My point it that you could make it so difficult to break E2E for even the most elite hackers that the only realistic way to do it is with a warrant.
Like who? Russia? China?
Here's how they can compromise my device:
1. Locate me within the USA (easy)
2. Send a spy onto US soil to find me and steal my phone (hard)
3. Send another spy to work for Apple (easy)
4. Spy needs to break into Apple's vault and retrieve airgapped media containing my device's private key without a warrant (super hard)
5. Send both back to the motherland and use scanning electron microscope to complete the process (easy)
You really think that is viable? Seems extremely far fetched to me. Can you provide a more realistic scenario?
(And I suspect, for a sufficiently-motivated state-level actor, that actually falls under "easy", or at most "medium".)
e) If the keys are stolen, issue new keys to all devices
The leaked keys are only good for physically compromised devices in the hands of people with access to the scanning electron microscopes, which I daresay is an extremely small attack surface.
There is only a small window after the leak in which a device can be stolen, powered down, and compromised.
On the other hand, you could mandate that such keys aren't allowed to be stored in databases (physical access only)