Not true.
They may be connecting directly by IP (it's typically not possible to determine if they did just from access logs). The web (or other application) server may also leak the name when connected to.
If you use TLS, which is likely, your domain names would leak through the certificate transparency logs.
...and there are surely more leak vectors than the above, so it's far from certain that the crawlers you see found their target by sniffing your DNS requests.
There are a number of other, perhaps more likely, reasons your hostnames have leaked.
Have you got any certificates for any of those names? Then they are in the public CT database which numerous people constantly scan for interesting data.
Are any of your DNS zones enumerable for some reason? Same thing. Any reverse DNS set up? What protocols and public services do you run? Do any expose hostnames in the protocol handshake? Then you are in the public Internet scan datasets.
As soon as you run any kind of SSL on any of your protocols your hostname is in the SNI header.
Host names are visible in a number of ways. It is best to consider them public data. I have seen a number of ISPs from the inside, and none of them has had any interesting in wiretapping their customer's DNS data. I'm not saying it doesn't happen, but it can't be very common. They have much more interesting data available to them should they want to go down that road.
But I am the owner of my own network, and DoH reduces my ability to protect it. That is the main (but not only) reason why I strongly object to DoH.
> I think this train has passed.
I suspect the battle has just begun. For example, my response to DoH has been to implement a MITM packet inspection system on my network to regain control over this. This means that DoH will not work from my network. I expect that we're going to see this sort of thing more and more.
If you are MitMing all encrypted traffic anyway, why not block whatever you want to block when someone actually tries to connect to it, rather than trying to prevent them from learning where it is?
I want to maintain the ability to block the resolution of certain domain names.
The threat model is malicious software or websites that want to phone home. This includes reaching out to command-and-control servers, ad tracking servers, data exfiltration points, etc.
> If you are MitMing all encrypted traffic anyway, why not block whatever you want to block when someone actually tries to connect to it
Because most of the malicious actors don't use raw IP addresses as they can change frequently and without notice. They resolve a domain name instead. Blocking the domain name lookup is therefor more effective and less likely to result in blocking the wrong things than working with raw IP addresses.
This is not a replacement for other security measures (including IP-based blocks), but is is, in my opinion, a critical measure in and of itself.
Some schools already started to block Firefox from being installed because it was being used as a "VPN" by some elementary students to access porn - at school. Guess what this VPN was? Just DNS over HTTPS.
There is a fine line between your ISP and local network operators that NEED to apply some security policies to their traffic. Even Google offers "Safe Search" for schools and libraries that removes porn content.
Unfortunately, on our school network, we also allow BYOD, so we will have to have some strict rules to block DoH, the same way we block proxies and vpns.
You're free to do whatever you like with devices that you own and you're also free to have an acceptable use policy on your network but breaking security and privacy to accomplish it is the exact wrong way to go about it.
In my ideal world school BYOD devices would either not be allowed at or be given a private single-device VLAN with a direct unfiltered connection upstream, and made clear in policy that the school doesn't own, support, or control any aspect of them. No different whatsoever than students using their cellular connection.
Don't push things into applications and make things more difficult for everyone else when you can secure your own computer.
Because the we're dealing with computers as they actually exist and are configured. And within epsilon every personal computer on the planet is configured to trust DHCP and set their DNS servers to whatever is offered. So we're in a situation where these particular applications also don't really trust the OS to a certain extent.
As for the DHCP part, if you're on a public network you should only trust it as far as you need it to bootstrap your tunnel over which you can then finally contact a trusted resolver.
OS resolver -> a single thing you need to secure every app uses its own resolver -> complete mess which makes it harder to ensure privacy of your traffic
I absolutely agree that DNS should be a system-level concern rather than app-level. But today, right now, for computers as they are and will continue to be for the foreseeable future this is a huge improvement. Browsers being the app that handles basically all of our sensitive information I think have earned the exception.
Doing it properly would involve securing the system, once. This could be easily done by installing a DoH stub resolver service and then pointing the system config to localhost.
That’s not a very good governance strategy.
You trust your device and the entity, and the entity trusts the infrastructure and services they're using. Everything else is the enemy. So moving the barrier to a CDN which the entity trusts is actually an improvement over intermediate ISPs which neither of you trust.
Thanks for posting this. I knew Paul is against DoH, but never understood his specific arguments. He has great comment about DoT (dns over TLS) couple of minutes before the linked youtube (I agree with him on that).
Personally I'm not an "owner" of the networks I'm connecting to. My home router is managed by my ISP, I don't run pi-hole. Network at work is managed by yet-someone-else. I often use my mobile carrier (LTE tethering), and often use WiFi at coffee shops.
For all of these cases I would prefer to not expose my DNS traffic. Heck, I'm 100% sure that my dns traffic today is being re-sold! I have couple of unique domain names that I have open in my browser which have unique and non-guessable DNS names, which are crawled by some bots today. Even though I never shared them in any way with anyone! The only way they could be exposed for crawling is by my DNS provider leaking the DNS traffic to some shady third-party.
Many DNS people are opposed DoH, but I think this train has passed. As a user of the internet I really do want encrypt everything these days. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8404
If my corporate boss, or my ISP can mine less data about the malware I'm running - so be it. For me this is an acceptable cost of measurably improved privacy.