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Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by Arnt on Sunday November 04, 2018 @10:40AM (#18376322)
This might get a little longwinded. Sorry.

The following is from http://www.salon.com/2015/09/26/how_to_explain_the_kgbs_amaz... and describes the way the Russians implemented SELECT * WHERE CIA FROM EMBASSY_EMPLOYEES: "differences in the way agency officers undercover as diplomats were treated from genuine foreign service officers (FSOs). The pay scale at entry was much higher for a CIA officer; after three to four years abroad a genuine FSO could return home, whereas an agency employee could not; real FSOs had to be recruited between the ages of 21 and 31, whereas this did not apply to an agency officer; only real FSOs had to attend the Institute of Foreign Service for three months before entering the service; naturalized Americans could not become FSOs for at least nine years but they could become agency employees; when agency officers returned home, they did not normally appear in State Department listings; should they appear they were classified as research and planning, research and intelligence, consular or chancery for security affairs; unlike FSOs, agency officers could change their place of work for no apparent reason; their published biographies contained obvious gaps; agency officers could be relocated within the country to which they were posted, FSOs were not; agency officers usually had more than one working foreign language; their cover was usually as a “political” or “consular” official (often vice-consul); internal embassy reorganizations usually left agency personnel untouched, whether their rank, their office space or their telephones; their offices were located in restricted zones within the embassy; they would appear on the streets during the working day using public telephone boxes; they would arrange meetings for the evening, out of town, usually around 7.30 p.m. or 8.00 p.m.; and whereas FSOs had to observe strict rules about attending dinner, agency officers could come and go as they pleased." I read the book. When a CIA agent's cover was blown, the CIA had a spare care and apartment and the agent's replacement needed just that, so they tended to reuse the car and apartment. And wondered why the replacement was then identified so quickly.

So. After that long digression, here comes a hypothesis: Organisations that can keep their mistakes secret, can make themselves seem much more capable than other, similarly large organisations.

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by DonHopkins on Sunday November 04, 2018 @11:54AM (#18376750)
At the University of Maryland, our network access was through the NSA's "secret" MILNET IMP 57 at Fort Mead. It was pretty obvious that UMD got their network access via NSA, because mimsy.umd.edu had a similar "*.57" IP address as dockmaster, tycho and coins.

https://emaillab.jp/dns/hosts/

    HOST : 26.0.0.57 : TYCHO : PDP-11/70 : UNIX : TCP/TELNET,TCP/SMTP,TCP/FTP :
    HOST : 26.0.0.57 : DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL,DOCKMASTER.DCA.MIL, DOCKMASTER.ARPA : HONEYWELL-DPS-8/70 : MULTICS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/ECHO,TCP/DISCARD,ICMP :
    HOST : 26.1.0.57 : COINS-GATEWAY,COINS : PLURIBUS : PLI ::
    HOST : 26.2.0.57, 128.8.0.8 : MARYLAND,MIMSY,UMD-CSD,UMD8,UMCP-CS : VAX-11/780 : UNIX : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,UDP,TCP/ECHO,TCP/FINGER,ICMP :
https://multicians.org/site-dockmaster.html

Whenever the network went down (which was often), we had to call up a machine room at Fort Mead and ask them to please press the reset button on the box labeled "IMP 57". Sometimes the helpful person who answered the phone had no idea which box I meant, so I had describe to him which box to reset over the phone. ("Nope, that didn't work. Try the other one!" ;) They were even generous enough to issue us (CS department systems staff and undergrad students) our own MILNET TACACS card.

On mimsy, you could get a list of NSA employees by typing "grep contact /etc/passwd", because each of their courtesy accounts had "network contact" in the gecos field.

Before they rolled out TACACS cards, anyone could dial up an IMP and log in without a password, and connect to any host they wanted to, without even having to murder anyone like on TV:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVth6T3gMa0

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by damnmachine on Sunday November 04, 2018 @03:32PM (#18377939)
Holy shit. I can't believe some of what I just read. Although it appears this was in the late 80's, so I suppose it makes more sense factoring that in.
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by travmatt on Sunday November 04, 2018 @07:56PM (#18379005)
In the book “The Cuckoos Egg”, the author describes how the hacker penetrating his networks was using it to access military networks. That was in the 80’s as well I believe.
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by DonHopkins on Sunday November 04, 2018 @12:34PM (#18376974)
I found this handy how-to tutorial guide for "Talking to the Milnet NOC" and resetting the LH/DH, which was useful for guiding the NSA employee on the other end of the phone through fixing their end of the problem. What it doesn't mention is that the key box with the chase key was extremely easy to pick with a paperclip.

Who would answer the Milnet NOC's 24-hour phone was hit or miss: Some were more helpful and knowledgeable than others, others were quite uptight.

Once I told the guy who answered, "Hi, this is the University of Maryland. Our connection to the NSA IMP seems to be down." He barked back: "You can't say that on the telephone! Are you calling on a blue phone?" (I can't remember the exact color, except that it wasn't red: that I would have remembered). I said, "You can't say NSA??! This is a green phone, but there's a black phone in the other room that I could call you back on, but then I couldn't see the hardware." And he said "No, I mean a voice secure line!" I replied, "You do know that this is a university, don't you? We only have black and green phones."

    Date: Thu, 11 Sep 86 13:53:45 EDT
    From: Steve D. Miller <[email protected]>
    To: [email protected]
    Subject: Talking to the Milnet NOC

       This message is intended to be a brief tutorial/compendium of
    information you probably want to know if you need to see about
    getting the LH/DH thingy (and us) talking to the world.

       First, you need the following numbers:
        (1)  Our IMP number (57),
        (2)  Mimsy's milnet host address (26.2.0.57),
        (3)  The circuit number for our link to the NSA
            (DSEP07500-057)
        (4)  The NOC number itself (692-5726).

       Second, you need to know something about the hardware.  There
    are three pieces of hardware that make up our side of the link:
    the LH/DH itself, the ECU, and the modem.  The LH/DH and the
    ECU are the things in the vax lab by brillig; the ECU is the
    thing on top (with the switches), and the LH/DH is the thing
    on the bottom.  The normal state is to have the four red LEDs
    on the ECU on and the Host Master Ready, HRY, Imp Master Ready,
    and IRY lights on at the LH/DH.  If these lights are not on,
    something is wrong.  If mimsy is down, then we'll only have some
    of the lights on, but that should fix itself when mimsy comes up.
    Some interesting buttons or switches on the ECU are:
        reset - resets something or another
        stop - stops something or another
        start - restarts something or another
        local loopback -- two switches and two leds; you may need
            to throw one or the other of these if the NOC asks
            you to.  These loopback switches should be distinguished
            from those on the modem itself.
        remote loopback -- like local loopback, but does something else.

       The modem is in the phone room beside the terminal room (rm.
    4322, if memory serves).  It can be opened with the chase key from
    the key box...but if someone official and outside of staff asks
    you that, you probably shouldn't admit to it.  It has a switch on
    it, too; it seems that switch normally rests in the middle, and
    there's a "LL" setting to the left which I assume puts the modem in
    local loopback mode.

       Now that you have some idea of where things are, call the NOC.
    Identify yourself as from the University of Maryland, and say that
    we're not talking to the outside world.  They will probably ask for
    our Milnet address or the number of the IMP we're connected to,
    and will then poke about and see what's happening.  They will ask
    you to do various things; ask if you're not sure what they mean,
    but the background info above should help in puzzling it out.

       Hopefully, this will make it easier to find people to fix
    our net problems in the future; it's still hard to do 'cause
    we have so little info (no hardware manual, for example),
    but this should give us a fighting chance.

        -Steve
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by DonHopkins on Sunday November 04, 2018 @12:25PM (#18376916)
I dug up an "explosive bolts" reference -- fortunately that brilliant plan didn't get far.

(Milo Medin knows this stuff first hand: https://innovation.defense.gov/Media/Biographies/Bio-Display... )

    To: [email protected] (Erik E. Fair)
    Cc: [email protected], [email protected]
    Subject: Re: a question of definition
    Date: Thu, 29 Jan 87 12:29:36 PST
    From: Milo S. Medin (NASA ARC Code ED) <[email protected]>

    Actually its:

    SCINET -- Secret Compartmented Information Net  (if you don't know what
    compartmented means, you don't need to ask)
    DODIIS -- DoD Intelligence Information Net

    The other stuff I think is right, at least without me looking things
    up.  I probably shouldn't have brought this subject of the secure part
    of the DDN up.  People like being low key about such things...

    Erik, all the BBN gateways on MILNET and ARPANET currently comprise
    the core, not just mailbridges.  Some are used as site gateways, others
    as EGP neighbors, etc...  And just because you are dual homed doesn't mean
    you get a mailbridge.  And the IETF doesn't deal with low level stuff
    like that; DCA does all that.  In fact, the reason we are getting an
    ARPANET PSN is because when DCA came out to do a site survey, they
    liked our site so much they asked if they could put one here!  It's
    amazing how many sites have tried to get ARPANET PSN's the right
    way and have had to wait much longer than us...  BTW, since we are
    dual homed (probably a gateway with 2 1822 interfaces in it), we
    are taking steps to be sure that people on ARPANET or MILNET can't
    use our gateway to bypass the mailbridges.  The code will be hacked
    to drop all packets that aren't going to a locally reachable network.
    BARRNet, even though its locally reachable, will be excluded
    from this however, since the current procedural limitations call for
    not allowing any BARRNet traffic to flow out of BARRNet to MILNET
    and the reverse.  NASA traffic of course can traffic through BARRNet,
    and even use ARPANET that way (though that's not a big deal when
    we get our own ARPANET PSN).  That's because only NASA is authorized
    to directly connect to MILNET, not UCB or Stanford, etc...

    DCA must have the ability to partition the ARPANET and MILNET in
    case of an "emergency", and having non-DCA controlled paths between
    the nets prevents that.  There was talk some time ago about putting
    explosive bolts in the mailbridges that would be triggered by
    destruct packets...  That idea didn't get far though...

    The DDN only includes MILNET,ARPANET,SCINET,etc...  Not the attached
    networks.  If it did, you'd need to file a TSR to add a PC to your
    local cable.  A TSR is a monstrous piece of paperwork that needs to
    be done anytime anything is changed on the DDN...  Rick knows all
    about them don't you Rick?

    The whole network game is filled with acronyms!  I gave up trying
    to write documents with full explainations in terms long ago...
    I have yet to see a short and concise (and correct) way of describing
    DDN X.25 Standard Service for example...  That's probably one of the
    harder things about getting into networking these days.  We won't
    even talk about Etherbunnies and Martians and other Millspeak...

                        Milo '1822' Medin
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by DonHopkins on Sunday November 04, 2018 @12:21PM (#18376885)
There were rumored to be "explosive bolts" on the ARPA/MILNET gateways (whether they were metaphorical or not, I don't know).

Here's something interesting that Milo Medin wrote about dual homed sites like NSA and NASA, that were on both the ARPANET and MILNET:

    To: [email protected] (Erik E. Fair)
    Cc: [email protected], [email protected]
    Subject: Re: a question of definition
    Date: Thu, 29 Jan 87 15:33:35 PST
    From: Milo S. Medin (NASA ARC Code ED) <[email protected]>

    Right, the core has many gateways on it now, maybe 20-30.  All the LSI's will
    be stubbed off the core however, and only buttergates will be left after
    the mailbridges and EGP peers are all converted.  Actually, I think DARPA is
    paying for it all...

    Ames is *not* getting a mailbridge.  You are right of course, that we could
    use 2 gateways, not just 1 (actually, there will be a prime and backup anyways),
    and then push routing info appropriately.  But that's anything but simple.
    Firstly, the hosts have to know which gateway to send a packet to a given
    network, and thus have to pick between the 2.  That's a bad idea.
    It also means that I have to pass all EGP learned info around on the
    local cable, and if I do that, then I can't have routing info from
    the local cable pass out via EGP.  At least not without violating
    the current EGP spec.   Think about it.  It'd be really simple to
    create a loop that way.  Thus, in order to maximize the use of both
    PSN's, you really need one gateway wired to both PSN's, and just
    have it advertise a default route inside.  Or use a reasonble IGP,
    of which RIP (aka /etc/routed stuff) is not.  I'm hoping to get
    an RFC out of BBN at this IETF meeting which may go a long way in
    reducing the use of RIP as an IGP.

    BTW, NSA is an example of a site on both MILNET and ARPANET but without
    a mailbridge...

    There is no restriction that a network can only be on ARPANET or MILNET.
    That goes against the Internet model of doing things.  Our local
    NASA gatewayed nets will be advertised on both sides.  The restriction
    on BARRNet is that the constituent elements of BARRNet do not all
    have access to MILNET.  NSF has an understanding with DARPA and
    DCA that NSFnet'd sites can use ARPANET.  That does not extend to
    the MILNET.  Thus, Davis can use UCB's or Stanford's, our even NASA's
    ARPANET gateways, with the approval of the site of course, but
    not MILNET, even though NASA has MILNET coverage.  Thus we are required
    to restrict BARRNet routing through our MILNET PSN.  If we were willing
    to sponsor UCB's MILNET access, for some requirement which NASA
    had to implement, then we would turn that on.  But BARRNet itself will
    but cutoff to MILNET (and probably ARPANET too) at Ames, but not
    cut off to other NASA centers or sites that NASA connects.  There is
    no technical reason that prevents this, in fact, we have to take
    special measures to prevent it.  But those are the rules.  Anyways,
    mailbridge performance should improve after the conversion, so
    UCB should be in better shape.  And you'll certainly be able to
    talk to us via BARRNnet...  I have noticed recently that MILNET<->
    ARPANET performance has been particularly poor...  Sigh.

    The DCA folks feel that in case of an emergency they may be
    forced to use an unsecure network to pass certain info around.  The
    DDN brochure mentions SIOP related data for example.  Who knows,
    if the balloon goes up, the launch order might pass through Evans
    Hall on its way out to SAC...  :-)


                        Milo
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by closeparen on Sunday November 04, 2018 @11:13AM (#18376528)
My understanding is that official cover is more a matter of politeness than secrecy. An embassy employee is obviously a foreign agent in some capacity. The real game is preventing the host country from discovering links between official-cover and non-official-cover agents, since the latter group’s affiliation is actually secret.
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by AlexCoventry on Sunday November 04, 2018 @10:51AM (#18376400)
> Organisations that can keep their mistakes secret, can make themselves seem much more capable

And also much slower to learn from their mistakes. The history of the CIA is pretty depressing, in this regard.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legacy_of_Ashes_(book)

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by ryanmarsh on Sunday November 04, 2018 @10:58AM (#18376435)
Legacy of Ashes does a pretty good job to that end...

https://www.amazon.com/Legacy-Ashes-History-Tim-Weiner/dp/03...

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by dev_dull on Sunday November 04, 2018 @11:26AM (#18376611)
> The CIA does appear to have lucked out when it comes to Russia. The Intelligence Agency ring fences its Russian activities and the report states that intel chiefs were quick to harden up its Russian communications channel at the first sign of trouble.

Your post makes a lot of sense for that above line in the article. Maybe Russia would rather keep tabs on them as known-people rather than murder them. China seemed to have taken it personally, which is ironic given their vast purported corporate espionage spy networks.

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by unchocked on Sunday November 04, 2018 @12:22PM (#18376897)
These are different kinds of agents.

Those described in the above comment were US nationals in Russia operating under diplomatic cover, and are not subject to Russian law. They would be deported. Russian nationals working for the CIA would not be found by that search.

The agents in the story were Chinese/Iranian/etc. nationals working for the CIA. They had no diplomatic protection, which is why they were killed.

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by Arnt on Monday November 05, 2018 @03:47AM (#18380821)
Different, certainly. What about it?

Do you mean that the people who were careless with one group would be careful with the other? That the people who issued one car model to the real cultural attachés and another model to the CIA agents would be very careful about the agents who risk their lives?

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by 3pt14159 on Sunday November 04, 2018 @11:46AM (#18376706)
China is much less pluralistic than Russia. It's more important to send a message to locals than it is to poison the information.
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by EliRivers on Sunday November 04, 2018 @11:32AM (#18376638)
Adam Curtis has a piece, in the style of Adam Curtis, wondering if spies (well, in this particular case, mostly spy catchers) simply aren't very good at their job; http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/entries/3662a707-0af9-...
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by Gibbon1 on Monday November 05, 2018 @03:59AM (#18380857)
Also possible corrupt, Aldrich Ames was living way beyond his means for a decade before he got caught. And the CIA knew it. My assumption has been the CIA turns a blind eye when it's high level agents pass information to 'friendly' governments and corporations, and so were gobsmacked when they found Ames was selling critical information to the Soviets. Which is itself deranged and stupid.
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by gniv on Sunday November 04, 2018 @07:13PM (#18378830)
Wow. Thanks for posting this. It's a better read than anything currently on the front page of HN.
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by std_throwawayay on Sunday November 04, 2018 @11:17AM (#18376557)
So, they were basically relying on metadata to inspect an organization. If anything, this shows the power of metadata.
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by baybal2 on Sunday November 04, 2018 @12:47PM (#18377043)
Totally true. That Fogle guy was standing out like a white crow among the rest of the "geriatric ward" that US embassy in Russia was.

Moreover, to a Russia person, it would be totally unbelievable that such pipsqueak could get to the position of a "third secretary" of anything in his short, only 5 years long career.

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by fit2rule on Sunday November 04, 2018 @01:03PM (#18377134)
> Organisations that can keep their mistakes secret, can make themselves seem much more capable than other, similarly large organisations.

Organizations gain only corruption through secrecy. Fix the reason for having to keep a secret, and you build a strong organization.

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by TallGuyShort on Sunday November 04, 2018 @03:21PM (#18377890)
Software projects that can keep the implementation details (and bugs) of their security secret, can make themselves seem much more secure than other, similarly large projects.
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by nyolfen on Sunday November 04, 2018 @02:13PM (#18377534)
you should put these together as a blog post
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by Arnt on Monday November 05, 2018 @03:24AM (#18380734)
There's a book already, https://isbn.nu/0374536279. It's dreadful. Well, the book is good, even great. What's dreadful is the mistakes one can commit when the consequences are secret.

The CIA would send a 35-year-old spy out with a cover job that only accepted applicants up to the age of 28, and then send a polite letter to the Russians informing them of his arrival. Meanwhile there was a giant search for the mole at CIA HQ, because there had to be one, how else would the Russians unmask so many agents so quickly?

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by commandlinefan on Sunday November 04, 2018 @10:54AM (#18376413)
> SELECT * FROM EMBASSY_EMPLOYEES WHERE CIA

ftfy

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by dorfsmay on Sunday November 04, 2018 @11:09AM (#18376504)
> SELECT * WHERE CIA FROM EMBASSY_EMPLOYEES

Although I personally don't find this type of humour funny I can understand why beginners use it. However, if you are going to use it, please make an effort and get it right. In your attempt to showing off, you're just showing you don't know basic SQL.

Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by brrt on Sunday November 04, 2018 @11:49AM (#18376719)
This is actually (almost) legal in teradata sql, which doesn't enforce clause order, but it doesn't accept an identifier as a predicate.
Re:30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network by danharaj on Sunday November 04, 2018 @11:19AM (#18376568)
Care to guess what you've said about yourself with this critical comment? :^)