That's why pageandrew said "pilot unions" and not just "pilots". I doubt that SW, for example, is ready to try to break a strike by pilots in order to force the 737 Max back into service.
Which leaves us with pageandrew's comment: "If pilots and pilot unions are satisfied with the results, I'm satisfied with the results."
By that argument, no union could ever do anything in opposition to a company. That is, I think your argument is utterly flawed.
Their business model depends on the business of their member's beings successful. This doesn't mean they cannot oppose company actions, it means though they want the planes in the skies and not on the ground.
That is, your logic still doesn't hold.
I think the problem is that they trust a system that got corrupted or never was that robust in the first place.
Seeing how this thing unfolded, I don't really believe that people making claims are in good authority to make those claims.
If I've got a wicked sharp pairing knife and I cut my finger while peeling something with it then I'll be more careful, but chances are that as the pain fades I'll relax - maybe I'll always be careful with that particular knife but when I get a new pairing knife the memory will be detached.
Boeing needs more than the vague memory of bad PR and low profits for a quarter or two to learn this was unacceptable - and the American legal system is unable to apply a lesson, while the general business culture refuses to learn the lesson.
That they should in no way proves that they do. Computer programmers build all sorts of foot-guns with the idea that they'll be clever enough to avoid them in the future. I expect pilots are a little more humble and self-aware than that, but they're still human.
A single sensor failing and causing unlimited automatic shifts in pitch is a nightmare I will not fly on.
The new software now only does a single stabilizer movement. They have eliminated all known failure conditions which might cause multiple movements.
With only a single movement, the pilots will be able to counteract the force.
Two sensors is not quite as good as three sensors. It can't know which sensor is bad. But it can disable itself and prevent unintended activations.
The new software, when combined with adequate pilot simulator training to both disable MCAS when it encounters an issue, and to fly the plane in with MCAS disabled makes things safe enough.
But how does this fix the problem that MCAS was supposed to be a band-aid over (That the plane is aerodynamically unstable during take-off, and pulling too much on the stick will cause the plane to easily stall)..?
The new MCAS sounds like it will only protect against this instability once - and, if overriden, will not do anything to protect against a stall?
MCAS is not even enabled during take-off, which makes it hard to see how it could be meant to address supposed stability problems during take-off. It can't come on until the flaps are retracted.
It's not that the MAX stalls super easily, It's not an instability. It's just that the controls feel wrong when approaching stall. The FAA have pretty precise regulations about how much backpressure the pilots should feel when approaching stall.
In normal flight, the plane is never anywhere near stalling, so MCAS never activates. Nor do the pilots encounter this weird stall.
The combined chances of both MCAS being disabled AND the pilot not recognizing the stall is pretty low.
But this is why the simulator training is important, so the pilots are familiar with the new feel as the plane approaches stall.
IMO the risk of a mistaken activation that leads to an accident is extremely remote with these changes.
The whole reason the MAX exists is because of Southwest. If southwest didn't throw their weight around and loudly announce they were considering Airbus, the MAX would likely exist in a non-737 configuration right now.
So wait, it's a customer's fault that the supplier cheated the regulations?
HN folks here seem hesitant to say this.
But without the dumb ability to do repeated activations it would've been a much less severe problem.
The error was in the specification.
So in this situation, the claim is that braindead contractors mechanically implemented something to spec by force of law? Sure, then whoever designed the logic is accountable.
In 99.9% other environments, the distinction is collapsed because the implementor typically has responsibility to design sub-component level logic correctly, to high-level requirements, but also to overall business need and in service to even higher level project goals, and the team that designed the logic is also implemented by the same team.
thus the invention of a discipline called 'systems engineering'..
i would say in 100% of engineering development, the design is done as a system, and specific requirements are allocated to design elements (like MCAS software). Each of these elements is tested against the requirements.
aeronautical engineering is a very specific skill. so is aircraft controls. so is airworthiness. a software engineer is an expert in software, not these other disciplines.
In fact, achieving a functional and fully correct piece of software based on such a specification is not at all a trivial task, as experienced software engineers will well appreciate.
Because while the specification may describe a certain sequence of inputs that should result in a certain sequence of outputs, it probably does not prescribe the exact data structures, memory layout, logic flow, and computational steps required to guarantee the correct output is always produced from a given set of inputs.
And the people being paid to create the necessary data structures, algorithms, calculations and control logic in order to implement the design specification... those developers are specifically not in a position to make systems design engineering changes to the underlying specification itself.
I think the parent post is an example of this problem taking on flesh. It has been so long since we realized the folly of over-specification in most projects that we have lost memory of there being cases where having a body of people engineering the system and specifications distinctly from the people who implement them actually does matter a great deal.
As a software engineer and not a systems engineer, I thank you for your comment. It has great clarity.