Materialism can't explain everything, but there is yet to be any proof that magic explains anything. Lacking that, assuming a physical basis as the explanation is prudent.
> To conclude that it happened randomly seems as naive as to conclude it happened purposefully.
I strongly disagree. You aren't saying that both outcomes are possible (I'd agree with that), but they are equally likely, a much, much stronger claim. The sun might go on shining tomorrow, or it might collapse due to some unforeseen physical process. Both have non-zero probabilities, but it is the person who claims they are equally likely who is the naive one.
As for not defined so let's interpret "miracle" to mean highly unlikely events, they happen millions of times day, and we rarely notice. The bill I received in tender has the serial number MF53610716D. What are the odds of that? If you limit "miracle" to be highly unlikely events that most people would also notice, it would be strange if they weren't happening all the time. Every person who wins a lottery (and there are thousands every day), the person who is told by their doctor their cancer is terminal but then it goes into remission has a "miracle", the guy who loses his job and is about to be evicted then gets a job callback for an application he sent in months ago and forgot about experiences a "miracle."
Now, if I put music on and rub her back a bit... Well, ha! There's the magic, my good sir.
Imagine walking into a film studio with the idea of film production based exclusively on the principles of physics. No. Magic and physics are no more opposed than biology and physics. When hidden (psychological?) forces clearly underlie economically valuable phenomena (architecture, music, media, etc) respecting the magic is closer to the truth than reducing it to physics. Physics just isn't the right explanatory level.
If you'd like to learn more about definitions of magic that aren't "phenomena that don't actually exist", I recommend Penelope Gouk's work on music, science and natural magic in the 17th century. It's about the magic involved at the formation of the Royal Society.
Your answer is rather flip.
Also, if you want to redefine "magic" to be nice things that are physically based but can't be summarized in a neat equation, then I also have no desire to argue. It is clear that the person I was responding to meant "magic" in a different way that you seem to be using it.
When you talk about the magic of forgetting about the laundry, you mean the first kind of magic. When others talk about consiousness being inaccessible to AI, they're talking about the second kind of magic. I don't think it's that hard to imagine an AI that would forget to fold the laundry and not know why. The main problem with a "concious AI", I suspect, is that nobody will actually want one.
[1] I have no idea if viruses or prions are supposed to have vital force, vital theory emerged before most of modern biology and is mostly used today by those who have no understanding of modern biology.
Why do you think that? Can't accept "fake humanness"? or maybe ego(superior) or not relatable
The one thing I wonder if they were truly sentient why would they care/try to serve you
Sure. There's also the magic of feeding my cat, so he stops nagging me, and sits on my lap purring. And just about everyone would agree that's similar, no?
But what about the magic of running "sudo apt update" before "sudo apt install foo"? That's also arguably similar, albeit many orders of magnitude simpler.
On the subject, you are making a good point comparing social behavior with mental activity. Just like there is no “magic” in the way people interact with each other, there is no magic in how neurons do the same.
Except I am arguing that there is most definitely magic in human interaction.
You nailed it. People think that accepting consciousness is hard is giving into religion.
It need not be that way.
FWIW, his wikipedia entry says,
> He also presents an argument against qualia; he argues that the concept is so confused that it cannot be put to any use or understood in any non-contradictory way, and therefore does not constitute a valid refutation of physicalism. His strategy mirrors his teacher Ryle's approach of redefining first person phenomena in third person terms, and denying the coherence of the concepts which this approach struggles with.
that's specifically what I don't like. In re: the "hard problem" he wants to declare victory without a fight, or a prize.
Anyway, trying to understand consciousness by applying physics is just as silly as trying to understand why your complex fluid dynamics simulation is giving an incorrect result by peering at the CPU's transistors with an electron microscope: it's the wrong level of abstraction.
One thing that seems to be making our task a lot more difficult is that evolution doesn't even try to design the biology of systems with clean abstraction boundaries that we can understand. There are so many strange things going on in our bodies that we can barely describe them, never mind understand them. One example is what happens when a person consumes Ayahuasca [1].
I think Chalmers helped clear the air a bit here, though I don't think jumping straight to panpsychism is particularly helpful to the discourse, either.
One of my more vivid memories is excitedly opening my copy of Jayne's "The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" and being dismayed as it slowly dawned on me that Jayne's entire book was based on this category error.
For the life of me I can't understand why people don't understand this distinction (or choose to ignore it).
I can only assume that people ignore the very obvious "magical thing" that is happening in their own heads due to ideological commitments to physicalism or something.