Since that looked like an SMS, I would report it to your mobile provider, let them track who sent the message.
As for the domain name, that problem isn't going away. If anything, it will only get worse, as people are lazy and push UX designers to show less and less information. And the UX devs are right, the users won't know what to do with the extra info most of the time anyway.
And then there are payment processors, who also teach people BAD habits, by sending HTML messages, clickable links, etc. And that isn't going to change because it would increase customer support cases which costs them money. Banks won't implement secure authentication beyond phone MFA for the most part. I can think of a dozen ways to make this more secure, but all the ideas would be rejected as adding too much friction.
All that is left is educating the masses and that fails as well. Most people learn by making mistakes. About 40% of people will click on the scammers links. About 10% of people will enter their credentials.
That is not always true. You can have regulations which force banks to change. Banks don't like it but politicians don't like an unstable banking sector, especially if it causes sharp changes in the stock market.
As an example, the recent money laundering scandals in Sweden has caused some changes in credit card security. Politicians want to reassure the public and increase trust in Swedish banks, so the last years has seen several notable banking regulations. I would guess that they actually want noticeable friction in order to reassure the public that they have things under control.
If the incoming call or txt has an internal source number, but is coming from an external network, reject it. If its an outgoing session with an external source, drop it and follow up with the account holder.
The blame lies at the feet of the spammers.
And, I've worked for a couple of mobile providers. This spam was likely sent from a disposable pre-paid SIM. There's no realistic way to check who sent it.
Technically correct, but the thing is, spam like this is a consequence of a lot of things. Why draw attention to that specific cause out of everything else?
You could just as accurately say that spam like this is a consequence of human-readable domains. If humans weren't visually validating URLs, it would be impossible for a scammer to use unicode tricks to make a URL look legitimate.
A lack of gatekeepers means we'll have more scammers, yes. But, gatekeepers almost universally don't scale well in any system as large as the Internet, and they come with so many additional problems that they're not worth paying special attention to or prioritizing as a solution to any problem on this scale.
Not that it would tell who sent it, but would allow to track if the same devices were used as part of ongoing campaign.
But SMS sending devices are cheap and disposable. Sure, it's illegal to alter your IMEI in the UK - but if they're already committing one crime, I don't think that'll stop them.
1) The angry/evil spammer. Doesn’t give a shit and wants make his dollars. Usually someone higher up. 2) The worker. Just his bills paid. Usually rather uncaring what they are doing, although they acknowledge its wrong 3) Playing oblivious, just ignoring and avoiding any sense of blame or justice
It’s lucrative and as long as we keep falling for it, it will stay. Making domains more expensive will make the barrier of entry higher, but the top players will likely just consolidate more resources vs little scammers.
If a domain is like an address then maybe we could or should enforce some more legitimacy, but such a thing would be hard to implement in the countries where spam usually originates from.
So, sending a couple of hundred messages is about the same price as a domain.
Of course, if you've stolen a SIM or hacked peoples' phone in order to send the messages, it's even cheaper.
Then there’s also a significant time investment in setting up accounts with those SMS services that’ll constantly be banning you.
Couple of hundred messages isn’t going to get you very many hits unless you’re collecting low value information.
it kinda bugs me that letsencrypt which is a fantastic public service is being abused by scammers in this way.
Anonymity all the way down the stack...
Sadly there's no way to judge from just the URL if a site has an EV cert or just a cheap/free https cert, and by the time you opened it in the browser it might be too late.
I am not sure it really says anything about legit-ness either. It really only guarantees you and the next person you are talking to in the chain have an encrypted connection.
Hard to explain that to anyone really.
The Internet became the standard for global networking in the 1990s by being an informal trust based system where the competition was things like Al Gore's Information Superhighway - these other hypothetical systems were centralized extension of something like a cable TV network and essentially had all the bad things we decry in today's Internet and none of the good.
Which to say, the lack of centralization in DNS or whatever aspects on might name in the Internet (IP addresses, etc) allows bad actors from below to do their terrible things.
But the lack of centralization also prevents bad actors from above from doing their terrible things. Centralized DNS is already a target - cable companies were complaining to congress about firefox from enabling secure DNS and keeping them from MTM traffic.
Which is worse? I couldn't say.
No company should send messages containing a url that requires login, payment data or the like. People should go to these places by typing the url or by using their own bookmarks.
Maybe they don't? This wouldn't help here, that's not the company sending the message. For that to work, people have to deeply know and trust the policies and resolve of each of their service providers not to do that - might as well just teach them how links work.
A few weeks ago I had an argument with a few engineering students is one of the 30 top schools in the world, whether you can send an email form Gmail to Outlook or not!!
They thought it was like Messenger and WhatsApp not being able to talk to each other.
The concept of Open protocols and clients have to be taught in school.
Oh, how puzzled the looked when I showed them my Outlook email on my phone's Gmail app.
I was agitated.
Right now that infrastructure is the only thing in the stack that actually does any validation (you get your cert because you have the name). There isn't any other validation infrastructure to couple it to for it to be "decoupled".
`com.01-01-2020-billing.secure.hsbc` or whatever looks a hell of a lot more dodgy. But I presume it comes with a whole lot of issues of its own.
If you want a phone line you have certain fees for 911 and other regulations to help pay for the infrastructure and this is very similar in terms of a naming and communication service.
Even if your solution would solve the problem, it would destroy the purpose of the system. Throwing the proverbial baby with the bath water.
If I want a phone line it costs me $10 to get a sim card from walmart. Most reputable TLDa cost a ton more.
I mean what is it with this lazy way of solving real problems. What's next, tax domain registrations? Require a government ID? How ridiculous, this is what happens when humans give up their basic freedoms to goverenments and ruling classes. By what authority are you even regulating my free speech here? If I put up a website, I am not engaging in commerce unless I sell or buy something using that site. It is the equivalent of me calling myself a name and making a speech in public and you want to charge me £1000 for the right to call myself a name or to label the soap box I stand on a name so others can distiguish me. The fact that scammers also stand in soap boxes and make false claims for profit does not magically give you, your ruling class or the goverenmen t authority to regulate soap box labels and tax speech.
Even if this has popular support, free speech is a natural right. You can police harmful/false speech retroactively but you can't inhibit speech proactively to deter a possible crime unless you can guarantee your measure affects only law breakers.
Having a website doesn't require a domain. DNS is a vanity layer on top to make it more user friendly and provide an abstraction layer. Domain registration costs money today. According to your argument that should be free or it is limiting your speech. I never said anything about speech or what you use the domains for. If it is yours, do whatever you want with it. Ethos bought .org for $1B. Why should a private equity company be able to own DNS suffixes? Are you okay with that?
The issue at hand is that these domains are being created specifically to deceive. This is an issue of consumer protection and greater good. The US just passed bigger fines for robo-callers. Everyone seems fine with not getting scam phone calls from their own phone number. Is this a restriction of free speech? Everyone isn't allowed to run their own tv or radio station, it is regulated. Is that limiting your free speech? You can't make up your own phone number. If you want a special 800 number that is more memorable, you have to pay the phone company lots of extra money for it. I'm merely suggesting similar.
Are you even listening to yourself? Your idea was to make domain names hard to obtain so scammers can't have them. The only way that idea will be effective is if people only go to sites that are part of the validated domain name system. This means that if you don't have a domain, nobody will go on your site (this is already true today). So why on earth are you saying those legitimate websites should look like scams?
This article somewhat supports my assertion:
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/06/bad-men-at-work-please-d...
saying "domains in the remaining five [out of ten] Top Bad TLDs can be had for between 48 cents and a dollar each." so I would suggest a one-off $100 fee rather than $500 or $1000 a year.
A more interesting approach would be to make the fee act as a bond, which is returned to the registrant after a year of good behaviour. Unfortunately, determining "good behaviour" is almost as hard as determining "bad behaviour", but perhaps a domain could opt in to having anonymous metrics recorded of how many users visit their site or send emails to that domain. That would put a substantial amount of trust into the hands of whichever organisations were responsible for recording these metrics, but the only harm they could do to a registrant is forcing them to pay their $100 bond to charity.
20-30 victims can easily earn the phisher $1000
Beyond that it comes down to who's being spammed, with the right demographics your link could last very long without being reported by anyone.
I hack phishing sites for fun, anything between 0-500 hits seems common for the type of phishing seen in the OP (mostly depending on the quality of the leads).
No, that's the price we pay for using a name resolution system from the 80's (70's?) that was not built with trust validation in mind,decoupled from the infrastructure we use to establish domain ownership and authority. And also without user friendliness or of a layman's ability to independently validate authority in mind. e.g.: reverse order of hierarchy where in english you read left to right but dns has least authoritative/lowest level on the left and most authoritative on the right,why would I evaluate trust worthiness of site.com if 'secure' is evaluated first in secure.site.com (another example:google.com.site.info).
Cracked foundations make shaky buildings.