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Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by kanox on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @07:30AM (#18550967)
> the software was also installing a root certificate into the Trusted Root CA Certificate store.

This kind of stuff shouldn't even be legal.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by userbinator on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @08:00AM (#18551086)
I have to STRONGLY disagree.

It's a slippery slope towards a world in which the computers we use are completely locked down and we have no control over what they trust, being dictated by the corporations and their interests. The freedom to modify your roots of trust is extremely important and situations like this should not scare us into depriving ourselves out of that. I say this as someone who runs an adblocking/filtering proxy and MITM my own traffic continuously. What's scarier than being MITM'd? Being force-fed by those who want to control your life.

These certificates are used by the software to communicate with the headset using a TLS encrypted web socket.

Why does a headset even need TLS...

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by loup-vaillant on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @08:50AM (#18551396)
No you don't disagree. The comment you're responding to doesn't say users shouldn't be free to add whatever root certificate they want. Of course they should.

What should be illegal are programs that silently add a root certificate without the user's informed consent. I very much doubt you disagree with that.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by fabricexpert on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @08:05AM (#18551110)
The law doesn't have to lock it down though. Software companies should be accountable for putting users at risk in this way, it should not be legal to install fundamentally insecure software without explicit permission from the user.
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by tokyodude on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @08:46AM (#18551356)
Did it not ask for permission? "Type in your admin password to install?"

This seems like an OS problem to me. I wish Apple and MS would clamp down on allowing apps to even ask for root to install. I don't think the OS should be as locked as iOS, as a user I still want control, but the fact that so many apps ask for root to install needs to be stopped. 99.9% of all apps need to be sandboxed

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by kanox on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @02:27PM (#18554773)
> The freedom to modify your roots of trust is extremely important.

I agree, modifying certificates shouldn't be technically impossible but perhaps we could have regulations where companies that do this are penalized. If companies are expected to safeguard customer then facilitating MITM is a huge breach that should result in fines.

A lot of root CAs are backed by national governments anyway, shouldn't they object to being impersonated?

It's also extremely common for companies to install root certificates on work computers that employees use to check their personal email. Why is nobody objecting to this?

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by brokenmachine on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @06:15PM (#18556592)
> It's also extremely common for companies to install root certificates on work computers that employees use to check their personal email. Why is nobody objecting to this?

A question: if I'm on a work PC that has a root certificate installed, can you tell if they're using it to MITM? When I go to a site on my work PC with the padlock (eg my bank) and click to get more info, it does show the bank's certificate. Can they still be MITMing that connection?

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by userbinator on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @07:56PM (#18557245)
Of course it will show the cert with the matching name, practically all MITMs will generate the correct certificates so that browsers don't complain. You need to look at the CA it's signed with, and compare to the one you get when you access the site from somewhere else.

Also,

It's also extremely common for companies to install root certificates on work computers that employees use to check their personal email. Why is nobody objecting to this?

Because you do not own those computers, and they should not be used for non-work-related activity. The company policy will explicitly mention this, something like "all communications on company property are subjected to monitoring at all times."

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by brokenmachine on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @10:56PM (#18557955)
>Because you do not own those computers, and they should not be used for non-work-related activity. The company policy will explicitly mention this, something like "all communications on company property are subjected to monitoring at all times."

Just as a thought experiment, lets say I set up a "free computer booth" on a street, but made people tick a box when they started that expressed the same conditions.

Would I then be entitled to MITM and read all communications that passed through that machine?

Why or why not?

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by userbinator on Thursday November 29, 2018 @08:24PM (#18565825)
Yes. The owner always has the right to monitor what goes on with his/her property. If you remove that right (like what is happening on mobile devices, unfortunately), it's a slippery slope to a situation where no one has absolute ownership of what they "own", which is even more treacherous for privacy.
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by kanox on Tuesday December 04, 2018 @06:28PM (#18604463)
> Yes. The owner always has the right to monitor what goes on with his/her property.

No. By this logic your ISP owns the cables and has the right to MITM as well.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by SilasX on Thursday November 29, 2018 @04:00PM (#18563972)
That's why it bothered me so much when Firefox started banning unsigned addons, even if you go through a tedious process to enable them and recompile said addon. Ticked me off so much I made a Hitler parody:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=taGARf8K5J8

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by tialaramex on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @08:51AM (#18551398)
In practice the corporation "dictating" the set of publicly trusted CA roots is the Mozilla Foundation, a 501(c)(3) non-profit with a large volunteer effort.

On paper all the major browser vendors / operating system vendors (Microsoft, Apple, Google, Mozilla) have independent root trust programmes. But after several years working on this stuff I would say that all real public oversight is done by Mozilla, which AFAICT suits everybody else just fine.

So you can and should help Mozilla "dictate" what is trustworthy. You might be surprised how much difference you can make.

The libertarian dream solution (everybody makes their own trust decisions somehow) is unrealistic in the face of the reality that most people just vaguely assume that "someone" is keeping them safe and lack both the technical knowledge and the spare time to make useful decisions.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by dragonwriter on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @09:06AM (#18551502)
> In practice the "corporation" "dictating" the set of publicly trusted CA roots is the Mozilla Foundation, a 501(c)(3) non-profit with a large volunteer effort.

Why the scare quotes on “corporation”? Mozilla Foundation is a corporation. Here are he articles of incorporation: https://www-archive.mozilla.org/foundation/documents/mf-arti...

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by tialaramex on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @09:33AM (#18551714)
Fair. I've corrected my text to remove the scare quotes.
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by Giroflex on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @07:36AM (#18550989)
As a bit of a layman, is there even any legitimate reason at all (other than a user installing it in their own machine for reverse engineering purposes) for anyone to install a root certificate anymore?

I could understand it if it was a small company doing so at the time when certificates were expensive, but Sennheiser has plenty of money and certificates can be obtained for free nowadays.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by tialaramex on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @08:34AM (#18551269)
Nobody will issue Sennheiser a certificate for this purpose. Every so often a company abuses a cert they were issued to do what Sennheiser wanted to achieve here (local loopback HTTPS) and when they're caught the cert is revoked and they get a slap on the wrist. Blizzard is a recent example.

The Right Thing (TM) is to not do HTTPS, a modern web browser is supposed to conclude that ::1 and 127.0.0.1 are secure without HTTPS since there is no possibility of a "man in the middle" of your own computer's loopback.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by kilburn on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @09:21AM (#18551609)
If you want an arbitrary (thus https based) website to be able to communicate with a localhost server using websockets you are forced to use https on the localhost server. This is because the browser won't connect to non-secure websockets from an https website, even if the websocket is to localhost.

The actual right thing to do is to generate a private key and certificate (for a specific, public name you point to 127.0.0.1) during the software installation and add the latter to the trusted store. Now you don't have this vulnerability because each computer has a different trusted certificate with a different key, so a random attacker cannot just use the key they got to spy on other users.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by plopz on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @09:14AM (#18551554)
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by avian on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @07:47AM (#18551031)
I run some services for my private use. It's crazy that I need to have them certified by some third-party over-seas CA since I can't get my own devices to trust my own certificates.

We're not at that point yet, but running your own trust root is getting quite annoying. For example, Android constantly nags about "network might be monitored" when custom certificates are installed.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by otterlicious on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @08:08AM (#18551123)
Android constantly nags about "network might be monitored" when custom certificates are installed.

It won't if you add name constraints to your root certificate (because then it can't be used for blanket monitoring).

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by bostik on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @01:47PM (#18554367)
Does this actually work now? A name-constrained CA (or even its CSR) used to break things in absolutely hilarious ways.
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by pritambaral on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @07:49AM (#18551043)
> Android constantly nags about "network might be monitored" when custom certificates are installed.

This is why I baked my home network certificate into the system trust store when building the ROM.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by magic-chicken on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @09:32AM (#18551706)
What tools / guide did you use to accomplish this (building the ROM AND adding your certificate) ?
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by StillBored on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @10:57AM (#18552494)
(maybe not what you were asking)

But for beginners there are some pretty nice LineageOs build guides floating around:

For specific pieces of hardware: https://wiki.lineageos.org/build_guides.html

Generic instructions: https://forum.xda-developers.com/chef-central/android/how-to...

As far as changing the certs, I know offhand to do it with a couple random linux distro's but i'm not 100% sure for android, you might just try searching the repo for the default certs then looking at how they are built into the image and tweaking that.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by tyingq on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @07:44AM (#18551025)
Corporate MITM proxies, like Forcepoint/Websense. For loose definitions of "legitimate."
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by zorked on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @07:46AM (#18551029)
It's perfectly normal to install new root certificates - for example, so that a company can sign internal websites (or for MITM proxies).

It's incredibly shady to have random software install into your trust store.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by rblatz on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @08:00AM (#18551091)
As someone that has been burned by self signed internal only sites. Take the extra 15 minutes and get a proper cert, and domain name for your internal sites. It can save a massive amount of pain later.
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by wil421 on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @09:15AM (#18551562)
Why? It you are testing applications in a dev/test system that is only a available on the company VPN then how can you get burned?

Sure it’s annoying clicking through browser warnings but if it’s not public facing I don’t see the danger.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by rblatz on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @09:54PM (#18557655)
Just hope you never need an external system, or a cloud hosted service to talk to your dev/test environments. It’s so cheap and easy to do it right that it just doesn’t make sense to do it the other way.
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @08:45AM (#18551340)
burned how exactly?
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by rblatz on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @09:39AM (#18551762)
In this case we started doing hybrid cloud, we were unable to address a ton of sites since they were on a made up internal only tld. Plus every thing we could address served up certs we couldn’t trust since we were utilizing services that didn’t allow us to modify the trusted root cert store.

We saved probably $100 and 2 hours by rolling our own solutions instead of doing things the standard way. It took weeks to clean the mess completely up.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC on Thursday November 29, 2018 @12:11AM (#18558262)
Well, yeah, using a made up domain is obviously a bad idea ... but what does that have to do with root CAs? And how does trusting your own root CA lead to not trusting the certs presented by other parties? I don't really understand what kind of scenario you are describing there.

And no, I don't see anything "standard" about not running your own CA, it is perfectly standard as far as I am concerned, and a really good idea as well. Relying on an external CA for internal services just creates risks of both availability and security. If you need an external CA to set up or continue operating internal services, that is an availability risk, and if you trust the whole standard set of root CAs for all of your internal services, that's a massive security risk.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by rblatz on Thursday November 29, 2018 @01:27PM (#18562483)
Obviously if all your services are hosted in house and you will never need to expose internal services externally go for it. But as soon as your organization grows, splits, merges or starts utilizing other services that don’t give you access to the trust store you are boned. It screwed us, and was a giant pain to fix.
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC on Thursday November 29, 2018 @05:33PM (#18564772)
Why would all your services have to be hosted in house and why would it prevent you from "exposing internal services" (I mean, apart from the fact that they kindof aren't internal services anymore from that point on)?

For one, there is no problem hosting your own services elsewhere and having them use your own certificates. But more importantly: Why should your own CA prevent you from obtaining certificates from an external CA for external services? I mean, it just doesn't, that's how I run stuff: Purely internal stuff runs on internal CA, stuff that needs to face the public somehow runs on globally recognized CAs. And it's mostly trivial to switch services from one to the other - or to just run two endpoints, one using the internal CA, one using an external CA.

It seems to me like your problem wasn't your own root CA, your problem was that your services were incompatible with external CAs for some reason, among them probably your private DNS root? But that isn't a reason why you should put your internal services at risk from mismanaged public CAs, that's simply a reason why you should use a global domain and support provisioning of certificates from external CAs.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by rblatz on Sunday December 02, 2018 @03:22AM (#18581412)
The big issue was identifying all the impacted services, reconfiguring all of them testing and redeploying them. If it’s a few services fine. But once it’s a few hundred it’s a pain.
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC on Sunday December 02, 2018 @08:40AM (#18582252)
Well ... but then that still has nothing to do with using your own root CA, does it? I mean, why would you want to suddenly reconfigure all of your services to use a different CA? It might come up here and there that you need external access to some service hat was internal before, but that is hardly a huge problem to reconfigure?!

And also, if you have so many services running that swapping out all of the certificates is a major headache, your primary mistake probably was that that wasn't automated? When keys are compromised, you should be able to reprovision anyway.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by hannasanarion on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @09:15AM (#18551568)
It can be a real pain in the butt to go up and down the whole stack and reconfigure every library and application that might detect a insecure connection and bail. Need several independent webapps to communicate? Hoo boy.
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by AndyMcConachie on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @09:44AM (#18551819)
Stupid question.

Who should have the ability to install root CA certs?

I like using HTTPS instead of HTTP, so I need some installed. Who should be responsible for managing them?

And before you say the CABF, they're ultimatately not the ones who decide what gets installed on your computer. The answer to that question is much more complicated.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by jerf on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @09:56AM (#18551950)
There was never a good reason to install a root certificate for the purpose of speaking securely to your own gear or web services. In that case, you don't need to add them to the root trust store, you just need to create an SSL context that has those certificates set as trusted.

However, the problem is, nobody understands SSL properly. Among the people who don't understand SSL properly is, alas, a number of people writing SSL libraries. Not the actual SSL libraries like OpenSSL, but all the surrounding libraries to make it "easy to use", which includes libraries that try to make HTTP easy to use and abstract the difference between HTTP and HTTPS. Pretty much every "ease of use" library I have ever seen accomplishes its ease of use by dropping features from the underlying SSL support, but it's clear they often don't understand why those features were there and the consequences of dropping them.

I have a particular case where I've got some Perl code that is literally 4 levels deep in "SSL ease of use" code, with pretty much every layer dropping SSL features along the way (even the base level Net::SSLeay is missing a lot of stuff once you go beyond the basics, and it only gets worse as the stack gets higher). Once I had to poke support for a certain feature all the way down through the entire stack because it got dropped really early.

So what you need to do in this case is create your own root store of trust, and then stick your own certs in there from some .pems or something, and then use that to initialize SSL on your connection. But it's complicated to do that at the base level of a lot of SSL libraries, and this is often one of the first features to be "abstracted away" by support libraries, and a lot of HTTP libraries end up trying to "abstract away" SSL so thoroughly that they don't even have parameters to control the SSL elements of the connection, and if they do, they have some ad-hoc selection of random bits that someone once needed, rather than comprehensive support.

The upshot is that I'd consider it likely that they were using one of these libraries, and the only way they could see to get their certificates trusted was to stick them in the default root store, because that's the only thing that would work with such libraries. You can also find web pages and such recommending this approach. It's also possible they just came across one of these web pages or something and put stuff in the root without realizing what it really meant, even though their library allowed them to do everything I said, because it's way easier to slam something into the default trust store than write the code to create your own at run time. (It ought to be easy to write that code. The rather nice Go TLS library makes it almost as easy as I say it is; create cert store, add certificate, set that as your root trust, modulo a bit of error handling it really is just about that many lines of code. But the "ease of use" libraries can really get in the way, when the people adding the "ease of use" abstractions themselves don't understand what that means, or why you might want/need it, or how to make it easy.)

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by icebraining on Thursday November 29, 2018 @04:33AM (#18559063)
what you need to do in this case is create your own root store of trust, and then stick your own certs in there from some .pems or something, and then use that to initialize SSL on your connection

Their goal was to allow the browser to connect to the local daemon, for web-based softphones, so this wouldn't work.

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by sneak on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @07:59AM (#18551081)
Why? The user chose to run the installer and opted to give it control to modify their computer. What part of that process should be illegal?
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by tomseldon on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @08:02AM (#18551098)
They give permission to modify their computer/device, but obviously there's an implicit trust that it isn't going to do something horrifically bad.

Trusting a builder to come in to your home and change things- you'd be pretty angry if they took down a supporting wall to put up a new light fitting (and you'd probably have some legal comeback).

Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by sneak on Friday November 30, 2018 @04:52AM (#18567961)
Yes, in civil court. What part of it should be illegal?
Re:Sennheiser Headset Software Could Allow Man-In-the-Middle... by fabricexpert on Wednesday November 28, 2018 @08:08AM (#18551127)
They gave it control to install headphone software. This is beyond the reasonable scope of what headphone software could be expected to do.