...but not if you follow the procedure set out by Boeing and reiterated in an FAR published after the Lion Air crash. The ET302 pilots recognized that they were dealing with MCAS failure, and followed the procedure, including toggling the trim cutout switches. On 737 NGs, one could turn off trim automation while allowing electrical control from the yoke, but on the Max, the latter was also disabled when these switches were toggled [1]. I don't think this way in which the Max differs from the NG came out until later.
This created a second problem - the trim wheels are very hard to turn manually under the load created by using the elevator to counteract the mis-trim. The procedure in this case is to unload the stabilizer jack-screw by pitching down, but the airplane was not high enough for that.
This might have been apparent if pilots had trained for an MCAS failure, which brings us to a question I had in another thread: Were there any simulators that realistically simulated MCAS failure, or were the simulator manufacturers and operators as much in the dark about MCAS as were pilots and airlines?
[1] https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boein...
I read about this in the newspaper, it wasn't a secret. I do not have inside information.
Again, if I was an MCAS pilot I'd be very interested in following what happened with the Lion Air crash, to ensure it wouldn't happen to me. I'd still follow the procedures set out by Boeing - but when they didn't work I'd do what did work.
It's a little hard to discern from the erratic newspaper reports, but during the time the pilots were fighting the MCAS they were using the trim switches and surely would have noticed that those switches overrode the MCAS.
The reason we have pilots, and not a fully automated airplane, is we need them to think outside of the procedures when the procedures aren't working. This is not impossible as the pilots in the flight prior to the LA crash did have MCAS runaway and did successfully deal with it.
You would have to pulse the switch in sub-5 second increments depending on the way the switch works.
If it's a direct switch, I.e. switch held down->motor moves, then they'd have to hold it down until trim was neutralized, then cut it out.
If it's a discrete toggle, I.e. each toggle increments/decrements a set point the motor then follows; a pilot would have to be very conscious of their timing on the switches, and how much the stabilizer had actually managed to travel.
Both of these would constitute new, MAX specific skills, that Boeing cannot show any acknowledgement or foreknowledge of without opening a massive can of worms.
That's why I suggested in this thread to activate the cutoff switches when the trim is in the correct position.
The electric trim switches are a hold down => motor moves. It's not a MAX specific skill. Neither are the cutoff switches.
Neat!
>It's not a MAX specific skill. Neither are the cutoff switches.
Well, the cutoff switches functionality was changed according to the Seattle Times, so while the procedure may be shared, the semantic significance of the switches did, in fact, change for MAX.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boein...
While we certainly hope that pilots will be able to extemporize a solution to a situation, even if that involves going beyond or against the documented procedure, and while it is certainly possible that there was a course of action that could have saved ET302 (though the success of the Lion Air pilots does not necessarily prove that, as there were differences), I do not accept the implication that if such a course of action existed, there is nothing to be concerned about. Reliance on pilots' problem-solving skills should be a last resort, not a planned-for solution, and those skills certainly are not helped by withholding information about aircraft systems.
> I do not accept the implication that if such a course of action existed, there is nothing to be concerned about.
I did not suggest that. Nearly all crashes are the result of a string of failures, including these crashes, and each point needs to be corrected.
> and those skills certainly are not helped by withholding information about aircraft systems.
After the LA crash, that was no longer the case. I reiterate that my information comes from the newspaper. If I was a MAX pilot you bet I'd be much more diligent in finding things out, if only just to save my own hide.
I further find it very strange that after the prior LA flight successfully dealt with the MCAS failure, that the airplane was still deemed flight-worthy and nobody even bothered to inform the next flight crew?
There's plenty of failure that needs to be dealt with all around with those accidents.
Maybe the crew of the earlier Lion Air flight were lucky and had the airplane temporarily back in trim at the point where the deadheading pilot recognized that they had an ongoing trim runaway situation, for which toggling the trim cutout switches was the documented response [1].
I think it is unreasonable to suggest that the EL302 pilots were negligently unprepared. After using the trim cutout switches to disable MCAS, they found they were unable to correct the trim manually, so they did exactly what you suggested in your first post: they re-engaged the electric trim and attempted, unsuccessfully, to re-trim the airplane before it crashed. This suggests a familiarity with the AD issued after the Lion Air inquiry. Maybe if they had not switched the trim off initially, they would have prevailed, but the message from Boeing after the Lion Air crash was that its pilots were at fault because they failed to use the cutout switches.
Given that Boeing was still holding to the line that MCAS failure should be handled as if it were just another case of trim runaway, and that the procedure for that was the same as on previous variants, the pilots could reasonably consider themselves to be well-prepared for the situation - they now knew about the problem, and they had trained for recovering from trim runaway on NG simulators. The AD issued after the Lion Air inquiry says "Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT", but it says nothing about this differing from the NG, where one can disable faulty inputs while retaining trim-switch control. It also says "If relaxing the control column causes the trim to move, set stabilizer trim switches to CUTOUT" - and it seems quite possible that, in the case of MCAS runaway, relaxing the control column could coincide with the trim continuing to move (and the crew is not in a position to determine causation), at which point, using the cutout switches is prescribed. Finally, this checklist [1] says "If the runaway continues after the autopilot is disengaged: STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches (both) [to] CUTOUT." None of this says anything directly about getting the airplane back in trim before toggling the cutout switches, if that is what is necessary to regain control if this happens close to the surface.
[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/the-boeing-737-max-8-aircraft...
The critical question here would be would be did they use the electric trim switches, and did they cut off the trim after re-trimming the stabilizer?
> None of this says anything directly about getting the airplane back in trim before toggling the cutout switches,
The FAD did say that directly, and you quoted that part.
> if that is what is necessary to regain control if this happens close to the surface.
It obviously was necessary. It's why they re-engaged the trim system.
Pilots are not robots blindly following procedures - if they were, we wouldn't have pilots on the airplanes, it would be run be a computer. Pilots are expected to have understanding of what the switches do and how to use them.
The wording of the FAD could be improved, but it is not that hard to understand. The electric trim switches override any other inputs to the stab trim, and the cutoff switches prevent powered movement of the stabilizer. Those two facts are all one needs to know to regain control.
On first reading, I also thought the quoted passage from the AD was an instruction to use the yoke switch to re-trim before cutting out the stabilizer trim, but the following sentence (also quoted above) makes it clear that it is not: it is actually part of a statement about what options are available to adjust the trim before and after the switches are set to cutout. I feel sure you will try to argue this point, but I am pretty confident that this is the correct reading, because the checklist has no mention of delaying trim cutout. This is very significant, because the checklist is what pilots are trained and expected to follow (and, furthermore, I believe this checklist is a 'memory item' - one of the procedures that pilots are required to be able to perform from memory.) Nothing in a checklist should be incomplete or ambiguous, nothing of consequence should be taken as read, and if anything is, it is a more serious matter than poor wording.
And the checklist is unambiguous about what to do: if the problem persists after the autopilot is disengaged, use the trim cutout, and thereafter, trim manually - this is what the crew experienced, and this is what the crew did.
It is quite clear from the documentation that the manual trim wheels were regarded as an adequate means of adjusting the trim if the electric trim was cut out. Once the pilots found that this wasn't working, they did extemporize - they re-enabled the electric trim - showing that, contrary to what you insinuate, they did understand what the switches do.
You have set up a false dichotomy between pilots acting as robots and being able to extemporize a solution to every problem from first principles. The reality is that aviation has achieved its unprecedented level of safety by, in part, by considering a great many things that could go wrong and figuring out the optimal responses, taking into account that these responses must be made in a stressful and often degraded (informationally, functionally, physiologically) situation. Pilots are trained, and expected, to execute the documented procedures promptly, and only deviate when the situation demands: extemporize on a check ride, and you are likely to fail. This is not mindless bureaucracy at work: it is the rigorous application of hard-learned lessons. At the same time, they are also expected to know their airplanes thoroughly so that they can respond to unanticipated problems, and this is precisely why they were annoyed at not being told about MCAS.
So, to summarize: 1) by their actions, the crew demonstrated that they were up-to-date on the procedures that nominally incorporated the lessons from JT610; 2) by their responses to a problem with this procedure, they demonstrated that they did understand what the switches did and how to use them. Undoubtedly they did not figure out what they needed to do as rapidly as you would have in their place, but it is unreasonable to fault them for that.
I recently learned that, prior to the Max, the trim wheels were so rarely needed that their use was no longer part of simulator training, and the diameter of the wheels was reduced on the Max, yet here we have an AD saying you can use these wheels to trim the airplane when the electrical mechanism is cut out, and item 6 on the checklist explicitly says to do so. Elsewhere in the AFM it notes that the trim wheels can be hard to move in some circumstances, but if you are going to fault the pilots for not connecting the dots, then it applies doubly so for the people at Boeing and the FAA tasked with writing and certifying the procedures for handling an MCAS failure, who all apparently overlooked something that was obvious to you just from reading some newspaper articles.
At this point, the more you argue that an effective procedure for dealing with MCAS runaway was obvious following the JT610 inquiry, the more you indict Boeing and the FAA for not making it explicit in their response.
[1] https://www.businessinsider.com/ethiopian-airlines-et302-boe...
Check out the altitude graphic here [1]. It must have been absolutely terrifying, I doubt many of us have the nerves of steel to react so quickly and correctly in such a situation.
[1] https://graphics.reuters.com/ETHIOPIA-AIRPLANE/0100911Q1DX/i...
1. set the electric trim switches to nose up
2. enable the trim via the cutoff switches
3. wait until correct trim is established
4. cut off the trim via the cutoff switches
> I doubt many of us have the nerves of steel to react so quickly and correctly in such a situation
Indeed. That's why, if I was an MCAS pilot, I would have carefully read the reports on what went wrong, what went right with the previous LA flight, how the trim system worked, and what I needed to do if it happened to me.
It's my own life at stake. I don't understand not doing this.
My father used to do acrobatic formation flying with the Air Force. The idea for everyone but the lead is to concentrate on the wingtip of the adjacent airplane and track it. There were incidents where the lead would fly into the ground and the rest of the formation would fly in, too.
Against orders, my dad said he'd be damned if the lead would fly him into the ground, and would keep one eye on the wingtip and the other on the ground. He died as a very old man.
You might also want to read Chuck Yeager's biography. In it he makes a point of not just following checklists, but learning how the airplane systems worked. Saved his life many times. Yeager's still alive, and has buried many of his colleagues who took shortcuts.
The pilots could have also had this reflex training on the effected systems, but Boeing and the regulators decided not to bother with training, and the training they did have was inadequate because Boeing's system was fatally flawed.
> They didn't need to manually trim it:
This procedure you outlined goes directly in the face of Boeing's guidance to 'follow the procedure for runaway trim'. Since the system wasn't documented at all, I assume people would trust that the procedure should work. It's not until the plane is diving into the ground due to uncorrectable trim did they discover the procedure was going to get them killed.
I suspect that will be a crucial point in the NTSB's report.
Your assessment about pilots not being ordered to their deaths is incorrect. My father served as a navigator on B-17s in WW2. He was ordered to fly 30 missions. At the time, the 30 mission survival rate was 20%, as bad as any beach assault.
The aircrews knew this, and it put a terrible strain on them. But they went anyway. My father told me he was convinced he was going to die, made peace with it, and simply decided to do the best job he could before he bought it.
The Luftwaffe pilots had it even worse. There was no 30 mission maximum. It was fly until you die. Not many survived.
I've wondered the same thing. My assumption is that the MCAS disables the input of the trim switches used by the pilots when it's active. We know that MCAS resets itself after certain conditions and 'forgets' what it did previously to override it's intended maximum authority. It's also be stated that the MCAS is 'reset' when the pilot uses the trim switches, but I would think that this would have been abundantly apparent as well: press switch, nose stops going down, unless they just did not notice the trim being activated in the first place (which based on other people's accounts, that would be hard to miss due to a giant wheel).
> Your assessment about pilots not being ordered to their deaths is incorrect. My father served as a navigator on B-17s in WW2. He was ordered to fly 30 missions. At the time, the 30 mission survival rate was 20%, as bad as any beach assault.
Fair enough, that does sound pretty brutal. My point was more about the reflexive training to overcome fear to function. It might be impossible to think critically in such a moment for most people, thus the goal is to put people on 'autopilot' when they encounter a specific scenario.
But, WW2 was USAAF, USAF didn't exist yet, so no way for me to get that context ;)
I can give you a good hunch as to why.
Because the absolute last thing a pilot wants to do with a plane load of people is experiment. That's what a simulator is for.
I stumbled across the "suppress MCAS by trim switch spamming" within the first few seconds after I read a complete description of the system's functionality.
It took a complete description of the problem, and a background in programming/systems design, engineering, and an enthusiast+ level of aviation familiarity to come to that course of action in that amount of time, under ideal information processing conditions, with the initial information uptake immediately prior to the advent of reasoning.
Airline pilots had how to fly, and no information initially that there were dragons there, and even once they knew, they had no way to try to build new situational reflexes due to the lack of availability of accurate MAX simulators, because Boeing fought tooth and nail to get the regulator to agree that they weren't necessary.
They had to manually fault inject on an NG simulator to even get an understanding of the conditions involved.
Military pilot training, from my understamding, bypasses the simulator, and dumps you into the seat of some of the most disagreeable aircraft ever designed, with an instructor who sabotages you regularly, leaving you in a spin, and you have 30 seconds to recover please. Begin.
In that case, it's you, and the a-hole who just put you in a flat spin. Experiment away. Not 100+ innocent civilians depending on your ability to reason through what this damn plane is doing.
Point being, information about the airframe was withheld due to an absolutely crushing need by Boeing for the aircraft to not require even the smallest degree of retraining.
The pilots were absolutely not at fault for not being able or willing to experiment at the drop of a hat with a system they suddenly realized they had no way to understand.
Putting them in that position in the first place is undeniably Boeing's fault.
Indeed. Pilot training should attempt to wash out those people.
There's an audiotape of a test pilot who's airplane went into an uncontrollable spin at high altitude. He was in conversation with the ground, and methodically tried one thing after another, all the way down, voice even and calm to the end. It's astonishing.
I am pretty sure that most if not all pilots are following these things very carefully. As you know well, Boeing has been way too slow to divulge the information necessary for “learning how the airplane systems worked”.
The Lion Air pilots didn’t know how the system works because they could not know. The Ethiopian Airlines pilots did cut out Stab Trim, and later switched it back on, possibly because they know more about the system than you do, and it made sense to them to deviate from the checklist (just the way you advocate, incidentally) - consider the two switches on the NG and undisclosed change in functionality on the MAX. Or maybe it was a CRM mistake, maybe one pilot thought the other one would hold the etrim switch pressed ANU.
We don’t know yet. But it is rather annoying to read from you how you’d have saved the plane so and so, because you followed the story in the newspaper and value your life and all. But, yeah, keep telling pilots to read the newspapers and inform them that they’ll die if their airplane crashes, maybe then we won’t have any accidents anymore.
That graph is based on faulty FlightAware data. According to the preliminary report they were at 7,000 feet AGL and climbing when they re-enabled the electric trim.
It remains crazy how much this procedure would have required the pilots to do. It's utterly senseless how bad cockpit automation remains in 2019. If Boeing was going to add a bunch of code to the cockpit, they should have made flying the plane in an emergency easier, not harder.
But would "the procedure" actually have saved the plane? I don't believe so. WalterBright is arguing that the pilots should have known better than "the procedure" and done something different from what the checklists and memory items proscribed. I can't comment on doing so — as I'm not an airline pilot — but to put blame on pilots in this sort of situation without acknowledging Boeing's actions is beyond tasteless.
IMHO Boeing is 100% responsible for the deaths.
> tasteless
When you're trying to make airplanes safe, matters of taste, politics, emotions and legal culpability have nothing to do with it. The NTSB has a very good track record of dispassionately sticking to the facts, and I am looking forward to reading their report.
Here's the deal, though: this wasn't just one crash. It was two. The failure mode of the second was indeed different than the first: it was a failure of Boeing and the aviation authorities to appropriately respond to the first disaster.
To propose that pilots should have willy-nilly flipped MCAS on and off based on your reading of the news is just staggering. What if there was another bug where turning on MCAS when there was an AoA disagree led to an instant plunge, regardless of etrim inputs? I'd bet you'd be critiquing those dead pilots for not following the checklist — and keeping MCAS off — in such a case.
It's not willy-nilly nor staggering. The EAD (referenced in another post here) indeed talks about using the electric trim to fix the nose down problem, and then cutting off power to the system.
So add in the part where you can’t actually trust what your instruments are telling you, and the plane is flying like a demon has possessed it.
In the moment you are wondering, is the plane stalling? Is my airspeed actually what is being displayed? Why is trim not responding? My heart is beating 200bpm. Is that whooshing the blood in my ears or the wind?
The answers to these questions is obvious in hindsight. In that moment the flight had entered mortal peril. The question is not why didn’t the pilots recover from mortal peril with perfect hindsight. The question is how did this flight get into mortal peril in the first place?
My point is that it's easy to armchair quarterback the pilots whether they followed the checklist or went off checklist to do something better or worse. The problem started long before they got in the cockpit, though, and had been made evident once before at the cost of 189 lives. To continue to focus on pilots' actions at this point is missing the elephant for the flea.
The EA pilots already had gone off the checklist when they turned the stab trim back on.
I said "pick on" the pilots, not "blame" them. There were a lot of bad things that added up. In the case of the Lion Air flight, the maintenance staff signed off on the plane even though they were aware the angle-of-attack sensors were completely broken, which had nearly caused a crash on the previous flight. The previous flights' pilots also either didn't report this incident, or their report was disregarded. Then when the emergency occurred, the pilots didn't know what to do. There are many reasons that that any plane's trim system could have malfunctioned, and the black box data suggests the pilots would have been unable to manage any of them. So the plane was taking off in an non-airworthy state with pilots who didn't know how to deal with a common system failure and weren't told that a system had just malfunctioned hours previously on this exact aircraft. The MCAS failure was a match thrown into a kindling box of bad circumstances.
The LionAir crash was a tragedy. The Ethiopian Airlines crash was not just a tragedy; it was a complete systemic failure to appropriately react.
One thing to keep in mind: it’s not like there’s a big sign popping up saying “hey, AoA is faulty, MCAS is trimming down the nose, unless you set Stab Trim switches to cutout. What do you want to do?”
Instead, you have stick shaker activation during climb out, EICAS warnings, chaos, and you struggle to bring things under control by putting the plane into a stable, manual, mode (autopilot off, flaps up, ...), and then MCAS kicks in surreptitiously, more or less (you have the trim wheels turning, but a lot of other stuff is going on), and trims your nose down.
> it baffles me why pilots wouldn't have known about successful corrective action
They did, and they flipped the stab trim switches to cutout, but they didn’t manage to overcome the required forces on the trim wheel to trim properly, and switched the stab trim back on. Now, there was the other issue with there being two stab trim switches on the NG with different function, which, if I understand correctly, would allow you to reenable the electric trim switch on the yoke while keeping the automatic stab trim disabled - but on the MAX apparently those two switches are identical, without that having been mentioned, to avoid recertification (I haven’t seen any proper elucidation of that yet - if you have two identical off switches, do you need to set them both to off, or only one, to turn it off?). I wonder (and again, haven’t seen anything about that yet) whether they flipped one of the switches back on, to get the electric trim support, deeming themselves safe from MCAS as the other one was still cut out, only to be foiled by the aircraft.
This is what I mean when the newspaper articles constantly leave out crucial details. You have to read many articles to get an idea of the complete picture.
It doesn't matter that a third pilot figured out what was wrong and what the corrective action should be. Because after he did it, it was known and all the pilots should have known.
https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA...
You know how else to make it known to pilots? By making it a part of their training materials. But Boeing had significant financial interest in not doing so.
"Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT."
The MCAS system was known about after the Lion Air crash, and it baffles me why pilots wouldn't have known about successful corrective action taken on the previous flight. After all, I read about this in the newspaper. It wasn't a secret.
It's hard to tell from the newspaper accounts, which often leave off crucial details, but it seems the electric trim switches (on the control column) override the MCAS commands. So the way to recover is to set the electric trim switches to nose up, turn the trim system on at the cutoff switches, wait until it's trimmed out properly, then turn it off via the cutoff switches and let go of the electric trim switches.