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Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by monocasa on Sunday December 22, 2019 @05:30PM (#21860088)
It's just ABI instability. In BSD, Solaris, and MacOS the kernel and libc are distributed by essentially the same people as an atomic unit, and the syscall layer changes over time. On Linux, it's the syscall layer that's stable.
Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by pas on Sunday December 22, 2019 @07:59PM (#21860757)
It's entirely doable in Linux too. Introduce new syscalls for the new interface, plus one lockdown functionality that disables the old interface so sysadmins/distributions can switch to the new interface. Of course this can and should be coupled with compile time switching, so eventually the old interface will become deprecated, and if no one steps up to maintain it, it will be removed.

It's simply a different approach to doing backward compatibility. (Instead of maintaining very different trees for different versions, the functionality is concurrently available in multiple versions, but with feature switches [compile- and run-time configuration].)

Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by ori_b on Sunday December 22, 2019 @09:08PM (#21861013)
> and if no one steps up to maintain it, it will be removed.

"You don't break userspace". How many decades until people who no longer have source for the broken binaries that they run will stop complaining?

How long until sysadmins know to turn the knobs on?

How many knobs are sustainable? How much will they interact, and in how many ways will those interactions expose vulnerabilities?

The Linux way to introduce this is hell for everyone involved.

Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by pas on Sunday December 29, 2019 @06:29AM (#21905370)
If no one uses it, removing it does not break userspace. Removal of features happen regularly.

How many? Dunno, doesn't matter. If there are users they are usually willing to step up to maintain it, and that makes having parallel APIs not a problem (the old one becomes a wrapper).

Furthermore UNIX/BSD faces the same problem with every other program that lives out of tree. (Which is the majority of them anyway.)

Knobology is always an endless debate, yet also regularly done without much fuss, usually simply by what the maintainer(s) decide to provide.

Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by pjmlp on Monday December 23, 2019 @02:55AM (#21862133)
As done on the Trebelified Linux in Android.

Standard Linux drivers are considered legacy, with all new drivers using their own processes talking via Android IPC.

Userspace is all about Android Java, ISO C, ISO C++, and NDK APIs, everything else is considered off hands and there is also some gatekeeping via LinuxSE, securecomp of whatever else is allowed.

Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by saagarjha on Monday December 23, 2019 @03:05AM (#21862166)
Right, but the abstraction later for Treble is the HAL boundary and not the syscall boundary. The seccomp filter is unrelated and IIRC relatively permissive.
Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by pjmlp on Monday December 23, 2019 @03:42AM (#21862289)
Syscalls are not part of the NDK stable APIs contract, so although seccomp isn't as extensive as it might be, there are zero guarantees about blocking further syscalls.
Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by monocasa on Monday December 23, 2019 @11:45AM (#21864866)
Nothing you need to write a driver is part of the NDK stable API contract either. They're orthogonal concepts.
Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by pjmlp on Monday December 23, 2019 @12:20PM (#21865147)
Sure, however we are speaking about general purpose access to syscalls from user space here.

Only Android OEMs get to publish drivers.