I believe the Airbus flight envelope protection uses the same surfaces normally controlled by the sidesticks, ignoring the pilot inputs (which is possible because they're fly-by-wire), while Boeing's MCAS uses the pitch trim (since it cannot ignore the pilot inputs due to them being mechanically linked with cables).
> I wonder how well documented (and trained) this scenario is (and suspect that pilots are a lot more aware of it).
Here's a case of unreliable airspeed in which the three ADRs were turned off by the pilots: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2... ("In accordance with published procedures, the flight crew turned off the three air data reference systems (ADRs)"), so it does seem to be documented/trained.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72
Television special about that flight:
One Airbus plane was lost because of that. I believe it was icing caused by maintenance staff cleaning the exterior and getting water on the various static ports, which then iced over.
I think 5 people died.
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-...
Aside from actually having plenty of redundancy to avoid this scenario (this can only happen if two out of three sensors fail), this is basically the Airbus equivalent of MCAS. I wonder how well documented (and trained) this scenario is (and suspect that pilots are a lot more aware of it).