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Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by cpgxiii on Monday August 17, 2020 @03:26AM (#24184834)
So if I get this right, the attack vector here is

1) Take signed .MSI

2) Add my JAR of malware to the end of it

3) Send file to target

4) Target's computer recognizes the file as a signed MSI, ignoring the extra stuff at the end that's not part of the MSI

5) Target computer calls the JRE to launch the JAR

6) JRE ignores the MSI parts at the beginning of the file because compressed JAR files are loaded back-to-front

Obviously a major bug that signature validation ignores "extra" parts of the file, but a signature validation bug that (1) only affects specific types of files executed by a third-party runtime and (2) doesn't threaten system files (or any native executables at all) isn't an obviously critical vulnerability like an arbitrary "signature validation is totally broken" bug.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @03:33AM (#24184887)
Disagree on lack of severity; this is the kind of thing that calls into question any signed MSI I've downloaded over non-TLS HTTP or even over HTTPS served from a possibly-downgrade-attacked HTTP→HTTPS redirect.

e: or any signed MSI from a compromised system, like happened to Palemoon last year: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20435699

Endless rabbit-hole of course but that's already a lot of low-hanging fruit

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Xylakant on Monday August 17, 2020 @03:51AM (#24185000)
If I read the description correctly, it would need to be a jar file, though, not an msi. The trick allows to hide a malicious jar file from the scanner, not to hide a malicious msi. I think it’s better described by “take a malicious jar and prepend a signed msi to hide it from the scanner.”
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by a2tech on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:00AM (#24185052)
This is separate from anything an AV might do, so forget the scanner part. A virus scanner with a signature for this malicious JAR will still catch it. What this is avoiding is the prompt and extra scrutiny Windows throws up if you try and run an executable from the Internet.

Think of the legitimate MSI and malicious JAR files as separate short stories in the same book. The 'book' comes to your computer claiming to be one thing (the legitimately signed MSI) but the second chapter is something completely different (the malicious jar file). When your computer reads the book (calculates and verifies the signature) it only does it off the first chapter. That lets the second part slide under the additional scrutiny Windows applies to files downloaded from the Internet.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Xylakant on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:19AM (#24185156)
By “scanner” I meant the built-in windows defender tooling, which is - afair - affected. It trusts the signature. But you’re entirely correct - a virus scanner that does not rely on the signature w could catch the malicious code.

However, this blog post mentions that various security solutions trust the windows code signing, but it does not mention which ones - https://blog.virustotal.com/2019/01/distribution-of-maliciou...

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by pbhjpbhj on Monday August 17, 2020 @07:15AM (#24186101)
>It trusts the signature. //

Wtf? Am I reading this right, if part of the file is signed by MS then it just doesn't bother running it through the detection algo?

That looks exceedingly like a designed in security hole.

Presumably paired with the OP "bug" means MS could, with an NSA letter say, drop malware on devices if those devices were using Windows Defender for AV.

Just as well MS don't snoop on what software user's are running./s

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Xylakant on Monday August 17, 2020 @08:54AM (#24186752)
I may very well be wrong, but that’s how I read the beginning of this blog post: https://medium.com/@TalBeerySec/glueball-the-story-of-cve-20...:

“ Digitally signed files are more trusted by the Operating System. This higher trust allows such files to execute in sensitive contexts or excluded from Antivirus scans.”

It seems that msi installer packages with a trusted code signature (1) are excluded from scans by various antivirus protections. Which kind of makes sense: driver packages may contain code that would trigger heuristics a lot.

> Presumably paired with the OP "bug" means MS could, with an NSA letter say, drop malware on devices if those devices were using Windows Defender for AV.

Microsoft can already do that. To be quite honest - pretty much every institution with the right signing powers can on practically all OS. Have you verified the latest chrome installer package?

This bug seems to allow something more insidious: you could download the latest google chrome msi and append your payload jar to that msi and redistribute it. The signature remains valid. This allows bypassing the code signing checks even if you have no code signing powers.

(1) not from Microsoft, Microsoft only hands out the certificates, the signing is done by the developer

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by lawnchair_larry on Monday August 17, 2020 @11:20AM (#24188103)
This isn’t suspicious at all. All AV does it for good reasons, both efficacy and performance related.

And no, that’s not how the NSA works.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by pbhjpbhj on Monday August 17, 2020 @12:51PM (#24189014)
All AV ignores files which are concatenated to an MS-signed file? Huh, presumably you mean only on Windows, but really? No AV treats .jar files concatenated with signed MSI as suspicious -- how did that situation arise?? It's a strange heuristic.

Isn't it like having a special 'I know my bag smells like drugs to sniffer dogs but I promise I don't have drugs' channel at airport arrivals; and when people go down that channel you don't bother to check their bags.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by lawnchair_larry on Monday August 17, 2020 @07:05PM (#24193336)
Yes, kind of like that. That’s basically the point of digital signatures (when they don’t have a bug to bypass them, like in this case).

They don’t treat concatenated malicious files as safe, they trust that files signed by MS are safe. You aren’t supposed to be able to concatenate a file and still have the signature check out. That’s the bug.

If you want a good reason why, ask McAfee about the time that they incorrectly detected svchost.exe as a virus and made every customer’s windows machine around the world unbootable.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by mulmen on Monday August 17, 2020 @01:42PM (#24189651)
Don’t we have that? I don’t think TSA pre-check goes through the sniffers. Not sure what benefits that gives on arrival. I know there’s an express lane on the US/Canada border though.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by cpgxiii on Monday August 17, 2020 @03:50AM (#24184994)
I don't think that follows from what's been disclosed. What seems to be the case, based on the disclosures, is that the signature validation code does a correct job validating the parts of the file the MSI header describes, but does not check parts of the file that aren't described in the header. As far as I'm aware, adding arbitrary anything to the end of an MSI doesn't do anything since it's not described in the headers, so you can't use this to compromise an actual MSI file. You can only use this bug to fake signing for specific other file types that are read back-to-front where the actual MSI parts will be ignored.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by testplzignore on Monday August 17, 2020 @06:56AM (#24185988)
Why are MSI files designed like this? Why allow for just a specific part of the file to be signed? (I have no technical experience dealing with them.)
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Varriount on Monday August 17, 2020 @07:15AM (#24186100)
Other than a possible checksum calculated from the entire file contents, many binary formats use either:

  - Headers describing a section, including the length of a section.  

  - Prefixing each section with a size.  

  - Using a marker pattern (such as a null byte) to mark the end of a section of data.
(there are more than these three, but these are the most common) That last one isn't used very often, and when it is, it's mostly for textual data.

The consequence of using the first two techniques is that it's entirely possible to add data to the end of the format, since a parser would just read the last section and stop (assuming the format supports knowing what the last section is).

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by banthar on Monday August 17, 2020 @07:10AM (#24186074)
Extra bytes at end of file will be ignored by most formats. You generally don't want to depend on file length.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @07:31AM (#24186193)
If you hashed the entire file you wouldn't be able to append that hash to the file for distribution because it would change the hash of the file. That's why FOSS software signatures are usually MD5/SHAwhatever in a separate text file.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by wwright on Monday August 17, 2020 @12:18PM (#24188655)
The format could still be "hash of everything else + everything else"
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by hnick on Monday August 17, 2020 @09:03PM (#24194219)
You can, if the consuming system is format-aware. I think MSI can fall into that category.

I developed something like this to put an md5 hash in a comment in the first line of a code module at a place I worked. It simply read the file, removed that line, and hashed the rest of the file data to generate the hash for comparison.

This was just to stop programmers changing the code without submitting it to a secondary system for validation/tracking (easy to work around, but that shows intent to bypass policies when we see it in the repo).

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Xylakant on Monday August 17, 2020 @03:02PM (#24190608)
RPMs contain the signatures in the archive. DEB packages don’t, something I consider a major shortcoming in the Debian package format.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:00AM (#24185042)
Well I guess the actual payloads would all be fairly individualized, so that makes sense.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by proactivesvcs on Monday August 17, 2020 @06:46AM (#24185932)
And since Microsoft still serve updates from the Microsoft Update Catalog over HTTP, let's not mistakenly think that all downloads are protected via TLS, even today.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by gruez on Monday August 17, 2020 @08:54AM (#24186748)
Is this still the case for windows 10?
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by proactivesvcs on Monday August 17, 2020 @03:56PM (#24191272)
The Update Catalog is only for manual downloads, so if you mean Windows Update, this is all downloaded over HTTPS.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by smileybarry on Monday August 17, 2020 @10:39AM (#24187706)
Yes, but all updates are a specialized .MSU format and don't fall in this end-of-file parsing trap.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by pbhjpbhj on Monday August 17, 2020 @07:19AM (#24186129)
Or any signed MSI if downloaded from a country where security services can secretly oblige companies to act against their users - China, USA, and probably many others.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by skocznymroczny on Monday August 17, 2020 @08:08AM (#24186432)
Is there any technologically advanced country where that is not the case?
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by JamesBarney on Monday August 17, 2020 @05:58AM (#24185677)
Just to elaborate since there is some confusion about when the name would occur.

1) Take MicrosoftSigned.Msi

2) Append Malway.jar to it

3) Take file and rename it as RunMe.Jar

# Now you have a jar file that appears to be signed by Microsoft but contains malways.

4. Give target RunMe.jar and ask then to dbl-click it.

# Usually this file would prompt the user with a "You shouldn't trust this arbitrary file from the internet" prompt, but it doesn't because Windows thinks this file is correctly signed

5. Target is now infected

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @06:17AM (#24185783)
> 4. Give target RunMe.jar and ask then to dbl-click it.

Or, even better, simultaneously put a silent drive-by browser zero-day in a website they visit regularly, like https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/a-very-deep-d...

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by staticassertion on Monday August 17, 2020 @11:14AM (#24188043)
If you can execute code on the host I don't think this attack is necessary, unless maybe you disable execution entirely for unsigned programs.

The attacker can drop/ exec files as they please, regardless of whether they're signed.

Anyone can feel free to correct me.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by rootsudo on Monday August 17, 2020 @06:06AM (#24185715)
That's interesting, so you literally have to add the jar file to the EOF for the MSI?

I know this can be done w/ Cat.

--Wow, so JAR files are read from bottom top so it literally masquerades.

That's interesting.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by barrkel on Monday August 17, 2020 @07:02AM (#24186028)
Zip files have the index at the end of the file so that new files can be added to the archive without rewriting the whole thing.

Zips can also be read from front to back, reading the header of each entry and skipping the compressed data to the next header, which is most of what zip repair utilities do (or did, not sure anyone repairs zips any more). But it's faster to read the index.

And to be clear, jars are zip files.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by anonymfus on Monday August 17, 2020 @09:55AM (#24187223)
Not every zip-based format behaves like this, Microsoft's zip based container formats tend to require a proper beginning too. For example if you add docx (which is a zip file) to the end of something else and open it in Microsoft Word, it will complain that the file is corrupted, and will suggest to repair it.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by chupasaurus on Monday August 17, 2020 @06:45AM (#24185930)
There's an old similar technic - concatenate JPEG with RAR, JPEG header only describes image part, for archive files they're opened from their correspondent header.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by sukilot on Monday August 17, 2020 @09:18AM (#24186919)
Does Windows claim to verify signatures JRE data files, or only native executables?
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by hoistbypetard on Monday August 17, 2020 @01:02PM (#24189150)
Windows marks the JAR file as verified in the properties just because there's a verified msi structure at the front of it. I count that as a claim to have verified the file. Because that's what windows displayed.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by mqus on Monday August 17, 2020 @10:58AM (#24187919)
Well if they don't claim it, then they shouldn't try to verify and let it mark as "verified" anyways.

If they do claim it then they should properly verify signatures

Either way is wrong.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by donmcronald on Tuesday August 18, 2020 @11:57PM (#24207015)
So does the .msi contain a file length that gets blindly trusted? Or maybe that's part of the signature itself?

That's crazy the signature check wouldn't verify the file length.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by a2tech on Monday August 17, 2020 @03:54AM (#24185012)
The tricky bit I imagine is the gap between step 4 and step 5 in your attack scenario. To get this to trigger you need to get the JRE to invoke on the MSI file. The JRE isn't typically associated with MSIs so you would need a secondary step to trigger the JRE to look at that file and load the malicious JAR tacked on to the end of the MSI.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by phire on Monday August 17, 2020 @05:50AM (#24185641)
No, because the attacker renames the file to .jar before sending it to the target.

Windows still sees it as a MSI file while doing signature checking. But because it has a .jar extension, the JRE runs it when you double click.

Signature verification is done as a independent check, completely separate from execution. Because windows needs to know the signature is valid before even allowing the file to be executed. It also needs to show the signature check in the right-click -> properties dialog.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @06:36AM (#24185888)
You shouldn't assume the rename process or payload execution have to be manually triggered. That's what browser exploits are for :)
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by burtonator on Monday August 17, 2020 @11:51AM (#24188362)
I've been thinking about the ability for neural networks to determine flaws like this. If we could describe what a 'goal' would be (executing arbitrary binary data for example) and then some of these design aspects it might be possible to determine flaws automatically. This is only 6 steps... I imagine an AI could find more.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Kattywumpus on Monday August 17, 2020 @12:11PM (#24188594)
I imagine others are thinking about this, too. I feel as if we are headed towards either an era of radically secured code where serious vulnerabilities become rare as hen's teeth, or... the discovery that we exist in an environment of radically vulnerable code that cannot be secured at all. A world where AI script kiddies can take down civilization.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by creato on Monday August 17, 2020 @03:52AM (#24185006)
Does (5) happen automatically when running the file as an MSI file? If not, this doesn't seem that severe. If so, it's pretty severe.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by cpgxiii on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:09AM (#24185092)
I don't see any way it would be possible for such a file to be simultaneously executed by the system as a MSI and as a JAR (you can probably always invoke the JRE on a .msi file, just not through the system file associations).
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:14AM (#24185124)
It's renamed, not simultaneously-associated. From the fine article:

'Quintero said this weakness would particularly acute if an attacker were to use it to hide a malicious Java file (.jar). And, he said, this exact attack vector was indeed detected in a malware sample sent to VirusTotal.

“In short, an attacker can append a malicious JAR to a MSI file signed by a trusted software developer (like Microsoft Corporation, Google Inc. or any other well-known developer), and the resulting file can be renamed with the .jar extension and will have a valid signature according Microsoft Windows,” Quintero wrote.'

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by cpgxiii on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:27AM (#24185201)
Exactly, you can't have it be an MSI and a JAR, it has to be a JAR to invoke the JRE automatically.

In terms of practical impact, it sounds like you need a target where the JAR file will be run, but also where you'd expect Windows signatures validation alone to protect against malicious Jars.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by berdario on Monday August 17, 2020 @05:38AM (#24185582)
Just name your payload something like

"foo\u200fism.jar" (\u is the Python escape for arbitrary unicode codepoints)

And Windows will (as of a couple years ago, at least) render it as "fooraj.msi"

(Though I'm not sure what kind of verification prompt you'd get in this circumstance)

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by ChrisSD on Monday August 17, 2020 @09:33AM (#24187045)
Microsoft fixed that a few versions back. It will be displayed as "foo‏ism.jar" in explorer.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:33AM (#24185240)
Prepending "ren malicious.msi malicious.jar" to my exploit invocation doesn't seem that hard.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by cpgxiii on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:58AM (#24185371)
Sure, but if you already have code execution on the target to run the rename or directly invoke the JRE, either (1) you've already exploited the target or (2) lack of signature validation (since the rename script or equivalent to invoke it wouldn't be signed) wouldn't have been a barrier to running the malicious JAR.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @05:47AM (#24185626)
No way, exactly the opposite. Attacks are often described as "chains" because it usually requires simultaneous application of multiple exploits to achieve an attack's goal.

Here are a bunch of great real-life examples from the Playstation 4 hacking scene: https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Working_Exploits

Or iOS exploit chains, some of which I've used intentionally as part of iOS jailbreak tools like unc0ver. From Project Zero's "very deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild": "Earlier this year Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) discovered a small collection of hacked websites. The hacked sites were being used in indiscriminate watering hole attacks against their visitors, using iPhone 0-day." https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/a-very-deep-d...

I imagine the real-world application of this MSI thing is something like:

1) Get silently-malicious MSI on to target machine (via download server compromise, poisoned non-TLS download, redirect TLS-downgrade, etc etc)

2) Got malicious "trigger" exploit code on to any web page used by the target (via web server compromise, weak human security like admin passwords, etc etc).

3) There is no step three.

With this in mind we can look at even very recent real-world news—like the simultaneous patching of five Chrome exploits in June 2020—and instantly see how it's not just hypothetical: https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities...

For example, one of them (CVE-2020-6493) is "Use after free in WebAuthentication in Google Chrome prior to 83.0.4103.97 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page". How many more of these do you think are hanging around out there, waiting for Google to get the 'okay' to fix?

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by cpgxiii on Monday August 17, 2020 @06:07AM (#24185721)
I'm familiar with the concept of chaining multiple exploits to default different layers of security. That said, for step (2) to work, you need either:

a) A separate vulnerability that provides arbitrary code execution to run your trigger exploit

or

b) A vulnerability that allows you to execute a specific program/command on the target system

If you've got either of those, the ability to run a pre-existing JAR doesn't really increase your capabilities. You've already got at least user-level access. Having a way to distribute a malicious JAR in advance might be useful in some cases, but having a file sitting on disk in advance significantly increases the risk of having your exploit detected before you get to use it.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @06:34AM (#24185878)
I'm glad we're understanding each other, but I completely disagree with the conclusion you reach in your last paragraph. Networks are iffy. People already expect their signed MSI installer to be multiple megabytes of binary garbage and probably wouldn't notice it being a megabyte of two larger than normal, so that sounds like one of the best possible places for a payload to hang out and wait to be triggered. No competent attacker would make their payload-delivery and their command-and-control the same thing.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by cpgxiii on Monday August 17, 2020 @06:58AM (#24186005)
Hiding your malware in some other file is a good idea, although sticking it in an executable file format is only going to invite more attention and relies on your target only using security tools that assume Windows signed == safe.

It strikes me that the primary use for this would be attacking a target that (1) has some level of system lockdown/scanning such that signing is required, (2) has Java installed on computers and uses it (not just a program that bundles in its own JRE), (3) has scanners vulnerable to the signature validation bug that assume signature OK == safe, (4) has some sort of network scanning IPS/IDS such that the "run malware" trigger needs to be small to avoid detection.

If (1) isn't the case, then there are probably easier ways to sneak your malware into position. If (2) isn't the case, your malware can't run. If (3) isn't the case, your attack risks getting detected in advance and burning any chance of using it. If (4) isn't the case, you'd probably be better off delivering the full malware via the browser sandbox escape/whatever network exploit you're using to avoid needing 1-3 in place first.

I would venture the guess that this has been used for (1) opportunistic malware intended for wide distribution with a low probability of any given target being compromised due to requiring the user to run the malicious JAR and (2) very targeted attacks on specific institutions that meet the 1-4 criteria.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @07:28AM (#24186177)
I think you're making a lot of assumptions and pigeonholing the applicability of this based on things we have only passing knowledge of, like "there is a JAR of some sort". I wonder what kind of fun HotSpot exploits might be in the JAR a real attacker would use. Hopefully Oracle will get permission to fix them some day if there are :)
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by cpgxiii on Monday August 17, 2020 @07:47AM (#24186291)
I don't think it's too many assumptions. The number of personal Windows users with Java itself installed (rather than programs with their own bundled JRE) is probably very low at this point, so it means targets for this are either "download eXtra_special_cod3cs_for_pr0n.exe" users, or institutions that match this specific profile.

I would actually expect a number of interesting institutions to match that profile - places likely to keep systems updated (or at least updated AV), so not guaranteed to be vulnerable to last month's patched bugs, who have some level of system lockdown and scanning such that hiding in plain sight behind file signature verification is necessary, who have some type of IDS/IPS such that the separate trigger needs to be kept to a minimum, and who rely on a set rather poorly packaged Java software. I'm sure the list of targets matching those criteria includes a number of financial institutions and infrastructure operators - targets that need to pay more that trivial lip-service to security, but where security is a "we've checked all the boxes so we're good" mindset.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by cesarb on Monday August 17, 2020 @11:32AM (#24188200)
> The number of personal Windows users with Java itself installed (rather than programs with their own bundled JRE) is probably very low at this point

This can depend on your country. Here in Brazil, the income tax preparation software (http://receita.economia.gov.br/interface/cidadao/irpf/2020/d...) is written in Java, and the install instructions in that page tell you to update Java, so it's probably not bundled. Since everyone with income above a certain amount (and several other situations) has to use that software to fill the tax report (the option to use the paper form has been discontinued many years ago), I'd guess a high number of personal Windows users in this country have Java installed.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by dboreham on Monday August 17, 2020 @09:01AM (#24186795)
Depends if the attack is targeted to specific users: sysadmins for example will often have jre installed to run clunky old kvm clients.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by cpgxiii on Monday August 17, 2020 @09:13AM (#24186885)
Even better, those users are probably suffering from alert fatigue already due to all the security warnings about the ancient kvm software, so using a technique like this to bypass AV scans would probably be enough to compromise some major systems.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by what-the-grump on Monday August 17, 2020 @08:19AM (#24186481)
You see the problem right?

You can damage most software vendors with just #1.

Then #2 is even worse.

#3 you already own them because #1,#2 let you download a poisoned msi to the machine. You can get cleaver and dynamically change the hash per download as described year ago when signature based AV was all we had, you dont need this trick.

Or... you could just drop powershell, python and execute it and own the machine without trying so hard with just #1 and #2.

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by creato on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:49AM (#24185334)
The issue is it would seem the file needs to be an MSI file to get signature validation, but need to be a .jar file to run the malicious part. Transparently going from "File passes signature verification" to "running the jar payload" seems like it would require another (more serious than this) bug or active steps from the user.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @06:13AM (#24185763)
> seems like it would require another (more serious than this) bug

Yes on your first part; no on the parenthetical. One exploit to let the malicious hanger-on into your computer. Another exploit—maybe in a web page you visit regularly—to trigger it. Compare to this real-world iOS attack: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/a-very-deep-d...

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Ardren on Monday August 17, 2020 @05:17AM (#24185457)
Yeah, it's simple if you've already exploited the target's computer...
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @05:53AM (#24185653)
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:12AM (#24185101)
For the audience: How many exploit demonstrations have you seen that launch `C:\Windows\calc.exe` or something to show you that you just got exploited? Now imagine the same exploit runs a program that does not announce its presence.

Here are twenty-three of them to get you started: https://github.com/arntsonl/calc_security_poc

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by melvinroest on Monday August 17, 2020 @03:40AM (#24184930)
This vulnerability reminds me of PlayerTwo on hackthebox.eu!

One of the top ranking hackthebox players summarized PlayerTwo quite neatly [1].

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u_GkIzCmU90 (13 min.)

Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by tus88 on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:09AM (#24185094)
Why does (5) occur.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by cpgxiii on Monday August 17, 2020 @04:14AM (#24185118)
Because you told the target "if you have trouble running it, right click and open it with Java" and you assume they'll do it? Not clear how you could automate without using a different vulnerability to invoke the JRE on the file.
Re:Microsoft Put Off Fixing Zero Day for 2 Years by Lammy on Monday August 17, 2020 @05:58AM (#24185675)
> without using a different vulnerability to invoke the JRE on the file

Funnily enough this is exactly how real attacks tend to work https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/a-very-deep-d...