According to this article (https://www.vox.com/business-and-finance/2019/3/29/18281270/...), this was a requirement of the 737-MAX while it was being developed. It needed to be sold as pretty much the same as it's predecessors, therefore requiring minimal retraining.
> The training piece is important because a key selling feature of the 737 Max was the idea that since it wasn’t really a new plane, pilots didn’t really need to be retrained for the new equipment. As the New York Times reported, “For many new airplane models, pilots train for hours on giant, multimillion-dollar machines, on-the-ground versions of cockpits that mimic the flying experience and teach them new features” while the experienced 737 Max pilots were allowed light refresher courses that you could do on an iPad.
> That let Boeing get the planes into customers’ hands quickly and cheaply, but evidently at the cost of increasing the possibility of pilots not really knowing how to handle the planes, with dire consequences for everyone involved.
not excusing Boeing here, just extrapolating the situation to where there are so many automated systems doing so much and such complicated stuff that handover to pilot is just not an option (especially if plane is designed to fully utilize the automated systems capabilities). Like F-16 which just can't flown manually, or autonomous vehicles (Uber/Tesla/ect.) where handover to human driver in reality is absolutely not option. I mean, look how we completely lost the ability to stick-shift the cars.
I can't even imagine a sensor failure having zero redundancy, much less changing control inputs to a complicated system like a multi-engine jet. This is completely against everything I know about engineering and I find even discussion of this being possible to be deeply offensive. The fact that it happened twice and hundreds of people are dead is just mind boggling.
Don't put off a $150 job and cost yourself a $2k job. Most sensor replacements don't require removing the cylinder heads.
When sensors fail, the system will transition to degraded modes of operations where the pilot will have more responsibility.
The safety case will rely on demonstrating that transition to such degraded modes is low enough to be compatible with the human rate of errors.
A modern system should not be declared safe if it relies on pilot _whatever_.
Not sayin’ it did not happen in the past. Unfortunately.
I'm questioning whether a system as the one I described can be abused to the point where redundancy is offloaded to pilot flying the plane even when it shouldn't be?
The standards define checks and balances designed precisely to detect such abuse. In particular, the pilot’s rate of error is quantified and it should not be possible to abuse it without going unnoticed.
Their poor decisions led to this. Single sensor as input to autopilot to augment the nose!?
Any reason to not just use at least 9 of them, pick the median value and forget about it?
This is why the redundancy choices and availability calculations should always be made pondering the maintenance burden.
I think that created the right incentives: you could ignore a faulty sensor or two, but the results were increased travel times, so costs to the operator.
I always wonder why we don't have massive arrays of micro-sensors on planes spread out over the plane. If a handful your 65k sensors start to fail, you can delay repair for quite some time - otoh, if sensors start to fail all over the plane, you know you have to wake up the pilot hard, since it's a systemic problem like icing.
[0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Airways_Flight_9
When, in actuality, it may not have looked much like runaway stabilizer trim to the pilots.
My understanding is in a runaway stabilizer trim situation the trim wheel (a medium sized wheel near the pilot and co-pilots knees) spins continuously and makes a loud clacking noise as part of the spinning.
This makes runaway stabilizer trim easy to identify. The wheel is spinning (for no identifiable reason) and making noise.
The MCAS failure, however applies trim discretely with intervals of 10-20s. This means it might be very hard to spot the adjustments to the trim wheel if you glance down briefly.
A pilot might notice the control column is heavy, glance down to see if it's runaway trim see the wheel not moving, rule out that scenario and move on to other diagnostic steps.
This is getting worse for Boeing at every turn.
In fact we don’t even know what the cause of the crash was, and we won’t actually know for several months—there have been a number of crashes where everyone “knew” what the cause was early on, only for it later to come to light that is was something completely unrelated.
Details of the flight if you want to do some research: Lufthansa Airbus A321-200, registration D-AIDP, performing flight LH-1829 from Bilbao, SP (Spain) to Munich (Germany) on November 5th, 2014.
I suspect AoA is sending signed data, computer expects unsigned data, or possibly LSB/MSB conversion problem. Or it could just be faulty logic somewhere.
Critical AoA is somewhere in the realm of 17 to 20 degrees.
That doesn't leave much room for where MCAS wouldn't be a problem.
Also, AoA sensors are not normally safety critical. The MAX is the first 737 airframe for which this is the case.
I cannot even imagine what the designers of this thing are going through now. It must be terrible.
To make it worse, it's a confusing topic. There are two pillars to the design of such system.
1. Faulty sensor must be detected with a very high probability. The typical way to achieve that is redundancy and diversification. The exact amount of redundancy depends on the reliability of the sensor considered. In most cases, it is sufficient to have 2 sensors, but of different models, in order to avoid common mode of failure.
2. In case of a failure, the system must have a graceful degradation, and in aeronautics, this means a clean handover to the pilot.
So, in the case of this MCAS thing, having two sensors is not necessarily a bad thing, and what M. Kornecki reports is 100% correct. What looks strange is the way a single failure was managed by the software, and how the procedure to recover was quite complicated and, even worse, not exported to the training material of the pilots. In my world, we called this "exported safety requirement application conditions" - SRACs, and verification of their proper allocation is a big chunk of the safety case. More than discussing architecture, in my view, the investigation must explain why the organisation failed to perform this activity.
The case for a third sensor can be made to decrease the likelihood of having to bypass the system ("belt and suspenders", as says M. Kornacki), but based on my experience, it will not be sufficient. As other correctly report here, it's not a silver bullet.
Ultimately, the degradation scenario and pilot handover is part of the overall system safety.