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A comment on OpenBSD system-call-origin verification. Parent comment

Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by pjmlp on Monday December 23, 2019 @02:55AM (#21862133)
As done on the Trebelified Linux in Android.

Standard Linux drivers are considered legacy, with all new drivers using their own processes talking via Android IPC.

Userspace is all about Android Java, ISO C, ISO C++, and NDK APIs, everything else is considered off hands and there is also some gatekeeping via LinuxSE, securecomp of whatever else is allowed.

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Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by saagarjha on Monday December 23, 2019 @03:05AM (#21862166)
Right, but the abstraction later for Treble is the HAL boundary and not the syscall boundary. The seccomp filter is unrelated and IIRC relatively permissive.
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Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by pjmlp on Monday December 23, 2019 @03:42AM (#21862289)
Syscalls are not part of the NDK stable APIs contract, so although seccomp isn't as extensive as it might be, there are zero guarantees about blocking further syscalls.
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Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by monocasa on Monday December 23, 2019 @11:45AM (#21864866)
Nothing you need to write a driver is part of the NDK stable API contract either. They're orthogonal concepts.
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Re:OpenBSD system-call-origin verification by pjmlp on Monday December 23, 2019 @12:20PM (#21865147)
Sure, however we are speaking about general purpose access to syscalls from user space here.

Only Android OEMs get to publish drivers.

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