Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by ginko on Monday January 06, 2020 @10:27AM
(#21969790)
Had that happen before a flight once. They said there was some weird behavior and they'd powercycle the entire plane for a few seconds. Everything went dark for a bit and apparently it was fine afterwards.
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by rconti on Monday January 06, 2020 @03:29PM
(#21972940)
Heh, it's like rebooting the tablet in my Tesla 3 by holding both scroll wheels for 10 seconds. It's both creepy and reassuring that the car operates just fine even when you can't see your speed, hear your turn signals clicking, and so on. The separation between body control modules and "user-facing" controls gives me more confidence in the face of potential bugs.
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by utopian3 on Monday January 06, 2020 @01:08PM
(#21971382)
I’ve experienced that while on the ground (also an Embraer I think). Was your experience in the air? I think I’d hold my breath if that happened while mid flight.
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by el_benhameen on Monday January 06, 2020 @03:51PM
(#21973171)
While I understand that it's part of the procedure and flying is generally very safe, I'd be holding my breath, armrest, and fellow passengers with a vise grip if they power cycled my plane mid-flight.
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by scrollaway on Monday January 06, 2020 @12:23PM
(#21970948)
I love IT Crowd's first scene introducing Moss & Roy. Roy saying "Have you tried turning it off and on again?", then Moss saying "Have you tried forcing an unexpected reboot?".
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by rkochman on Monday January 06, 2020 @08:46AM
(#21969049)
Regarding a bomb on board:
“In the cabin, procedures are laid down for assessing the risks of moving the device and for moving the device to the LRBL at door 2R.”
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by 51Cards on Monday January 06, 2020 @10:28AM
(#21969798)
This is fascinating, thank you for the link. Makes perfect sense when you think about it, identifying the least vulnerable location on an aircraft but not something I would have ever considered was part of the formal specifications.
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by tgsovlerkhgsel on Monday January 06, 2020 @11:46AM
(#21970585)
I found this part about unreliable airspeed indicators interesting: "Thus flight envelope protections based on airspeed data from unreliable ADRs may activate. This may lead to pitch inputs from the flight computers that cannot be overridden with the sidesticks. In this case, immediately switch off any two ADRs"
Aside from actually having plenty of redundancy to avoid this scenario (this can only happen if two out of three sensors fail), this is basically the Airbus equivalent of MCAS. I wonder how well documented (and trained) this scenario is (and suspect that pilots are a lot more aware of it).
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by cesarb on Monday January 06, 2020 @01:03PM
(#21971344)
> this is basically the Airbus equivalent of MCAS
I believe the Airbus flight envelope protection uses the same surfaces normally controlled by the sidesticks, ignoring the pilot inputs (which is possible because they're fly-by-wire), while Boeing's MCAS uses the pitch trim (since it cannot ignore the pilot inputs due to them being mechanically linked with cables).
> I wonder how well documented (and trained) this scenario is (and suspect that pilots are a lot more aware of it).
Here's a case of unreliable airspeed in which the three ADRs were turned off by the pilots: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2... ("In accordance with published procedures, the flight crew turned off the three air data reference systems (ADRs)"), so it does seem to be documented/trained.
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by selectodude on Monday January 06, 2020 @03:56PM
(#21973208)
And the 777, which is FBW, has the same control protection as the Airbus jets. It's that the 737 is a completely obsolete design and duct-taping 2015 tech onto it was impossible.
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by vilhelm_s on Monday January 06, 2020 @02:39PM
(#21972368)
I thought the unreliable airspeed indicators section was particularly interesting because it can be read as a list of everything that the Air France Flight 447 crew did wrong...
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by redis_mlc on Monday January 06, 2020 @09:26PM
(#21976170)
> I wonder how well documented (and trained) this scenario is (and suspect that pilots are a lot more aware of it).
One Airbus plane was lost because of that. I believe it was icing caused by maintenance staff cleaning the exterior and getting water on the various static ports, which then iced over.
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by VBprogrammer on Monday January 06, 2020 @12:38PM
(#21971100)
Only vaguely related to the original article but I've often wondered what causes the loud screeching noise as an Airbus 320 shuts down. I did a bit of reading around it and came to the conclusion it is actually the PTU (basically a hydraulic motor directly coupled to a hydraulic pump which allows coupling the hydraulic power between the two systems without risking bringing down both in the event of a failure) trying to keep the pressure in one system up as the engine driven pump stops.
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by morganw on Monday January 06, 2020 @11:58AM
(#21970693)
Flight crew did all the right things and saved the aircraft and passengers. Brilliant improvisation saved the day and the tale made better with post-incident interviews: 'Moody described it [glide slope calculation] as "a bit like negotiating one's way up a badger's arse."'
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by gsnedders on Monday January 06, 2020 @05:44PM
(#21974323)
The announcement from BA9 is still a work of art:
> Ladies and gentlemen, this is your captain speaking. We have a small problem. All four engines have stopped. We are doing our damnedest to get them going again. I trust you are not in too much distress.
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by jamesharding on Monday January 06, 2020 @09:02AM
(#21969149)
The view out the side window is pretty good for straight ahead! It is more on the corner than the side of the flight deck, so it can be used to see straight ahead if needed. Here is the view out of this side window: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vyRVyNO-nYo
Re:Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes [pdf]
by jrwr on Monday January 06, 2020 @10:59AM
(#21970099)
I love page 117
"You’re going to need a longish runway. Worst case is if you only have blue, since you have, at best, accumulator braking and you’re coming in fast due to lack of flaps. Yellow is better since you have alternate braking, and its mainly about the lack of slats. If you have green, its not really all that bad."
"Abnormal computer behaviour can often be stopped by interrupting the power supply of the affected computer."
I didn't expect a more eloquently phrased "have you tried turning it off and on again" in this manual.
I think it was an Embraer E-170.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-o...
LRBL is “least risk bomb location” and is apparently required by the FAA: https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/...
Since you want the bomb behind the engines to avoid ingesting debris, you would likely have to put the bomb in this previously "more survivable" area.
Aside from actually having plenty of redundancy to avoid this scenario (this can only happen if two out of three sensors fail), this is basically the Airbus equivalent of MCAS. I wonder how well documented (and trained) this scenario is (and suspect that pilots are a lot more aware of it).
I believe the Airbus flight envelope protection uses the same surfaces normally controlled by the sidesticks, ignoring the pilot inputs (which is possible because they're fly-by-wire), while Boeing's MCAS uses the pitch trim (since it cannot ignore the pilot inputs due to them being mechanically linked with cables).
> I wonder how well documented (and trained) this scenario is (and suspect that pilots are a lot more aware of it).
Here's a case of unreliable airspeed in which the three ADRs were turned off by the pilots: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2... ("In accordance with published procedures, the flight crew turned off the three air data reference systems (ADRs)"), so it does seem to be documented/trained.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72
Television special about that flight:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0cS1SMptlnQ
One Airbus plane was lost because of that. I believe it was icing caused by maintenance staff cleaning the exterior and getting water on the various static ports, which then iced over.
I think 5 people died.
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-...
https://hursts.org.uk/
and where there is a "plain" html version:
https://hursts.org.uk/airbus-nonnormal/html/index.html
Anyone happen to know if I'm correct?
[0] https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=SCplhq1xoYE
"Damage to the windshield may necessitate an autoland or landing with a sliding window open."
> Ladies and gentlemen, this is your captain speaking. We have a small problem. All four engines have stopped. We are doing our damnedest to get them going again. I trust you are not in too much distress.
> Damage to the windshield may necessitate an autoland or landing with a sliding window open.
Landing while sticking your head out the window is sure going to be interesting...
"You’re going to need a longish runway. Worst case is if you only have blue, since you have, at best, accumulator braking and you’re coming in fast due to lack of flaps. Yellow is better since you have alternate braking, and its mainly about the lack of slats. If you have green, its not really all that bad."
In addition, what source is this from?