If you believe that the only consequence to Gödel's theorem is we need to "extend our axiomatic system", I do think you've missed the point.
For one thing, I think Gödel's theorem and Gödel's proof are unfortunately conflated.
Gödel's proof is lovely and elegant, and can be understood with minimal knowledge of logic, but, ultimately, all it does is provide a counter example. So when people read his proof and understand it, they tend to be unimpressed with its power because the counter example is very generic and seems an uninteresting barrier to our ability to discern "truth". But that says nothing about there may be lots of other kinds of unprovable statements.
Ultimately, Gödel's theorem tells us one absolute kernel of truth by saying all but very basic axiomatic models are necessarily incomplete. However which way you want to make the philosophical leap to connect that to our notion of "truth" seems far more up to interpretation, but it annoys me when people disrespect the theorem because they're unimpressed with the counter examples the proof constructs.
You seem to be confusing "true" and "provable", as far as first order logic is concerned those are equivalent (by another theorem of Gödel, the completeness theorem), but the first in defined in terms of models and the second is purely syntactic
Also, it doesn’t seem right to use the informal “take” when the object in question is not computable.
Also intuitionist logic is not my area, but isn't it divided in inference rules for provability and (Heyting or Kripke) semantic for model theory and truth just like FOL?
This is not acceptable to a constructivist, for whom “a statement is true if we have a proof of it, and false if we can show that the assumption that there is a proof for the statement leads to a contradiction”[1]. The parent poster, whatshisface, may be a constructivist.
[1] Troelstra A., D. van Dalen (1988) “Constructivism in mathematics: an introduction”
The weirdness of True Arithmetic comes not from proofs (which are trivial) but from the axioms themselves. You can object that it’s not a “reasonable” or “proper” theory because it’s not recusively axiomatizable (i.e. there’s no effective procedure for even deciding whether a statement is an axiom), but I don’t think that objection is specifically constructivist.
I suspect you haven't gone through the actual rigorous proof which is highly technical and requires more than a "minimal knowledge of logic"
It’s important that we are talking about models of the first order Peano Axioms. One can always find a system of axioms in which all true statements are provable. To do this just take the collection of all true statements in the standard model. Now every true statement is a theorem. It’s easy to have a complete set of axioms. What can’t happen is a recursively enumerable set of axioms that is complete and consistent.
Recursively enumerability is needed so that one can have an effective means of determining if a statement is an axiom. Think computable when I say effective.
When talking about truth we need to be careful because this is tied to a model of an axiomatic system. By the Completeness Theorem a statement that is true in all models of the system is provable.
I used both the words "truth" and "provable" in the correct and appropriate ways. Both are distinct concepts that form an important part of the theory.
It is, it really is. Yet is also an interpretation that Gödel himself would indulge in.
Consider his most famous quote: "Either mathematics is too big for the human mind, or the human mind is more than a machine." (I remember reading this statement in the Time-Life book on mathematics when I was a kid).
I don't think it's irrational or anti-science to say or think that. It just seems like it might be a possibility, which sure, why the hell not?
"There's this thing we can't prove under the given axioms"..."Ok, well just extend the axioms"..."Right but there is still this other thing we can't prove under that set of axioms."..."Ok, so rinse and repeat?"
How, if you can't prove it, do you figure out if it is an axiom in the first place?
But what's say there was some conjecture that if proved to be the case proved a unifying theory of everything in Physics that relied on that conjecture, but that conjecture couldn't be proven under the given set of axioms... then in that case wouldn't it be that there were some truths about the universe that aren't possible to prove?
- Well, the axioms of a given model generally can't be proven. Every model one builds begins with "unprovable things". However, the "truth about the universe" would have to be demonstrated by experimentation and mathematics would only provide the model. So every theory about the universe is using something unprovable (the axioms of its model). But Godel's theorem in particular (technically Godel's 1st incompleteness theorem) is still just a statement about proof processes work and how truth-assignments work. Whether are ineffable truths or not is a different question.
"There's this thing we can't prove under the given axioms"..."Ok, well just extend the axioms"..."Right but there is still this other thing we can't prove under that set of axioms."..."Ok, so rinse and repeat?"
- Yes, you can do that, well you can talk about doing it. In fact, Godel's "completeness theorem" is based on this procedure, more or less. The thing is you start with a set of axioms, add a proposition that can't be proven either true or false under the axioms, and decide arbitrarily whether to make it true or false. Continue forever (or transfinitely, depending how huge your system is) and you get a complete truth-assignment. Of course, there's no algorithm for finding all these undecidable propositions so this procedure is very theoretical. You or I or an AI couldn't do this to arrive pocessing this complete set but mathematically you can say "I hereby choose all the unprovable axioms and string them together thus (one of those weird "axiom of choice" things). So this approach is used, it's just it doesn't us to escape unprovable things.
If I'm understanding things right it's that proving things with logic means you are showing that something is consistent within a system and that is all you are definitely able to say from that. Not whether something is 'true' in a wider sense outside of that system. And all axioms are assumptions, so all our proofs are saying is that 'assuming that these things are the case then we can show the following result is commensurate with those assumptions and completely internally consistent'.
But the very interesting part is that you might keep extending and extending two axiomatic systems until every true statement is provable in one or the other system. However, you're guaranteed that in that case, the two systems will be inconsistent with each other such that they cannot be combined into a consistent whole.
Mathematical and logic truths have highest apstraction level.By definition they can 't be proved or disapproved in reality they exist only in apstraction.
Well, if there’s an analogue of a Gödel sentence for humans...
This is a gross misinterpretation of Gödel's actual theorem that helps perpetuate irrational superstitious attitudes against science, mathematics, and logic.
What Gödel showed was that proofs are relative to some underlying axiomatic model and that for any particular axiomatic model there are always truths unprovable by it.
That doesn't mean "there are truths that humans can never prove", all it means is that we have to extend our axiomatic systems in order to prove some truths. (And whether they are true or false "in reality" is another question, to be determined empirically.)
A more accurate (and just-as-click-baity) way of interpreting Gödel's theorem is that "mathematicians and logicians will always have a job".