It seems like pretty intuitive logic but it doesn't make any sense on inspection; people adjust to changing economic circumstances much faster than the authorities can change things. The situation will change quickly even if the authorities do nothing. Lessons that get 'learned' about crises and responding to them are probably a build-up of rain dances rather than actual knowledge.
It is a situation primed to promote economic witchcraft. Nobody agrees with which parts of are the most cargo-culty because political groups generally support the stupid ideas which happen to favour them.
It's notable that you use the word "story": that is exactly the right word. These are stories we tell ourselves to try to make sense of what happened. But we should not mistake them for actual knowledge that would allow us to predict what will happen in the future. It isn't.
Better for what circumstances? The Fed doesn't start with interest rate targets, they start with a dual mandate on employment and inflation control and set interest rates based on expected results based on that mandate, which can at times be high and are now low (which is mostly, currently, a sign of monetary policy compensating for an extended period of defective fiscal policy.)
No, it's not. Under the Federal Reserve Act (specifically, 12 U.S.C. § 225A) there is actually a triple mandate, as monetary policy is to aim to acheive “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”
Inflation control (stable prices) is the second listed.
The Fed chair doesn't unilaterally set policy, and the Fed Board of Governors in Volker’s term didn't ignore the other parts of the mandate, it just saw inflation as the biggest risk, for reasons which are pretty easy to understand in the historical context, even if they were wrong in hindsight.
> Even today, there is not an employment target, there is only an inflation target and its precisely because no one really knows or agrees on what the employment target should be
That's not entirely true, it's more that it's because they have a very firm idea of what the employment target should be, but it's not a fixed employment level but the (dynamically shifting, in terms of employment measures) point at which further monetary stimulus has little further employment impact but great inflationary impact.
> I think when greenspan acted to raise rates, like Volker, he was predominantly concerned about inflation rather than jobs
Of course; the Board of Governors raises rates when inflation is the greatest concern, it lowers them when jobs are the greatest concern. They’ll admit that quite openly, you haven't made some stunning discovery. The understanding (somewhat simplified) is that there is a range (which moves dynamically based on other factors in the economy) in which easier money produces more employment with comparatively little inflationary effect, and a range (in interest rate terms, a lower level than the preceding range) in which it produces inflation with little jobs effect, as “full employment” has been reached (with the reverse effects in each range for tighter money). The Fed, again somewhat simplified, largely acts on interest rates based on which range it feels the current situation is in, aiming for the moderate inflation/“full employment” boundary.
I think that's rather due to the Cantillon Effect, which posits that those who are closest to new money issuance (primary dealers, banks, etc) extract more value from it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Cantillon#Monetary_the...
https://slate.com/technology/2018/02/why-the-russian-governm...
Yes. In one interview Volcker recalls having told Carter "Yes, I can end inflation. But if I do, you won't get re-elected". Carter: "Do it anyway." (Can't find the reference now, anyone know it?)
From a few years back: https://fortune.com/2015/10/31/paul-volcker-jimmy-carter-don...
Lots of people knew what had to be done, but Jimmy Carter was the rare sort of electee who would act in the country's best interests, even to the ruin of his own career.
That’s actually the opposite of what Reagan was saying at the time.
But...it didn't recover for most people, whatever broad aggregate figures without distributional measures suggest. Reagan drove the nail in the coffin of the long post-WWII broad-based prosperity, and put the lie to the slogan favored by his campaign that a rising tide lifts all boats. Rather than trickling down, the gains in the economy since (and including) the Reagan years have been captured by an ever narrowing elite. And that's a direct result of government policy, centrally (though not exclsuively) tax policy, starting with the great tax shift under which Reagan oversaw, back to back, the largest tax cut in US history (on progressive taxes) and the largest tax increase in US history (on regressive payroll taxes.)
I do wonder what will happen if mortgage rates return to even their pre-Volcker level, much less the 1980s levels. Household incomes versus PITI on a 30 year mortgage places a ceiling on housing prices, so if interest rates go up, then the prices in currently hard-to-afford areas will have to go down.
E.g. $100k, 4%, 30y -> $477/mo, but $65k, 8%, 30y -> $477/mo. This isn’t the full picture, obviously, but in this hypothetical example, both scenarios are more or less equally affordable. (Again, this example is just illustrative. I know people who bought in the 1980s and then refinanced in the 1990s, which ended up being a pretty sweet deal.)
Going under 20% down results in poor loan terms and extra expenses like mortgage insurance that ruin the economics.
So high sticker prices on homes really do make them unaffordable to first time buyers who don't have family help or a very high income.
I do not think this is true. Everything I have seen shows that mortgage rates and house prices are positively correlated. Probably because they are both determined by the overall state of the economy.
When the economy is good, prices rise and interest rates rise. When the economy is bad, both fall.
It's a scenario that can't occur as far as the Federal Government's solvency is concerned.
Just 5% on $50 trillion in public debt, 20 years out = fiscally say goodbye to the US military and Social Security (or say hello to the highest taxes on earth). Even 3.x% on $35 trillion in ~10 years starts to become a figure impossible to manage as it explodes the budget. You can plainly see the limits on where the Fed can allow rates to rise to.
Instead, the Fed and government's only option is to do everything possible to hold rates down forever. The Japan model reveals some of what the US is going to face, most likely. It's also why US growth keeps persistently sliding lower as we keep taking on more public debt, the debt is putting our productive capital into perma cold storage, robbing the economy of dynamism until we hit zero expansion. That debt will gradually yield less and less, we'll have $40+ trillion yielding 1.x% eventually. Effectively a massive pool of permanently dead wealth stripped out of the economy that will never be put to productive use; and that process of removing money from the economy simultaneously is what helps prevent traditional inflation from soaring despite the low rates. Picture reversing that and rapidly injecting that $40 trillion of dead capital back into the economy and see what would happen in terms of inflation for example.
Another thing jacked up was the unemployment rate - to 11%. Bad for the people doing the work and creating the wealth, good for the heirs receiving dividends from the expropriated surplus time if those who work.
Jacking the interest rate up to ~20% so that unemployment goes to 11% is not a stroke of genius, it's just something no one was politically capable of doing beforehand.
When he became chairman of the US Federal Reserve in 1980, the US was suffering from stagflation, or stagnation + inflation, which economists previously believed was impossible to have at the same time.
The fear was that solving stagnation by lowering interest rates would drive higher inflation, possibly hyperinflation, but conversely that raising interest rates to solve inflation would exacerbate the stagnation, possibly into a depression.
Volcker showed that focusing on and killing inflation by raising interest rates, even to extreme levels (briefly up to ~20%), you end both inflation and stagnation. For one reason, low, steady, predictable inflation, better enables businesses to plan, hire and invest.
And that has been central bank policy ever since (though they arguably mistakenly deviated from it under the latter part of Greenspan’s tenure). As Bernanke said, “He personified the idea of doing something politically unpopular but economically necessary.” It’s rare to have such an impact on one’s field, especially under such adverse circumstances.