I agree that none of these reports could be considered "critical." I also agree that the tone is a bit unprofessional. I'd add that I generally find these publicity pushes using fairly bland findings to be distasteful. All that being said, I'd like to clarify a bit based on my read of #1.

> #1 "In order to bypass PayPal’s 2FA, our researcher used the PayPal mobile app and a MITM proxy, like Charles proxy."

> So you need to be MITM'd and have a malicious cert installed? Yeah... not "critical" and out-of-scope for most places.

In generally, using a proxy to perform a 2FA bypass wouldn't decrease the risk. In this case, the attacker already has compromised credentials, and they are trying to bypass the secondary control. As they are the one authenticating, the need for MiTM isn't a huge deal.

That being said, another point that was made is that the "2FA" they are bypassing isn't actually Paypal's 2FA. Instead, it is a secondary, risk-based validation. A bit of a semantic difference, but important to note that if a user was leveraging 2FA this bypass wouldn't actually get an attack who had compromised credentials access.

> So you need to be MITM'd and have a malicious cert installed?

No. The attacker is the man in the middle to himself, because why are you trusting the client.

> A "security" flaw that requires stolen creds and brute forcing isn't going to get much traction anywhere.

The feature is meant to stop people from using stolen creds.

It does not work.

Given that stolen creds exist, that sounds like a security flaw to me.

As far as I can tell, "it's impossible to use stolen credentials" is not part of Paypal's security model or a promise that Paypal has actually made. It's important to distinguish flaws in a company's security model from additional security controls we think they ought to add.

But why does that system exist at all, if it's not supposed to do something?

It's not "impossible to use stolen credentials", it's "you have to clear this barrier to use stolen credentials". If that barrier is broken, that sounds like a flaw in the security model.

It's analogous to the systems that make your password show up as dots when you type it in. The security model isn't affected at all - dedicated attackers can "break the barrier" by just looking at your keyboard instead - but it significantly mitigates harm by making certain low-effort attacks harder to perform.

A not-for-sure harm mitigation as part of defense in depth is a great thing to put in a security model.

But with the flaw here, the effectiveness drops to zero. The "making certain attacks harder to perform" is basically gone in the scenario where someone is buying a bunch of credentials. That's not good!

Although I rejected many similar MITM reports myself, in this case I think this is valid threat. It's not some random comments or forum site where there's almost no value for attackers, we're talking on pseudo-banking system, where users have usually at even few credit cards hooked and/or some account balance, and indeed there are many places you can buy leaked/stolen stolen credentials. Ability to bypass automatic 2FA by hackers is little alarming for service where users may lost $1000+. This simply should be fixed and some bounty should be paid for it (of course probably not maximum bounty, but still).

#5 and #6 are indeed exaggerated, especially that even if hacker has stolen credentials, and bypassed automatic 2FA, security question won't be displayed on same page users use to confirm payment (to replace e-mail address), or keylog credit card information.