You seem to be confusing "true" and "provable", as far as first order logic is concerned those are equivalent (by another theorem of Gödel, the completeness theorem), but the first in defined in terms of models and the second is purely syntactic
Also, it doesn’t seem right to use the informal “take” when the object in question is not computable.
Also intuitionist logic is not my area, but isn't it divided in inference rules for provability and (Heyting or Kripke) semantic for model theory and truth just like FOL?
This is not acceptable to a constructivist, for whom “a statement is true if we have a proof of it, and false if we can show that the assumption that there is a proof for the statement leads to a contradiction”[1]. The parent poster, whatshisface, may be a constructivist.
[1] Troelstra A., D. van Dalen (1988) “Constructivism in mathematics: an introduction”
The weirdness of True Arithmetic comes not from proofs (which are trivial) but from the axioms themselves. You can object that it’s not a “reasonable” or “proper” theory because it’s not recusively axiomatizable (i.e. there’s no effective procedure for even deciding whether a statement is an axiom), but I don’t think that objection is specifically constructivist.
I suspect you haven't gone through the actual rigorous proof which is highly technical and requires more than a "minimal knowledge of logic"
If you believe that the only consequence to Gödel's theorem is we need to "extend our axiomatic system", I do think you've missed the point.
For one thing, I think Gödel's theorem and Gödel's proof are unfortunately conflated.
Gödel's proof is lovely and elegant, and can be understood with minimal knowledge of logic, but, ultimately, all it does is provide a counter example. So when people read his proof and understand it, they tend to be unimpressed with its power because the counter example is very generic and seems an uninteresting barrier to our ability to discern "truth". But that says nothing about there may be lots of other kinds of unprovable statements.
Ultimately, Gödel's theorem tells us one absolute kernel of truth by saying all but very basic axiomatic models are necessarily incomplete. However which way you want to make the philosophical leap to connect that to our notion of "truth" seems far more up to interpretation, but it annoys me when people disrespect the theorem because they're unimpressed with the counter examples the proof constructs.