And based the log on my hand, probing is really "mainstream" now days. I have a Shadowsocks proxy instance started since Oct 20 last year, and it's been attacked

    $ docker logs shadowsocks 2>&1| grep "AEAD: repeat salt detected" | wc -l
    16468

times total. The last 6 happened less than 10 minutes ago. My expectation is, TLS will be probed even more, because the handshake parameters (the order of CipherSuite for example) itself could leak a lots of info about the client&server.

It's not easy to build a protocol that is cryptographically safe all while keep the traffic characterless/innocent. Could be a "World Changing Event" if somebody discovered a way through.

TLS 1.3 supports (encrypted) padding bytes for Application Data; which could be used to normalize the packet lengths. Probably not accessibly via normal system TLS libraries though.

Although, if only Signal is making nice sized packets, that could be suspicous.

> Censors just use signal domains and non-signal domains to test your proxy.

If the censor already knows about your proxy they would have no reason to test it... The whole point is that there isn't a central list of proxies for them to easily block.

No but look, they're blocking connections country-wide. Apparently they have government boxes installed on the outside lines. If you're looking at IP headers and deciding to drop or pass based on that, it's trivial to collect the IPs you don't yet know, check if they're running a proxy (Signal, Tor, I2P, whatever), then add them to the block list if they are.

If it's trivial to figure out (by doing a nice handshake) whether something is a certain kind of proxy, then the cat-and-mouse game is reduced from finding lots of mice to updating the cat system to test whether passing animals are mice and instantly wiping out the mice population.

This is the very same problem that Tor faced when Tor bridge use started to pick up in China around the late 2000s / early 2010s. You only needed a single Chinese user to connect to your server for it to be probed by the Chinese censors. Older versions of the obfs Tor bridge protocol could be detected by active probes and thus blocked very much like these Signal proxies. This is a cat and mouse game that Signal could very easily lose should Iran start to care about probing all new active connections that leave Iran.

> there isn't

YET. I wonder if someone will find a simple way to map these with shodan.