From my end, there are a lot of trivial things I have to go through where it's low effort on the researcher end (And I've even had automated searches where the researcher has sent mails to us assuming we'd have the same issue because of some similar HTTP Header or something similar). Thankfully I've gotten faster at keeping these out but it still takes up more time than needed.
From the researcher end, I assume it's frustrating where they put in the effort to craft a well documented mail and I have to inform them that it's a duplicate or known issue that we are currently working on a fix for. It's a hard call and I'll often have to use a judgement call on these. But it's made harder still when I'll suddenly see an issue that has existed for a long time be reported by a single researcher. And then in a matter of two days 3 to 4 other researchers will pop up with the exact same issue leading me to believe that either there's different accounts under the same name, or some kind of researcher group that works together in sharing findings (And maybe bounty).
Basically, I'm not sure how much this is a HackerOne issue vs a general bounty program pain ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
You also have to be aware of policy changes. I've noticed companies remove language that told how much they'd pay out. Some companies have a mandatory pay out of 7-14 days but they are rare; with everyone else, you just have to hope they pay you, and they do, I guess... whenever they feel like it.
Yes. I would say 2/3 of my reports were resolved this way. Sadly I can't fault either HackerOne of the company -- I don't see a viable alternative.
As for the problem of spammy submissions: charge a small nominal fee of $10 or so to submit, with a full refund if it’s a legit issue (even if it’s a duplicate).
Maybe that's a little farfetched, though.
Not a perfect fix, but I think it helps.
One potential issue: someone on the Mozilla team could pass some of these on to a few friends who then claim some of the money.
It's not a major likelihood, unless the bounties are numerous or especially large.
So long as there is a big of lag before confirmation (which, in practice, there already is), the vendor would know about the issue at least several days in advance of the black-hat even getting a hint and could hopefully patch it in that time.
For especially big holes, just take a bit longer than usual to get back to people until it's fixed.
Another scenario is someone does what you suggest after finding a real vulnerability, to waste the teams time while they exploit the real vulnerability.
The problem is that you can just tell all your friends to file the same bug, and now they have to pay everyone?
The "fair" thing here is probably to split the bounty among the discoverers, but that's not going to happen either.
The core issue is not the reward division algorithm, it's the inherent lack of visibility. One solution here would be to just open all reports after a while, but this creates problems of its own. One is that it gives ammo to people engaging in dishonest or clueless PR. Another is that some researchers don't actually want visibility, because their employers have murky rules around such engagements, or because they have some far-off disclosure timeline in mind (as a part of a presentation at a conference, or whatnot).
Or a mechanism for companies that use email to register the researchers submissions in HackerOne. The details will be sealed and non-public, with researchers having no way to know it exists unless the company provides a link to it as proof of work. HackerOne thus acts as a kind of notary against accusations from researchers that it wasn’t really a duplicate.
Probably also need stiff penalties for insiders who might conspire to notify others of bugs and split the pay out.
As far as not doing it. At some point critical industries may be have to be regulated to force them to behave responsibly.
And some payouts are 10k, I’ve never even heard of $50 minimums, I thought it’s either $100 or swag.
Out of curiosity, why shouldn't they? Is it because they then end up with a lot of garbage/spam submissions to sort through from people hoping to trick the company into paying out a bounty?
They simply don't take no for an answer.
They closed one of my reports for being a "denial of service" attack when it was a crash caused by malformed input. I've also heard of others having the same issue.
Sounds like you have a crash that you think might be exploitable- in that case, consider saying "memory corruption triggered by malformed input" to make it more clear that the crash isn't the point.
sounds these "hackers" have an incentive to be stubborn over non issues
The companies that consistently publish their bugs have a good track record of giving appropriate bounties. I don't see a clear incentive for a company that doesn't allow their bugs to be published, to be anything other than stingy. Computer security is a cost center for a business, and the folks managing the bug bounty program have a clear incentive to minimize their costs, while maximizing the bugs found.
I think a potential solution would be increased bug disclosure on platforms like Hackerone. Currently, a company has to agree to disclose the details, and most never do. Openness allows hackers to vote with their feet, and spend more time on the companies that are easier to work with, both in bounties rewarded, and easiness of the reporting process.
Whatever the scale is, companies have no incentive to avoid paying them, because even at the high end of the scale the amounts are immaterial. Remember, we're talking about H1 bounties here, not the Apple and Google platform bounties, which are totally different animals.
The real risk companies that run bounties face is that their programs won't generate any real bugs at all, but will absorb costs from both the platform and all the nonsense bugs they have to triage. New serious bounties are good news, not bad news, for most bounty programs.
(I've managed several, continuing until recently; before I did, I went around talking to people who ran them to get the lay of the land. I'm pretty confident in my answers here.)
The issues I've personally experienced have been with impact, for bugs outside of the very traditional XSS/SQLI/RCE. I've gotten things along the lines of "yes, our _______ is seriously broken, but it's not/barely a security issue," with an explanation that stretches plausibility. Maybe I'm full of crap, maybe they are.
I'm sure those running bounty programs would have all sorts of folks contesting things that aren't actually real bugs. I think the only real good solution is increased visibility on all sides. That way each of our technical arguments can stand on their merits, whoever is full of crap can get called on it, and others looking for bugs can choose where to invest their time (glossing over that solution missing a bunch of thorny implementation details, I'm sure).
I've heard rumors of people selling exploits for this company on the black market for more money now.
cool, posting my PoC on pastebin then
(Tangent) Can anyone recommend a coherent interpretation of that statement?
I know what it means for an individual person to be proud. And I could see an argument for extending that notion to a group of persons if every person in the organization was proud.
But I assume HackerOne has had employees / members come and go over time. And I also assume that some of the past or current members don't share that feeling of pride for this particular milestone.
So the only interpretation I can think of is that the person writing the PR was being sleazily vague. I.e., trying to get the audience to take a sentiment that's only meaningfully applied to individual humans / animals, and getting them to unwittingly apply it to a brand name instead.
Is there a better explanation that eludes me?
Not by HackerOne per se but the companies using the platform.
A better title would be “$100M in bounties paid to ethical hackers by companies via HackerOne”.
To be fair, the original message on Twitter reads much better than the title of the article:
> HackerOne is proud to announce that hackers have earned $100 Million in bug bounties by hacking for good on our platform.
I was on both sides of this: leading the security team at a company paying bug bounties via HackerOne and also reporting security problems to other companies as a freelancer. To be honest, the experience was always bad in both cases. I wasted several hours triaging bugs reported by “hackers” that often disregarded the conditions of our bug bounty program. People reporting the most trivial things and we would have to pay them anyway just to move on, otherwise they would end up ranting for days.
On the other side, as a bug bounty hunter, the experience is also awful. One of the biggest problems is the fact that you have no way to know if other person has reported the same issue, so you spend hours if not days documenting a vulnerability and creating proof of concepts (PoC) and it is only after your submission that you get a message saying “closed: duplicate issue”. Add to that all the back-and-forth trying to justify more complex issues that are slightly more difficult to prove without damaging the system you are testing.
I am glad so many companies and people are still onboard with this service, but I wouldn’t blame anyone for closing their account after all the bad experiences I had.