News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by WalterBright on Thursday April 18, 2019 @05:50PM (#19695107)
You'll see it in any piece of software written by any developer who is self-managed. The notion that software quality would greatly improve without managers is a myth.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by ken on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:00PM (#19695180)
We seem to have very different experiences. Every manager I ever had (including one at Boeing) has pushed me to ship software that wasn't at all ready, on the basis that the UI of the prototype looked good.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by inflatableDodo on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:43PM (#19695449)
I am terrified these days of showing anything that looks like something that works to a project manager or client, without covering it in warning graphics.

Even photoshop mockups of UIs, introduced as, "Here's a photoshop mockup of the UI, what do you think?" will get some people to demand that it be shipped immediately.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by outworlder on Thursday April 18, 2019 @08:45PM (#19696110)
One thing that I've learned (from someone else) is that unfinished software should look unfinished. Even if you have to muck around with CSS, disable some buttons here and there, maybe add something out of place.

If the UI looks perfect, then everyone will deem it to be finished, even people who should know better.

Yes, I'm advocating knowingly crippling demos. Your master branch may have something prettier, but take a sledgehammer and uglify the bastard before showing to decision makers.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by WalterBright on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:19PM (#19695309)
If you were your own manager for your own code, you'd do it to. I'm unaware of any data showing managed software development is buggier than programmers working by themselves, and my experience is it is less buggy.

Programmers by default tend to want to work on the fun stuff in a program, and neglect the unfun pedestrian stuff. This is where managers step in to improve things.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by blunte on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:32PM (#19695379)
Funny you should present it this way. My view is the opposite. As a self-managed, often solo developer, I find that team developers seem sloppy and very willing to choose not to consider the full scope of possibilities because they figure it's not their problem. Many of them work "to spec" and (rightfully?) choose not to consider the bigger picture.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by rubicon33 on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:31PM (#19695374)
It's the artificial timeline, not the manager. The manager just enforces the artificial timeline.

A developer themselves can hold themselves to an artificial timeline. It takes discipline, and patience, to choose quality over speed to market.

CEOs and managers almost always prioritize time to market, over quality. That's the problem.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by WalterBright on Thursday April 18, 2019 @07:05PM (#19695555)
Most projects (not just software) never ship unless there's a deadline. For example, how many students complete their term papers weeks before they're due? If there was no due date, how many would ever complete them? I know I never would have learned much of anything in college without deadlines and exams.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by rubicon33 on Thursday April 18, 2019 @07:17PM (#19695620)
Of course. I'm not advocating for no deadlines. I'm advocating for flexibility.

If your deadline arrives and you can honestly say you've worked hard but haven't met it, consider extending the deadline in the name of quality.

Again, this takes discipline. You have to be honest with yourself if you are just moving the deadline back because you were slacking. In my case many times, the deadline was not hit because the scope of the project was underestimated. We were working hard on a new technology stack, but missed the deadline. Rather than delay the product, CEO decided to launch (despite our warnings).

Needless to say, the brand suffered.

I understand its a tug of war. Managers need to put out something. Engineers are never ready. The art in it all, is finding the balance. Being flexible to listen to your engineers, and knowing them well enough to trust them.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by LordHog on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:04PM (#19695215)
In the various industries I have worked in DO-178B, industrial controls/IEC-61508, and storage the one consistency shared by managers is meeting schedules and milestones. Generally, a manager's insight to development/engineering is for the product to be just good enough. Developers/engineers have a tendency to over engineer the solution. Good peer reviews have the most influence on software quality as does independent testing. Managers rarely have little impact that I have witness over my 25 year career, thus far. For industries that adhere to DO-178B or IEC-61508 guidelines, it is the process that imbues greatly improved quality.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by airbreather on Wednesday April 24, 2019 @01:56PM (#19741067)
Yep, 61508 is basically a specialized form of IS0 9000 quality management.

And independent testing really makes a difference, I am trying to introduce automated testing into my company at the moment, they still spend a month with buttons and lights testing a safety system.

I have been getting blank looks when I ask how they test for single scan events like this. But I know of several industrial incidents resulting from common single scan software design failures in safety systems (usually order of execution issues, but sometimes the flitter logic of oneshots is the cuplrit).

One single scan incident in particular was from equipment in service for over 10 years, and then the stars suddenly aligned and the resulting software failure event ended up costing a big miner well over a billion dollars.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by ncmncm on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:29PM (#19695367)
I have frequently seen standards, guidelines, and "process" prevent improvements to code. Since change is considered risky, it takes more time and effort to document improvement than the individual change is worth.

But software improves, when it does, by a series of small changes, each by itself hardly worth doing, but in sum producing a wholly better product.

It is the process that turned lizards into birds.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by WalterBright on Thursday April 18, 2019 @07:08PM (#19695580)
Businesses would not employ expensive managers if the dev teams worked better without them.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by andbberger on Thursday April 18, 2019 @05:52PM (#19695121)
[citation needed]

idk man, my code is pretty damn clean

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by WalterBright on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:06PM (#19695231)
I think my code is cool, too, until I look at it again 5 years in the future.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by D-Coder on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:20PM (#19695318)
There's your problem — you're releasing too early. :-)
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by alacombe on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:00PM (#19695176)
Code cleanliness has no correlation with lack of bugs. Also, 1) your sample size is pretty small, and 2) what looks clean to you might very well be despicable to someone else.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by blunte on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:36PM (#19695399)
And more importantly in this case, the appearance of your code is relatively meaningless compared to you failing to consider all cases of inputs.

Honestly, the appearance of code is irrelevant. The goal is to absolutely accurately meet the requirements - the true, actual requirements. It may not be within scope to know all the information you need to know to cover all the cases, and that's certainly a problem. But the cleanliness of your code, assuming it functions correctly, is unimportant to the operation. (It certainly will be a maintenance cost, though.)

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by onemoresoop on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:55PM (#19695509)
The actual argument is that code cleanliness improves readability which in turn makes finding bugs easier and also eases the conceptualizing of what the code does. I'd say it's first line of defense against bugs.. tests could miss bugs too but that doesn't mean we shouldn't test thoroughly
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by andbberger on Thursday April 18, 2019 @07:45PM (#19695779)
I guess that was a poorly chosen word on my part then. How about 'elegant'.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by ncmncm on Thursday April 18, 2019 @09:16PM (#19696244)
"Elegant" does't mean "right" either.

But with elegant code it is often easier to tell if it's not right, and also how to get it right if it's not. Often that requires making it less elegant, because the real world rarely poses elegant problems. You want to ensure that as much as possible of the necessary inelegance is at the top level, with everything below clean.