It hasn't. That's a lie. Police/etc have far more resources available to them than they've had at any point in history. The trail of digital exhaust we leave behind is only increasing, which makes OPSEC much harder[1]. End to end encryption doesn't prevent metadata analysis[2], network usage/timing analysis (e.g. [3]), or investigation of the massive amount of data that isn't end to end encrypted..
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1q4Ir2J8P8
[2] The NSA admits[4] metadata tells them far more than the message contents.
[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/world/how-the-nsa...
edit:
[4] "We kill people based on metadata" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdQiz0Vavmc
Shouldn't the metadata be more than enough for them?
Like the San Bernadino shooter, for example[1] (jump to decryption section)
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_San_Bernardino_attack
I personally store those inside my brain, though.
Soon after: Congress wins government the right to mandate surgery to extract neuro-chips from the brains of suspected terrorists.
Beliefs like these are antithetical to a free society.
1. Government should not be able to examine thoughts with mind reading tech, that's too private
2. Therefore, since computers hold our thoughts today in 2019, government should not be able to examine computers with tech, that's too private
3. Therefore, since diaries held our thoughts in 1925, government should not be able to examine diaries, that's too private
4. Therefore, since cave paintings held our thoughts in 30000 BC, tribe chief should not be able to look at cave paintings, that's too private
It's not like lobbying for more privacy is going to prevent the government from secretly abducting you and using whatever mind reading tech they want.
Because media are very biased and police loves to cry wolf. Do you expect them to admit when they have too much information or power in general?
Police work has become lazy and they'll have to go back to finding evidence they can access
For more detail on this, look at the musings of the 98th Congress during the 1980s who really speculated on what privacy would mean once everyone's files were digital. The period of digital files without encryption made it convenient for the governments to circumvent privacy protections. This convenience is being removed. Warrant or no warrant.
Yup. Tried very hard. It's not possible. This isn't a restriction of our current tech. It's a fundamental part of the mathematics of cryptography. Asking for it is kind of like trying to legislate pi having a different value.
In theory that is true, but in practice paper money works quite well.
For crypto, the principal actor is whoever is encrypting. The downside of an activist in a repressive regime having their crypto broken is basically unlimited for them. Or the population that uses ecommerce as principal actor. The downside for them is enormous and the upside for someone who suborns a system incredible. Since we don't know tye power and incentive imbalance between the actors, crypto has to assume the worst.
Your plan doesn't work.
You can't have backdoors in encryption.
What you think is "expensive" today will not be tomorrow, and there's little that would be "difficult to obtain/replicate" -- SEMs are not hard to get access to, for instance.
There is no security if you leave a backdoor for the government or anyone else.
1. Physical access to the device
2. Physical access to the vendor's key storage (this could be extremely difficult if not impossible if the company were responsible - consider an air gapped storage vault)
I still think my system could work if implemented by, say, Apple. You have only shown weaknesses of individual parts, not weaknesses of the entire system.
If you can make it, someone can break it, and will. And companies are not responsible, that's not how this works.
Also, a "weakness of the individual part" is a break, and the entire system collapses. You're essentially arguing for security by obscurity.
> And companies are not responsible, that's not how this works.
Why not? If a company implements a government requirement poorly they are absolutely responsible for the ramifications, just like they are with existing regulations (like if I made a handheld gaming system that jams radios on accident, I'm responsible for not following FCC regulations properly).
> Also, a "weakness of the individual part" is a break
That's ridiculous. That's like saying you can't build a bridge out of pure rebar and you can't build a bridge out of pure concrete because individually they are too weak, so therefore you can't build a bridge out of rebar-reinforced concrete.
If you build a bridge out of concrete with weak rebar, guess what? Bridge falls down, people die. If you build a bridge with shit concrete and great rebar, guess what? Bridge falls down, people die. You've made nearly the perfect analogy for me.
Privacy from the government is something most people want. If the government wants my data, I'm not going to build a system that makes it easier for them to get it.
And finally, you can't ban math. I don't give a fuck who says what, I won't put backdoors in my code, and if someone else does I'll stop using their code and I'll build my own.
> Privacy from the government is something most people want. If the government wants my data, I'm not going to build a system that makes it easier for them to get it.
You won't have a choice; Apple will build the system and it will be transparent to you and they will only let the government into your phone if they have a warrant.
> And finally, you can't ban math.
No, but you can make it harder for people to use said math.
That's like saying "you can't ban physics! If you try to ban my automatic weapons I'll just 3d print a part that makes my semi-auto gun full auto!" Well, yes. You can do that, physics won't stop you. Your average person, however, won't do that and everyone is better off as a result.
> I don't give a fuck who says what, I won't put backdoors in my code, and if someone else does I'll stop using their code and I'll build my own.
Well you'll spend the rest of your life living like RMS then because you can't control the whole stack of a phone - it takes millions of man hours to develop and maintain.
I don't care if you believe that it's inevitable. I don't, and won't live my life that way. Slavery was inevitable once. The holocaust was inevitable once. People standing up against it stops what weak minds believe inevitable.
And gun parts are machined, not 3d printed for the most part. The laws against it are directly contrary to our Constitution and a lot of people dedicate a lot of time to working against those laws. But even that isn't math -- you simply can't ban math. The files that describe how to machine those parts -- those are readily available all over the world, even where they're banned...
Also, I trust Apple a lot more than I trust the other tech companies, because they've been willing to stand up for the consumer -- other companies don't.
I believe it is possible to design a secure system that complies with warrants while otherwise retaining user privacy; you don't. That's okay.
Before computers existed police could bust down your door with a warrant and search through the files/mail. I don't see why that should change just because we store files/mail digitally now.
No one with any credibility in the field of math or CS believes this fiction. In addition, I encrypt my data specifically so that no one can get to it. That includes the government. I don't care what the government thinks they are entitled to with regard to my data.
My proposed system in the original post is just as secure as any current scheme.
> No one with any credibility in the field of math or CS believes this fiction. In addition, I encrypt my data specifically so that no one can get to it.
Huh? It's easy to get an individual's data. Don't fool yourself. You are not low hanging fruit in broad attacks, but if a highly skilled group wanted your data, they could easily get it. I would just look at what keyboard you use and swap it with an identical one that has an invisible keylogger in it. Or I would get to know you and your coworkers and do a precise spear phish.
Bam, instantly compromised, no decryption needed.
It's only if you commit a terrorist attack and then commit suicide that I have a hard time getting your data because I can no longer spearphish or keylog you.
You can’t get my keyboard, and I don’t answer phishing attacks. This isn't about that -- in fact you're making the argument your broken key management system isn't needed.
And yeah, I don't know who you are obviously. But if I did and you were my target, I could pwn you easily. Pwning individuals is easy with keyloggers.
Also, my scheme isn't broken by design, you just labelled it as such with no evidence. You never said why it's broken by design. Because it's not.
You have articulated clearly that you require your proposed system to have a backdoor for the authorities to use to read the traffic. That is the definition of broken by design.
Good day.
Also dead people cannot be social engineered.
Good day.
My muslim coworker was recently arrested by the FBI for trying to carry out a truck attack (apparently he was radicalized by online ISIS videos) - it might be nice to get a warrant for his phone and see who else he was talking to or conspiring with.
Or for the sake of privacy we could just not have any of that information which is what you are suggesting?
The bar for developing law and schemes for eradicating privacy rights should be higher than "it might be nice".
That's a pretty high bar if you ask me.
The problem is that we have already extant and widely circulated encryption algorithms that (we believe) are secure against decryption. It's math. You can't "uninvent and destroy" all the math and preclude its use by adversaries determined to use it.
A single message can mobilize millions of people to take to the streets and riot. A single firearm can't do that.
Why haven't they thought of that in Chicago, Stockton, Newark, Detroit, Memphis, Baltimore!? Oh wait, no.
Stolen guns that actually make up the majority of crimes committed with, and straw purchases that "your plan" doesn't address. You know, reality of the situation, not what you heard on the news.
I suppose there is also the fact it doesn't address that the murder rate in London is the same as NYC, despite an extreme lack of availability of guns surrounding London. Which strongly implies that guns aren't the only way murders are committed.
I was ready to agree with you the problem was just "regulations" but then I thought about it.
If you are arguing that NY and London shouldn’t have the same murder rate, well, I don’t see how that plays for three reasons.
1. Despite the laws, criminals break them. Guns aren’t allowed to be carried in NY, but people do it anyhow. Just as heroin and coke aren’t legal ANYWHERE but we have lots of crime with them.
2. The murders in London are mostly knife as the weapon. New York has knife laws too, but not as strong as London iirc. I know my everyday carry knives are all illegal in both places.
3. Very much on topic, Illinois, Delaware, New Jersey, and etc have some of the strongest antigun laws in the country and cities with highest crime and guns as murder weapons. Here is the thing... we know EXACTLY, down to the neighborhoods where our crime is, and our rural areas with all the guns are on-par with rural Europe murder rates 2-4 per 100,000.
Also you are proposing a solution where access to private information is gated by economics. I'd invite you to think about the connotations and ramifications of that model in our current society a little more.
That's the problem with all these systems, you're increasing the size of the attack surface enormously.
e) If the keys are stolen, issue new keys to all devices
The leaked keys are only good for physically compromised devices in the hands of people with access to the scanning electron microscopes, which I daresay is an extremely small attack surface.
There is only a small window after the leak in which a device can be stolen, powered down, and compromised.
On the other hand, you could mandate that such keys aren't allowed to be stored in databases (physical access only)
My point it that you could make it so difficult to break E2E for even the most elite hackers that the only realistic way to do it is with a warrant.
Like who? Russia? China?
Here's how they can compromise my device:
1. Locate me within the USA (easy)
2. Send a spy onto US soil to find me and steal my phone (hard)
3. Send another spy to work for Apple (easy)
4. Spy needs to break into Apple's vault and retrieve airgapped media containing my device's private key without a warrant (super hard)
5. Send both back to the motherland and use scanning electron microscope to complete the process (easy)
You really think that is viable? Seems extremely far fetched to me. Can you provide a more realistic scenario?
(And I suspect, for a sufficiently-motivated state-level actor, that actually falls under "easy", or at most "medium".)
Have we? I'm going to assume that you mean CAs in the Web PKI and not just "My friend Bob runs TLS and this has happened to the CA he was running on his Windows 10 laptop".
The last CA where we had a really grave problem was DigiNotar, in 2011. It seem _very_ unlikely that the problem at DigiNotar was full key compromise, instead bad guys appear to have penetrated the issuance infrastructure. This means they were able to (and did) issue themselves arbitrary certificates, but it did not give them the actual keys as you've said "happens frequently".
Since then we've seen a variety of unacceptable behaviour, including issuing backdated certificates to conceal the (also problematic) choice to continue doing something that was no longer allowed in new certificates, and issuing "test" certificates which would have been trusted by real client software even though their contents were known to be false. All unacceptable, and all having consequences (for example Symantec is no longer a CA) but all far short of "vendor has the keys stolen or leaked by a disgruntled employee".
Yes.
The key is write-only... there is no way for the vendor to read it without physical access to the device
Apple, for instance, encrypts a lot of your data using your AppleID password, which they obviously don't know, so they have no way to decrypt that data.
And note that it was the Clinton administration that proposed it, for all those who want to make this a Trump issue.
Why is it so hard to create a cryptographic solution that would allow E2E that works 99.9% of the time, is resistant to malicious actors, but is breakable with a warrant? Have people really even tried?
For example, consider the following system:
1. E2E decryption keys are encrypted with vendor's device-specific asynchronous key
2. Keys are then stored in write-only non-volatile storage
3. Only way to read key is with expensive hardware that is difficult for civilians to obtain/replicate (scanning electron microscope, etc.)
4. Thus, only way to decrypt key is by a) physically obtaining device, b) using expensive hardware to extract encrypted key(s), c) serving encrypted key along with legal warrant to vendor who would then comply with the law (or not, if it is unlawful)
Wouldn't such a system allow privacy yet also be resistant to attacks?