News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by ChuckMcM on Friday October 05, 2018 @01:28PM (#18149978)
Ok, that finally makes a bit of sense about "if" this is true, how it might be carried out. And I agree with the author that the simplest action for a chip on the SPI bus would be to hold the MISO line low during power on to suggest to the BMC chip that its QSPI flash isn't programmed (note that QSPI starts up as 'regular' SPI and then switches over[1]). I would guess that the next thing the BMC would do is assume its on the factory floor and hasn't had firmware loaded yet and so it would attempt to boot via TFTP from some server to start the firmware loading process.

FWIW at NetApp the firmware engineers called the BMC the 'BiteMeChip' because they always caused issues when bringing up a new filer motherboard. They were finicky, were often hard to update, and when misbehaving could completely screw up the system.

So I can see this as a vulnerability but really I'd want to stick some probes on that 'mystery' chip and make sure it wasn't just some LC filter or something which is shunting off noise on the data lines.

[1] https://github.com/ChuckM/stm32f469i/tree/master/demos/qspi

Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by fkd221 on Friday October 05, 2018 @07:14PM (#18152486)
Bruce Schneier talked in 2013 already on BMC security linking to a paper [0] from Dan Farmer who did an Internet scan to find that ~230,000 BMCs were exposed to the Internet of which 90% could be compromised [1], yikes.

  [0] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/01/the_eavesdroppi.html
  [1] http://fish2.com/ipmi/river.pdf
Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by SlowRobotAhead on Friday October 05, 2018 @04:49PM (#18151625)
Agreed on finally makes sense. Depending on what article it made it sound like a chip that sat between CPU and RAM or some external cache that was intercepting some pattern of data and real time buffering then modifying the output - which at CPU/RAM speeds made no sense.

A chip holding and SPI line down - makes way more sense.

Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by amelius on Friday October 05, 2018 @07:38PM (#18152603)
One question: how do you hold an existing line low without drawing lots of current, and without cutting that line first?
Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by ChuckMcM on Saturday October 06, 2018 @01:02AM (#18153628)
Two things help you here; SPI usage and CMOS I/O pins.

The SPI bus can be configured with shared master-in-slave-out(MISO)/master-out-slave-in(MOSI) lines since many SPI chips won't even drive the bus if their chip select line is not driven low. Thus the MISO and MOSI pins usually have a fair bit of buffering on them and will often be connected to the bus with a 1K resistor (either externally or built into the chip[1]). On a 5V system this limits the source current to 5mA. Either way these pins are designed to take some abuse.

Current drive is another issue because typically the output driver, if it isn't open drain, will use a p-type drive transistor which has a harder time passing current than an n-type transistor does. As a result the spec iOh (output current when the device is held high) is much lower than iOl (input current when the device pulls the pin low). So one pin to ground will overwhelm the output driver and pull the line effectively to a low state (not as low as it would if nobody was trying to pull it high, but low enough to read as 0). You will see this technique used in 'wired and' type circuits, where output pins are connected in common to a line, and any one going low will pull the bus low. If they are all logic 1 the bus is logic one, if one or more of them are logic 0 the bus reads logic zero.

[1] Yes I know that on "high speed" SPI ports this is not done because of the parasitic inductance in said resistor rounding out the edges of the data pulses with respect to the clock line thus reducing setup and hold time margins for accurate data transmission.

Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by dbcurtis on Friday October 05, 2018 @07:58PM (#18152683)
It's not like the MISO line is tied to a power rail. You just need to sink more current than the output of the chip you are trying to override. So the driver is likely in the single digit milliamp range, and in any case, you don't care if you toast the output driver on that chip. In fact, if you do, bonus!
Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by amelius on Friday October 05, 2018 @09:34PM (#18152996)
Ok, but i suppose that in the future chip output pads can have circuitry which can detect a forced output (by measuring current). When this happens, the chip could short-circuit power lines, or superimpose a signal on the power-lines to notify the rest of the system.
Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by ispiansclsda on Friday October 05, 2018 @11:10PM (#18153292)
> When this happens, the chip could short-circuit power lines

No chip design would ever do this. The chip would incinerate itself.

> superimpose a signal on the power-lines to notify the rest of the system

The rest of the system i.e. the BMC already know that something weird is up.

Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by akiselev on Friday October 05, 2018 @07:56PM (#18152672)
"Lots of current" in this case would only be about 20mA, generating heat that you can easily dissipate from just the surface of a 0201 resistor. I doubt many microprocessors have pins that can drive higher current than that.

Realistically, in order to drive it low you don't have to bring it down to 0V. Most 5V chips will stop registering logic high around 2.5-3.3V for example.

Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by dbcurtis on Friday October 05, 2018 @08:01PM (#18152701)
These days 20mA is a "high current" I/O. When you do the math on an 88-pin package, 20mA * N active outputs gets big pretty fast. The max total I/O current can be found somewhere around page 987 of the data sheet... don't stop reading early... :)

(edit: 88 I/O is a modest size microcontroller sort of chip)

Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by Dylan16807 on Saturday October 06, 2018 @12:18AM (#18153511)
I don't understand how this is relevant to holding a single pin low.
Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by 8note on Saturday October 06, 2018 @02:39AM (#18153878)
it's even easier than the comment above suggests
Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack by ispiansclsda on Friday October 05, 2018 @06:49PM (#18152342)
> the simplest action for a chip on the SPI bus would be to hold the MISO line low during power on

MISO is master-in, slave-out for anyone not familiar with serial peripheral interface jargon. Usually, the slave quad-SPI memory would send the configuration over this line, so pulling it low should dump the real data to ground.