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Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by ninkendo on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @03:13PM (#19627836)
Fascinating. But it seems like the kind of scenario that would be odd for the pilot, no? You nose down, a stall warning goes off, so you nose back up again? That's exactly the opposite of what a pilot would be trained to do, right?

I'd imagine in a car, if my vehicle warned me that I was going too fast when I slowed down, my reaction wouldn't be to speed the vehicle back up to avoid the warning...

Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by chupa-chups on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @03:20PM (#19627892)
Exactly, and this is what caused the crash. The other pilots simply did not think of one of them trying to pitch up.

This is well sourced, sadly not on wikipedia. But there are countless threads of real pilots.

I guess Air France had some influence.

Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by foldr on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @03:30PM (#19627978)
It's not well sourced. It's a speculation in an old Popular Mechanics article published before the official accident report. The official accident report does not identify the sidesticks as a factor in the crash (because they weren't).
Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by chupa-chups on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @03:32PM (#19627996)
https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/539756-af-447-thread-no-12-a...

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/2012-07-08/final-af4...

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/stall-warning-con...

https://www.quora.com/Why-did-the-pilots-of-AF447-pull-up-in...

And an explanation why bonin did react as he did: https://www.flightsafetyaustralia.com/2015/08/without-warnin...

Downvotes are so cool, right? Just post your better informed opinion and enjoy the upvotes. This has the side-effect of not just informing me but others about your more correct opinion.

Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by foldr on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @03:37PM (#19628038)
The general consensus on pilot forums is that the side sticks were not a factor. See e.g. here:

http://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=772033&start=...

https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/14027/sidestick...

The thread you link to explains why the sidesticks are a red herring:

>Again, the stick inputs from the PF are very easy to see if you just look at them. You would see that immediately if you sat in an airbus pilot seat.

The PNF is going to spend most of his time looking at the instruments. He's hardly any more likely to be looking off to the side at his own control stick than he is to be looking at the other control stick, so linking them would be unlikely to make any difference.

Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by chupa-chups on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @03:40PM (#19628071)
I didn't say anything about sidesticks (in a comment below i did). I don't believe myself that the sidesticks were a real factor in themselves - but if the PM had sensed that PF (bonin) was pulling up he would have reacted earlier.
Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by foldr on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @03:46PM (#19628125)
The PNF wouldn't have sensed anything because his hand wouldn't have been on the stick.

The premise of the Popular Mechanics article is that for a significant period, each of the pilots thought that they were the PF and were unaware that the other pilot was making stick inputs at the same time. This is unlikely, because the Airbus has a clear "dual input" warning. If you read the transcript, you can see that there's actually quite a lot of discussion between the pilots about who is in control. It was only the captain who had any clear idea of the correct control inputs to make, and he wasn't seated at the controls at all, so linked sticks wouldn't have made any difference to him.

Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by cco on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @03:31PM (#19627987)
Yes, if memory serves in AirFrance 447 that upon finding out the co-pilot had been pulling up the whole time the other pilot is shocked to hear this and realizes the problem. I remember being really affected by this so I went out and found the transcript:

02:13:40 (Robert) Climb... climb... climb... climb...

02:13:40 (Bonin) But I've had the stick back the whole time! [At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself.]

02:13:42 (Captain) No, no, no… Don’t climb… no, no.

02:13:43 (Robert) Descend, then… Give me the controls… Give me the controls!

Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by foldr on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @03:41PM (#19628076)
What you're pasting there is an editorialized quotation of the transcript from an old Popular Mechanics article. The transcript and its English translation are here:

https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01_04...

https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01.en...

Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by auslander on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @10:40PM (#19630686)
> my reaction wouldn't be to speed the vehicle back up to avoid the warning...

In car you can see and feel what's going on. In a jet at night, with complex behaviour in 3D, you'll have much less sensory input, close to zero. Hence Instrument flying.

Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by oliveshell on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @03:18PM (#19627877)
I recall sleep deprivation was found to be a factor in the Air France crash. The pilots weren’t thinking clearly.
Re:Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data by cmurf on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @07:10PM (#19629595)
The final report says it's impossible to evaluate the level of fatigue as they have no data on their sleep during the stopover. But from the CVR, the report says the crew showed no signs of objective fatigue