https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus

Even without your previous experience, you are literally not the same cells that you were a few years ago. As such, to achieve the same kind of continuity of consciousness and become fully digital, I think one would have to gradually replace their brain.

I am not making any unprovable claims about a spirit/soul, though I do not completely shut out the possibility there is something we haven't measured yet. I believe that externally, there is no difference in your scenario.

I think where there might be a difference, is to the consciousness itself. The continuity of that experience being the difference. In which case, gradually replacing the brain should be a solution to the continuity problem (like the Ship of Theseus). Where I think this is conceptually weakest, is when considering how much continuity of consciousness exists while sleeping or being sedated.

What is the point of information if you can't embody it? I guess the desirability of immortality in a computer system completely relies on how faithfully the system can pretend on your behalf, that you have a body. An endless heaven without having a body to structure your sensations and grant you movement through space and time... seems lacking.

Separately: There's no point in my life where I'm ever the same person. I've continually evolved.

With human history, the resolution of records continues to expand. Fossils, artifacts, writing, photos, and Google search logs all contain personal information. The resolution of historical information shows a clear trend.

Am I immortal if only a moment of my life is preserved, or am I immortal if all points of my life can be accurately be resimulated?

I would argue there is no difference. In order to resimulate me at any point in time, my context, my surroundings, must be considered. My context exists for historic reasons. In order for my brain to be interpretable its application in real world interactions must be considered the the world can only be understood by knowing its history.

To know me you need to know my life and surroundings at all points in time. Technology is slowing increasing the resolution of human immortality, although the universe seems to have already accomplished this perfectly.

1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surface_Detail

I don't think it would be a problem if it isn't the same you or if the old you dies. Linear continuity is rooted in our biology, and this would be something entirely new that requires new ways of thinking about it.

Reconstituting memories and information would be a game changer. Imagine manipulating them! Making them more efficient encodings, removing inaccuracies, etc. (There's a lot of potential for bad here too.) Cloning memories, merging them...

If you're extremely concerned about not being the same person, maybe consciousness can expand to fill a vacuum? I'm not particularly concerned, but there might be ways of dealing with the issue.

This is all so sci-fi that it probably makes the researchers laugh and shake their heads.

It's possible that the new you would believe you are still you, even though you would be a separate new you. I think what we're really touching upon here is that it starts to go against our belief that we are exceptionally special. And of course we are -- we don't really know any better. But maybe it simply doesn't matter and it would be good enough. Think of it like going to sleep -- how do you really know, beyond theoretical doubt, that you're still "you" when you wake up?

I'm simply here to provide a perspective perhaps not often considered. More for sparking additional thinking on the subject than anything else. I too believe we're super duper special unique snowflakes ;)

In practice, people who received heart transplants are generally considered to be the same person as they had been before the transplantation, so it seems most of us have already accepted that you don't need the whole body.

"Three groups of patients could be identified: 79% stated that their personality had not changed at all postoperatively. In this group, patients showed masslve defense and denial reactions, mainly by rapidly changing the subject or making the question ridiculous. Fifteen per cent stated that their personality had indeed changed, but not because of the donor organ, but due to the life-threatening event. Six per cent (three patients) reported a distinct change of personality due to their new hearts." https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00435634

The robots need a body to orient their brain in spacetime. AIs classifying images from pure theory requires a body to relate to all the other objects in the world. Tagging a door knob as 'turnable, openable' requires the robot to have a hand that can do it. A banana only looks edible and life sustaining because we have a body. A floating head loses all interest in a lot of things, I'd guess.

The hubris of this idea is just so far off the charts I can't even call it wrong or insane. It's in the "FTL" bucket for me.

Reread the GP: "heart transplant"

In fairness, the context was uploading the brain, and whether the whole body was needed, so it was a semi-reasonable misread.

Still... there's a large distance from "I can have a heart transplant and still be considered the same person (even though 1% of my body now has different DNA)" to "I can have no body at all and still be the same person". The claim was that a body is a significant part of who we are as people, which is not a claim that a heart transplant addresses at all.

All right, let's tackle it a bit more directly than replacement: Does amputation of a limb diminish an individual's personhood? Is your answer dependent on the use of a prosthetic?

I mean, I saw this guy who had both legs amputated. He entered the Utah Summer Games in the 100 meters in the "open" class, meaning he was taking on the best in the state straight up - no "handicapped" class. He took first in the preliminaries and second in the final.

If he thinks of himself as an athlete, he still is. But if he wants to play footsie under the table with his SO... that's something he lost.

So it depends to some degree on where your sense of personhood is. But I think for all of us, we're not a brain in a vat. We interact with our external physical environment. If you lose all of that... haven't you lost something that matters to you? If you can't enjoy a steak, can't enjoy a kiss, and can't enjoy the smell of a flower (or even the sight of one), then aren't you something less than you were when you could do all those things?

Let's just agree to disagree.

Does it matter of the substrate is replaced a bit at a time or all at once? If so, why? If not, how is the “transporter problem” any different than what every person goes through all the time?