Source?
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23273247 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23281564
True, but it didn't make much difference, since the reports from the thread showed it had a bizarrely short cache time.
>the server didn't keep any logs
Well, that's the rub isn't, it? Part of privacy-centric design is that you shouldn't have to risk such information being exposed or trust such reassurances; if they don't need the information, they shouldn't get it at all. There are privacy-respecting ways to do what they wanted to, which are also more efficient. For example, periodically update the machine's local revoked cert list, and check signatures against that (as several users recommended).
>etc
Was there anything substantively different from my characterization?
>To make sure the certificate hasn’t been revoked, macOS uses OCSP—short for the industry standard Online Certificate Status Protocol—to check its validity.
https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2020/11/mac-certificate-chec...
There is no information tracking the application that is sent.
The protocol is only used to check and see if the developer's certificate is still valid, if the app hasn't been run in some time.
Google is LITERALLY a fucking ad company.
Apple is tracking the exact time and location you use any piece of software on their systems (Don't worry guys, it's just for security purposes! /s)
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I'm no longer sympathetic to the "They're securing my device from the boogeyman!" argument.
It has the same overtures as "Won't anyone think of the children!!!!" in policy debates - It's rhetoric designed to obfuscate the true intentions of the parties involved, and short-circuit real discussion with an immediate emotional response.