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Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by ptah on Monday September 30, 2019 @11:44AM (#21116590)
according to nicholas Taleb, Black-Scholes was always broken. I tend to believe him based on results achieved by Scholes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-Term_Capital_Management
Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by mikeyouse on Monday September 30, 2019 @12:24PM (#21117026)
Taleb's funds aren't any more impressive.. LTCM blew up very publicly but Empirica shut down after many years of losses and Universa isn't exactly a high performer. He's still out there banging the drum about hyperinflation!
Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by viburnum on Monday September 30, 2019 @12:28PM (#21117075)
Just wait until the paleo/deadlift bubble pops, he’ll be wiped out completely.
Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by conistonwater on Monday September 30, 2019 @12:21PM (#21116984)
But LTCM wasn't based on options trading, its main strategy (the one that failed) was arbitrage of bonds with different maturity dates: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-Term_Capital_Management#F... That hasn't got much to do with Black-Scholes
Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by viburnum on Monday September 30, 2019 @12:28PM (#21117066)
LTCM cracks me up because it should have been obvious that linking a massively liquid market with a not very liquid market was going to be trouble. IIRC when the crisis came it turned out there were only three or four buyers on the tight side, and when they sat on the sidelines it was game over for LCTM.
Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by darksaints on Monday September 30, 2019 @01:13PM (#21117495)
You should take a closer look at what actually happened to LTCM. Their model remained profitable even after the crash, and recovered value far quicker than other hedge funds did. The real cause of the systemic failure had more to do with the actions of investors than the fundamentals of the model. The investors were heavily overleveraged across the board, and when they started losing money elsewhere, they initiated a flight to liquidity within LTCM. The flight to liquidity caused them to liquidate positions before they converged, compounding losses. Those positions for the most part actually did converge, but were prematurely exited. Had those investors not liquidated, they would have continued making strong returns.

In other words, LTCMs collapse was the fault of the investors in LTCM, not the fault of the model. There are hundreds of hedge funds that have continued using the same basic model as LTCM, and have lasted through two recessions and several global financial shocks. They have achieved that by learning from LTCM: keep the model, dump the stupidly overleveraged investors.

Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by listenallyall on Monday September 30, 2019 @05:29PM (#21119825)
Not true. LTCM had some of the most restrictive covenants among similar funds. Minimum lockup of at least 2 years, and redemption notice of 3 or 6 months (hey its been 20 years) - in other words, if you wanted to redeem, you had to give multiple month notice. The investors had no way of forcing LTCM to liquidate any holdings in a panic, in fact the covenants were to protect against that exact scenario, so the firm could ride out their positions.

Counterparties, on the other hand, very different story, if they didn't force LTCM'S hand, they would be stuck with an empty bag.

You're correct that many of LTCM trades did eventually work out positively. But when you're driving a car at 200 mph, a mundane pothole is deadly. When your hedge fund levered 30x, a temporary liquidity crisis is also fatal.

Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by conistonwater on Monday September 30, 2019 @02:37PM (#21118365)
I don't think that's right, at least this is not the way I learned it: the terms on which you borrow money to fund your investments should be considered a part of the model. So if you borrow short term and invest long term, your model itself now includes maturity transformation, and it can blow up just like any such model. Sure you can then construct a different model that's basically the same but without the maturity transformation, and that's okay, you'll get different returns. Thinking about it this way I think it's still fair to blame LTCM, their investors were free to do whatever their contract allowed them to do.
Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by owenversteeg on Monday September 30, 2019 @05:20PM (#21119755)
That's true, and very important. And while I think (or, at least, I hope) large investors keep that in mind after so many high profile explosions like LTCM, I think small time retail investors tend to forget that, and that there's a reason Vanguard (for example) suggests 70% stocks and 30% bonds. Doesn't seem too important, until you need the money...
Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by SilasX on Monday September 30, 2019 @03:37PM (#21118924)
>The flight to liquidity caused them to liquidate positions before they converged, compounding losses.

But that wasn't some incidental thing; it indicated that the core idea behind their arbitrage was flawed -- that there is a reason that the more liquid (US) bonds were consistently overpriced: to account for the fact that, during the occasional crisis, investors flee to them!

Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by grenoire on Monday September 30, 2019 @11:50AM (#21116667)
This fact is luckily slowly leaking into higher education of finance, and is preventing hundreds of poor finance students from attempting to reinvent the wheel.
Re:Negative Rates Are Rewriting the Rules of Modern Finance by pfortuny on Monday September 30, 2019 @12:07PM (#21116853)
Also, options were priced (and this price agreed upon both parties) long before the formula. So, the formula is just a technical so to say after-the-fact explanation of the pricing. Interesting as a technical tool, but not mind-shattering per se.