I don't think there's anything dogmatic about keeping an open mind. If you want to see dogma at work, see a reply to another comment of mine here where I'm ranted at about what is or isn't 'Scientific' and questions being 'non-scientific' simply for pointing out that the Big Bang isn't a complete model of the origin of the universe.
There are a lot of unanswered questions in this area and it's far from clear to me at least how they will be resolved, but I'm very excited to find out. I just don't think mud slinging about dogma and being non-scientific is going to help with that.
However, I must say that once P. Steinhardt gave a seminar in my department, and he debunked two famous "predictions" of the inflationary theory (flat universe, scalar index n_s slightly less than ne) showing that papers published in the 90s claimed that inflation predicted "naturally" an open universe with a scalar index larger than one [1]. He used this to stress the fact that inflation can predict almost everything. I must say he sounded very convincing, he wasn't claiming that inflation is false, only that it is far from being a well-established theory, and that other hypotheses must be considered as well.
[1] http://physics.princeton.edu/~cosmo/sciam/index.html#facts
- Infinity: There is no beginning and something always precedes the 'current' step (e.g. the Big Bang occurred out of something)
- Discontinuity: There is a beginning. Everything suddenly started out of nothing.
While both options are hard to grasp for the human mind, the second one, which is the standard Big Bang also sits very uncomfortably with Physics' concepts and is the more 'disturbing' of the two. I think that's why people have been looking for alternatives to the standard Big Bang theory.
Infinity, is still unfathomable but at least it is easier to fit Maths and Physics around.
Even adding God to the mix still leads to these 2 options, because if the Universe was created by 'God' it implies that the Big Bang is not the beginning and that something (God) pre-existed. The idea that we might be in a simulation is equivalent to a creator God, just more hi-tech.
It really seems to me that these alternatives, infinity or discontinuity, are inescapable.
It's similar in some ways to the concept of block time, in which there is no progression of time. The universe simply exists and the perception of the 'present' is an illusion. Similarly for Minsky the perception of reality or existence is an illusion.
Labeling something an "illusion" like that seems like a massive cop-out, made by a mapmaker to avoid confronting the fact that their maps don't fully represent the territory. Fossils weren't illusions, and I don't think the present or existence are illusions either.
I suppose if what you mean by "reality" is "perception", and if what you mean by "illusion" is also "perception", then what you mean by "reality" and "illusion" would be the same thing, namely, "perception", but, I don't think that's what you mean?
But even these models of an objective reality that come from quantum physics are not direct, as you had to build them in your mind through information you received through your senses, so this sense of an objective reality outside of your mind is also an illusion.
That’s not particularly relevant to a discussion about science and the Big Bang. In science we assume that multiple measurements by multiple people of the same phenomena gives us a good idea of the behavior and whether it matches our models. Our models will likely forever be incomplete but throwing our hands up in the air and trying to say “yes, but do we really know that” doesn’t seem helpful.
Arguably Maths requires this same discontinuity due to Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. Consistent axiomatic systems require a Gödel sentence that is unprovable in the system; it requires a logical tautology or else your system will contain an infinite regress.
I think of a logical tautology as a kind of "something from nothing", but I suppose that is debatable. The implication of this property of axiomatic systems on reality is also debatable, but wouldn't any system we come up with to describe reality need to abide by these same rules?
I don't see the connection between these two statements. Yes, in a consistent system with a finite description, a statement in that system which can be interpreted as "the system [description of the system] cannot prove [this statement]" cannot be proven (also, where "can be interpreted as" is taken to mean the sensible thing that it should mean) (though, sufficiently weak systems can have languages incapable of expressing such a statement) .
But the second part of that sentence, after the semicolon, appears to be talking about something else? It seems like it is describing the Münchhausen trilemma , except applied to mathematical proofs, and giving an argument that a system needs axioms (and/or rules of inference). While a system of proof does need axioms and rules of inference in order to conclude anything, this is not because of the incompleteness theorem.
The two do not seem particularly connected to me. So, I don't see why you connected the two statements with a semicolon.
Perhaps I misunderstood what you meant by the second statement in the sentence?
Also, when you say "logical tautology", are you talking about purely logical tautologies, or are you talking about axioms? The way you are using it makes it seem like you are talking about axioms, which I wouldn't call logical tautologies. But maybe you do mean what I would mean if I was to refer to "logical tautologies"? In that case, uh, I don't think logical tautologies are all that much of a foundation?
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/eternity/#DiviTime
See also:
Now, I don't mean to say that you can't define senses of talking about "most sets" or "how common are sets with a given property". I believe some people working with category theory stuff came up with a sense in which the "amount" of finite sets (up to bijection?) is Euler's constant, e. So, I don't mean that you can't come up with a sense of "most sets" in which it is true that "most sets are infinite" or even a sense in which "almost all sets are infinite".
But you would have to both describe the sense in which you mean that, and also argue for why we should consider that to apply to our intuitive notion of what is "likely" to be true of the universe in which we live, rather than some other sense.
Also, the universe having existed for a finite amount of time, doesn't really mean that the, what, set of points in time (in a given reference frame) is finite. Like, maybe time is discrete, but afaiu, we have never observed anything that strongly suggests that it is, and everything we've seen is compatible with using, and we usually do use, mathematical description of which are based on infinitely divisible time (though, there are some things about the planck time and whatnot.) . So, if time is infinitely divisible, the amount of points in time would be infinite, not finite. So, even if one successfully argued that it be "unlikely" that the set of points in time so far be finite, it doesn't seem clear that the amount of time so far shouldn't be finite, because the amount of points in time could be infinite in cardinality while being finite in measure.
Even if you wanted to argue that the cardinality of amount of points in time should be at least [any cardinality you want], I still don't think that would be a problem, because the class of Surreal Numbers have ordered subfields of arbitrarily large cardinality (as well as having arbitrarily large cardinality in any interval), and I don't think we could do anything to really distinguish between points in time being infinitely divisible and like the real numbers, vs infinitely divisible and like one of the larger subfields of the surreal numbers.
You would have to argue that it be unlikely that something like the measure of the collection of points in time so far be finite, not just something like the cardinality of the points in time.
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> When you look at the axioms in first order logic the requirement of negation is suggestive of the idea that “nothingness” (i.e. something preceding a finite set) is a logical fallacy.
I cannot get any reasonable meaning out of this. First order logic doesn't even have a concept of "finite"/"infinite" or "finite set". I'm pretty sure this is just nonsense. Having the universe of discourse be empty is a totally valid model of first order logic.
Also, I personally prefer to reserve the "fallacy" to mean "a step in an argument which is not valid", and therefore would not apply it to a concept.
Also, "something preceding a finite set" does not, in my mind, at all correspond to "nothingness", so I don't understand why you equated the two.
The question of "why is there something rather than nothing?" is still absolutely valid, but my mind's open as to whether the answer necessarily involves either an infinity or a discontinuity.
Even if you assume that space-time has always existed, an infinity scenario, (though you then have interesting questions on the nature of time if nothing exists) you still need to explain the existence of energy/matter, which will still be either an infinity or a discontinuity scenario.
Anyway, if Universe is infinite, it is infinite in all 4 dimensions. It cannot be infinite in just 1, 2, or 3 dimensions.
Off topic, but I always found it interesting that some people who otherwise reject the idea of a God latch onto that one. At some point it's all kind of religion.
God exists outside time and space (is infinite) and created the universe by calling a potential into form.
Which of course still has the issue of infinity: where did God come from? And even: what does it mean to not be limited by time and space.
According to this[1] 'eternal' is now ambiguous enough to suggest either "outside of time and space" or "persistent through all time."
On nested-simulation views I suppose it becomes necessary to clarify which clock domain(s) we are talking about, in terms of persistence or time.
I mean... with the scale of the timelines being discussed, that makes sense.
They aren't suggesting that the expansion and contraction happens within thousands of years but billions of years.
"The universe" is not an answer because information about causal events prior to a configuration space capable of recurrent relationships is inherently unrecoverable not non-existent. (Unobservable =\= causally impotent.)
This is why people are getting tired of scientism. Instead of being unbiased, some so called scientists are putting dogmas ahead of their observations and pushing for an agenda under the guise of science.
Every time cosmologists looked, the universe got bigger and suggested growth. The big bounce at no point in history ever looked right. Moreover, the big bounce kicks the bucket down the road. It ultimately has the same metaphysical issues.
I find the reasoning poor as well. "I don't like inflation" != "The universe ends in contraction". Yes, it's proven difficult to explain CMB smoothness, but this doesn't mean the big bounce is a better candidate than other non-empirical ideas.
I'm confident truth will be far stranger than big bounce fiction.