-to-end encrypted messaging, Let's Encrypt, and efficient cipher implementations that actually made encrypting everything useful are things that people in 1999 could only dream of (except for the above-mentioned cypherpunks). On the other hand, all of this extra security is fundamentally reactionary. We would not be encrypting the whole web were it not for certain Nation-State Actors abandoning their already-flimsy legal protections and going for full-take.
Of course, none of that matters when you were just going to self-surveil and post everything you do to Facebook anyway. But that isn't really all that new. People have always been bad at keeping secrets, advertisers have always been spying on you (before the Internet), and there's hundreds of years of legal precedent concerning when, where, and how much privacy you lose when you open your mouth or go out in public. If there is a difference between the 90s and today, it's that today's technology makes you a lot more aware of when your privacy has been violated. Target may know when you're pregnant before your father does, but Facebook will brag about it to you.
Back in 1999, we didn't have streaming TV services to any real degree. What ads you saw on the bulk of media was not visible to the intermediaries. The internet hadn't descended into the click-addition as engagement, as we hadn't created neural networks tuned towards rewards that result in damage to real world humans. Faked photos and videos required real effort and resources to create, and print media was still a viable funding method for investigative journalism.
The base of technology is neutral -- machines that do math for us are not good or bad on their own. The goals that advertisers and their enablers so heavily fund are goals that can and should be regulated when they cause actual harm to humans. Going "viral" can be a good thing, but when it destroys lives, the platforms that make that happen should bear some level of responsibility and liability for that. That's what feels to me to be the biggest loss of today's internet. It took real dollars to run a smear campaign on someone 20-30 years ago...
Or people could just access the pole outside the house, or the cab on the street.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_tank_problem
Further, over time, many authorities have to be repeatedly reminded that User-Agents with UUID's != the user themselves, and every attempt by technologists to cram more UUID on more and more closely held technology with more and more ubiquitous and trending toward always on data streams just makes this threat harder and harder to play down.
You don't need to serialize and track everything. We need to stop doing it. This is also why the systemd machine-id was a step in the wrong direction.
What a beautiful world that was