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Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by joosters on Monday December 16, 2019 @12:32PM (#21804940)
Presumably they could just get a wildcard certificate for *.has-a.name perfectly legitimately and then they can mimic every IPv6 has-a.name site they want.
Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by milankragujevic on Monday December 16, 2019 @12:35PM (#21804963)
Not without the ability to add a TXT record to the root domain.
Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by joosters on Monday December 16, 2019 @12:42PM (#21805045)
Which root domain? If they own has-a.name then that is good enough, right?
Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by LeonM on Monday December 16, 2019 @12:47PM (#21805101)
No, they'd have to get a cert for your domain name. Which they can't, because they cannot prove they own your domain name.

All they are doing if pointing to your IPv6 address, anyone can do that, that is why DNS TXT validation if needed in the first place.

Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by jrockway on Monday December 16, 2019 @08:25PM (#21809569)
ACME is entirely based on DNS. The HTTP and ALPN challenges look up which IP address to speak to via DNS. The DNS challenges look for a TXT record in DNS. (Letsencrypt tries pretty hard to ensure that the DNS is legitimately being served by looking up the IP address from multiple networks, so you can't disrupt one of their networks to issue fake certs. But it has no idea who really controls your DNS server or glue records.)

If you host your site at foo.example.com, then example.com can get a wildcard certificate for *.example.com that will be valid even if you have your own foo.example.com certificate and they can also change the A or AAAA record for foo.example.com to get a certificate with an HTTP challenge.

You could always petition browser vendors to pin your foo.example.com certificate, and thus override any tampering by the example.com DNS server. It is exceedingly unlikely they would do this for you.

TLS certificates these days only prove one thing: control over the DNS server at the time of provisioning.

Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by MrOxiMoron on Monday December 16, 2019 @12:53PM (#21805160)
whatever.has-a.name is the domain name they are suggesting you use, if you had your own you wouldn't need their service. So yes, you are basically giving them control that way. But for simple solution to temporarily get SSL to work on your container during development it's fine. But in that case a self signed certificate works too.
Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by LeonM on Monday December 16, 2019 @01:10PM (#21805376)
I haven't looked at it from that angle yet, but you are right: If you share the whatever.has-a.name address with other people and tell them to trust it, then this is very dangerous.

However, the OP wrote this:

> but keep in mind that the operator can also get SSL certs for your site

Which made it sound as if they can get a cert for your domain, which they cannot.

Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by yzmtf2008 on Monday December 16, 2019 @01:41PM (#21805730)
> Which made it sound as if they can get a cert for your domain, which they cannot.

Why? They own and operate the DNS server for has-a.name, so (if they wish to) they can just add any record that they wish, to any domain, right?

Of course this is true for any registrar, but that's also why not anyone can just become a registrar.

Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by ownagefool on Monday December 16, 2019 @02:51PM (#21806493)
Obviously if you can sign a cert which is trusted by browsers, then you technically have the ability to impersonate anyone, but processes are used to fight against this.

PSL (https://publicsuffix.org/), DNS Certification Authority Authorization , and Certificate Transparency could be combined so browsers are allowed to know who can sign what, who's a registrar, and who's doing what.

Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by yzmtf2008 on Monday December 16, 2019 @03:01PM (#21806592)
PSL protects the other way around: it can only prevent whatever.has-a.name to compromise has-a.name or another.has-a.name

DNS Certification Authority Authorization assumes trust of the DNS server. Doesn't work if the DNS server itself is compromised / malicious. (Maybe with DNSSEC, but DNSSEC has its own problems and definitely doesn't work when your TLD itself is compromised.)

CT is really the only thing that works in this scenario (attackers/third party gaining write access to DNS records), but not every CA has CT and not everyone has the means to monitor CT logs. CT isn't even required for every browser/certificate (only EV certs (dead) for Chrome, and you need HPKP (dead) or Expect-CT (no browser support) for this to work reliably). Plus, what are you supposed to do when you find out there's a bad cert for your domain out there? Yell at someone on Twitter? It's going to be hard to convince a CA that you're not doing business with that someone with write access to DNS does not own the domain. Attackers are already impersonating you while it takes hours to sort things out.

... all of this is not to say that these security measures are bad, just not enough. We really put more trust on DNS servers than we ought to.

Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by tialaramex on Monday December 16, 2019 @06:01PM (#21808468)
You're a little out of date on Certificate Transparency.

Chrome and Safari both require SCTs (the signed timestamps which prove a certificate was logged) for all new certificates, have done for quite some time. There are CAs which issue certs without logging but largely it's for applications which themselves know about SCTs so they can do the fix-up at runtime not issuance, because again if you just added these certs to a generic web server Chrome and Safari, two very popular browsers, will reject the certificates outright.

Since they'd be next to useless to lay people without, all the certs offered to the general public these days have SCTs baked in by the issuer. Let's Encrypt were ironically among the last to do this.

Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by yzmtf2008 on Monday December 16, 2019 @06:12PM (#21808578)
Wow, that's really good to hear. One of the chief complaints I have about CT is the lack of agency. Not that this solves all problems, but good on Chrome and Safari for enforcing it
Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by ownagefool on Monday December 16, 2019 @05:16PM (#21807956)
PSL could/should also stop sub.has-a.name trusting signed certs such as wildcard.has-a.name, depending on the configuration of the PSL. I'm just not really sure any actual browsers implement it like this though, as reading the PSL "how this is used page" doesn't turn up any such thing.

CAA does rely on DNS working, which your registrar can probably hijack. Fair point.

CT would help protect against the registrar but not against a malicious CA who simply wouldn't log if they were going to sign a cert maliciously.

You're generally right though.

Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by namibj on Monday December 16, 2019 @08:02PM (#21809443)
If a CA "forgets" to add a certificate to the CT log, they need a really good excuse to not get distrusted immediately. That's part of the reasoning: malicious certs are almost useless if you don't present them to a client. And if that client manages to exfiltrate the cert...
Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by ownagefool on Saturday December 21, 2019 @04:14AM (#21850467)
You have a very good point.
Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by stevekemp on Monday December 16, 2019 @02:34PM (#21806284)
They can get an SSL certificate for "example.has-a.name", i.e. your subdomain, in one of two ways:

1. They complete a DNS challenge and get a certificate for "\\*.has-a.name" - which obviously includes your subdomain.

2. They sneakily point "your-address-here.has-a.name" to an IP they control, get a certificate issued, then point it back to where it should go.

The second option is more hassle, and easier to notice, but the first makes it needlessly complex.

Of course if your actual domain is "bob.com" then this is just a distraction. We're using "your domain" in this case to refer to the subdomain that points to your IPv6 address.

Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by treysis on Monday December 16, 2019 @03:26PM (#21806828)
And then they have a certificate. What are they going to do with it? It's still not installed on your server.
Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by yzmtf2008 on Monday December 16, 2019 @03:35PM (#21806928)
Suddenly whatever.has-a.name is pointing to a different IP address and that server has the cert installed. Oops.
Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by treysis on Monday December 16, 2019 @05:08PM (#21807875)
So same trust you put in any 3rd party DNS service. But I agree there's less contractual bindings to this service than an account somewhere that you even might pay some money for it.
Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by yzmtf2008 on Monday December 16, 2019 @05:12PM (#21807922)
I guess the point of all this discussion is "don't trust a random guy on the Internet that offers to host DNS for you", but also we place way too much trust on DNS.
Re:Giving every IPv6 address a name by milankragujevic on Tuesday December 17, 2019 @02:25AM (#21811443)
Can all the nice people who have downvoted explain what I said wrong?