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A comment on OpenBSD system-call-origin verification. Parent comment

Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by saagarjha on Monday December 23, 2019 @03:05AM (#21862166)
Right, but the abstraction later for Treble is the HAL boundary and not the syscall boundary. The seccomp filter is unrelated and IIRC relatively permissive.
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Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by pjmlp on Monday December 23, 2019 @03:42AM (#21862289)
Syscalls are not part of the NDK stable APIs contract, so although seccomp isn't as extensive as it might be, there are zero guarantees about blocking further syscalls.
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Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by monocasa on Monday December 23, 2019 @11:45AM (#21864866)
Nothing you need to write a driver is part of the NDK stable API contract either. They're orthogonal concepts.
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Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by pjmlp on Monday December 23, 2019 @12:20PM (#21865147)
Sure, however we are speaking about general purpose access to syscalls from user space here.

Only Android OEMs get to publish drivers.

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