Sure, that's not the only effect it will have, it will also cost money for bankers that drive in from Westchester and park underneath their midtown offices. But, as you can imagine, it won't change their behavior much -- by definition the only people that it will affect are people who can't easily afford it.
If you look at it in a different way, congestion pricing takes a public good that everyone paid to create, the roads and streets of the central business district, and reserves them so they can only be used by drivers with lots of money. There are problems with that approach.
Of course there's another side to the argument, obviously. But I feel like many people don't realize this issue cuts in two directions, rather than just being an obvious "good idea".
Everyone gets a benefit from the public roads even if they don't use them directly: they feed the high-value trips that make the businesses there possible. But there's still not enough road-capacity for everyone without value-destroying congestion: a massive toll paid by everyone in delays. So, more money should be raised to improve roads and alternatives. And, that money should be raised in a way that shifts those who are most-adaptable into alternatives, in proportion to the congestion they'd cause. Only congestion fees do that.
So: it's highly progressive when you consider all NYC residents, including those who don't drive. And it's maybe a little regressive between the wealthy and the very-wealthy, just on the general pattern that the very-wealthy spend less of their income. So, boo-hoo for the merely wealthy.
Congestion pricing doesn't seem nearly as regressive as gas taxes or sales taxes, narrowly focused as it is on just those driving in an especially wealthy and especially congested area.
And the parent post's idea that it'd hit the "blue collar" especially hard is, without evidence, just hand-waving. Their time is valuable too, and commute/on-the-job-travel time saved, from pushing lower-value travelers to non-road (or on-road-but-shared-vehicle) paths, could be worth more than the congestion fees.
Why would you say that? A rich person would not spend hours every day commuting though rush hour traffic, or spend most of their day inside their work vehicle. They would buy or rent a central home, possibly near the central office building where they work. City driving in itself makes for a very low quality of life and most rational people would minimize it, given the option.
So I would expect there's either no driving-income correlation, or it's inverse. So reducing congestion would make life easier for rich people, who don't care about the money and only care about the time - by pricing out people who are, by definition, poorer and can't afford to buy that convenience. You could say that the resulting post-tax distribution is progressive, the rich paying and driving more; but that's just a way of distorting the initial argument, that introducing a flat congestion tax is strongly recessive - to the point of completely pricing out poorer people.
There's expensive tolls, and limited & expensive parking, but excellent public transportation – the USA's most extensive and most-used subway system. NY state has the nation's highest (regressive!) gas taxes.
New York is far-and-away the US city with the lowest rate of car ownership:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._cities_with_most_...
Manhattan is the most likely place for congestion pricing. But, though rare in the USA, many Manhattanites never learn to drive! And only 8% of Manhattanite workers commute by car to work:
https://www.nycedc.com/blog-entry/new-yorkers-and-their-cars
(I highly doubt that 8% is correlated with the poorest Manhattanites.)
Car-owning households in NYC are significantly richer than zero-car households:
http://blog.tstc.org/2017/04/21/car-free-new-york-city/
So, people who elect to drive in NYC (outside of driving-on-the-job) are richer than the New Yorkers who don't drive. Further, New Yorkers are richer than other Americans. Ergo, a fee that falls on people who choose to drive in NYC is unlikely to be "regressive", barring any actual evidence to the contrary.
I have no doubt that's true, as in most other places on the planet.
The thing is, you are making an absolute argument: those who drive in NY are richer than those who don't. I don't deny that. I'm making a relative argument: within the driving group, the poorer ones will be priced out. You say those are not poor, but "merely wealthy". Our grand-father said they are blue collar workers. You both lack data, and I suspect that we will see a wide, gentle slope, with most rich people driving, but also an important minority of the lower classes, depending on personal circumstances.
The thing is, does the exact composition of the driving public mater for the regressivity to be a political problem? Some will be priced out and they will scream bloody murder, because from their perspective they were sacrificed in favor of the rich. You could go out and say "boo hoo, you are merely rich", but that's a politically imprudent move - a thousand personal stories will pop up about those marginal blue collar workers no longer able to feed their families.
So you could be right that it is not regressive in a broad, social justice sense, but that's not the sense in which the problem will be sliced. Rather, the vast majority of the affected merely rich will invoke the principle of the matter, and in principle it's designed to price out the poorer drivers, there's no doubt about that.
An idea I'm toying with is to distribute "tradable driving coupons" to all people holding a drivers license. A flat tax would develop on the market, so the net effect is similar to congestion charging. But now the tax does not go to the city, but to the poorer residents who opt not to drive. Ideally, fiscal credits should be earned, so as to not reward those who don't pay any tax and thus have no contribution to the infrastructure. This beautifully solves the political problem and makes driving a matter of personal choice: you are now rewarded for preserving the public good.
If the congestion fees go to expenditures that broadly benefit all New Yorkers, it's far a simpler system than "tradable driving coupons" and could wind up highly progressive. (At one extreme, this "broad benefit" could be just a per-capita rebate of fees collected, in cash, to all residents.)
A "coupons" system would trend towards being just like fees: at the margin, every coupon-holder has to decide whether they prefer cash (from selling their coupons) or driving, exactly like someone facing a congestion fee. Roughly the same set of people "priced out" by fees would be eager to sell rather than drive.
A coupon-system might be nastier to the non-conscientious, because there's likely extra budgeting/deadlines/resale-effort involved. And the lost revenues for broad public projects would have to made up through other NY taxes – some regressive, some progressive – so the net effect on household budgets of a big "coupon giveaway" would be unclear.
Thank you for the perspective on the voucher idea. Yeah, in a perfect world, it's equivalent with a congestion tax coupled with a tax deduction of equal amount, I've hinted to that. But you would need to dynamically change the amount of the tax to keep up with road supply and demand, and that will clearly be be an explosive political decision. Also, for cash in hand to be psychologically equivalent to public services, the voters have to have full trust in the public spending process, which seems unlikely. So in practice revenue generating vouchers could be much more palatable. The additional transaction costs and friction could be negligible compared to a traditional congestion tax: to drive more than your allotment, you load your driving wallet with cash that is deducted at prevailing market voucher prices; at the end of the year, if you generally drove less than the allotment, you will find a nice tax credit waiting for you inside the public tax internet gateway.
By the way, I'm a city councilor in my European town and that's why I might show a strong slant towards practical ways to achieve political consensus, as opposed to just going for the superior theoretical solution. Cities rarely move on theoretical optimum paths and recently, of all idiotic policies, I had to struggle for ending the public subsidy of free parking. No-brainer, but wait until a significant part of the public received if for decades and strongly believe it's some sort of natural right.
1. There's no reason we couldn't provide exceptions for the kinds of vans and trucks that blue-collar workers need to drive into the city to make their livings.
2. There's no reason we couldn't offer income-based exceptions to people who absolutely cannot ride transit for this or that reason.
As in all proposals to ration some scarce resource, it's important to understand that we already ration it, even if it's not explicit. Today, we do it by literally clogging the streets so much that nobody else can get through. (And now we've added this new way, too.) Surely nobody thinks that's the smartest way to ration.
Should we charge $500 to get into national parks? Why not? Should we just charge people for the health care they consume a la carte or should we have a national system for that? Why?
As you can see you’re hitting on a general philosophy question here. My argument would be that trying to set shared government services at market rates tends to lead to deeply regressive outcomes.
There certainly are smart arguments on both sides with congestion pricing. Externalities matter. Are cars inefficient? And so on. But my intention is to illuminate the other side of the coin, which seems perpetually unrepresented.
A couple quick ones:
1. Registering the car in your grandparents name, who have no income, to avoid tolls. Or perhaps your stay at home spouse (assuming you file separately).
2. Make your next vehicle a light truck or van to avoid potentially hundreds in monthly congestion tolls. Luxury trucks are very much a thing.
I agree your plan would technically work, but it would be filled with exceptions, loopholes, and political handouts. That is rather fitting for NYC though.
The end result of which would be a whole bunch of people paying a congestion tax who aren't paying one today.
Automobiles are one of the absolute worst quality-of-life-impacting things about living in Manhattan. They're loud, dangerous, and smelly.
I'm not trying to hide my cards; if it were up to me, I'd ban private cars (at the very least) entirely in Midtown (at the very least).
The difference is that you can avoid the driving tax by not driving; unlike the city tax that can only be avoided by not getting born.
So it's less of a tax and more of paying for a public service.
A cap on Ubers/Lyfts + minimum pay will likely increase the price of Ubers/Lyfts. Rich people will be able to afford the new prices, but poor people will not.
At least until it's implemented, anyhow. Once people see congestion drastically reduced, it becomes more popular: https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2017/12/06/for-politicians-conge...
It also pretty obviously favors the rich, which is not a big vote-getter.
In many ways, a congested city works like a income-adjusted congestion tax, where you pay with your time. Since the time of rich people is more valuable, the burden seems "fair". The only problem is that the time is wasted, no tax is collected.
Maybe we should accept that political reality and setup income adjusted congestion taxes, putting the revenue to work to ease congestion for everybody.
Another option is to disburse a limited, equal number of "tradable driving hours" to each citizen regardless of income. You now have a market that eficiently allocates the limited public resource, allowing poor or thrifty citizens to earn tax credits, while allowing rich drivers to pay a fixed rate for each driving hour exceeding their allocation.
It's good politics, bad economics - but still much better than wasting millions of man hours each day.
I think value is an individual metric. E.g., I value good chocolate highly, but chocolate gives my girlfriend migraines, so for her it has negative value. So I think the time of rich people is exactly as valuable to them as it is to poor people. Or maybe less so, in that the rich people I know are on average much more willing to waste time than the poor ones.
Given that, your other schemes are more plausible, but I don't know that they'd be better in practice; the nth-order effects are hard to calculate, but could easily be pathological. Given that the real problem in doing this is the way some people have orders of magnitude more money than people, the cleanest solution is just to tax heavily enough that the wealth difference isn't nearly as large. Which, given the sensitivity of US politicians to the desires of the wealthy, is entirely unlikely to happen.
Cost vs. speed is a fundamental trade-off in transportation, nothing groundbreaking here. It allows an economic discussion and market allocation of various individual preferences. Otherwise we are stuck into positions like "my time with my family has infinite subjective value, so I should clearly be allowed to race my Formula 1 car down 5th avenue back from work" - and there is really no way for me to prove that you don't really love your family to that degree.
What we can all agree is that time wasted in traffic is net social cost that affects everybody, and that it takes very little extra vehicles on the road to go from peak road efficiency to gridlock. The public resource of road infrastructure is badly mismanaged by leaving it in a a congested, unproductive state.
As the subway crumbles, ride-share and taxis are the only practical way most people can get around. The cab-limiting "medallion" system led to infamous corruption (Michael Cohen, a name you might have heard from the news, owns an entire fleet of them); most New Yorkers thus consider ride-share to be a godsend. I don't see how capping ride share will result in anything but making Ubers as terrible as yellow cabs.
btw, if ride-share is capped at current levels, that means that traffic would merely not-get-any-worse than it already is. This will do nothing to reduce traffic; congestion pricing would accomplish something.
> The de Blasio administration has steadfastly maintained that it can’t get behind a congestion pricing plan because it unfairly burdens low-income New Yorkers traveling into Manhattan from the outer boroughs. On Friday, the Mayor seemed to soften on his prior opposition.
https://ny.curbed.com/2018/1/19/16910546/nyc-congestion-pric...
But I can't actually find a quote of him saying that; everything I can find just says he thinks it's not fair, but doesn't specify why: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/nyregion/de-blasio-conges...
I don't know what de Blasio's plans are after his mayoral term is up, but this ticks all the right political boxes for him.
Advocating for congestion pricing would mean no more Taxi campaign contributions, Uber the company is unpopular, and he would piss off those who benefit from toll free roads; as a politician that would actually take courage, so why do it?
> Many experts believe congestion pricing is the best way for New York City to fix congestion and secure the funds needed to fix the subway. Mr. Johnson supports the idea, but Mr. de Blasio has opposed it. Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo, who controls the subway, has said he will push for congestion pricing...
Why does de Blasio oppose it? It seems like another reasonable approach to tackling congestion -- heck, it's the public version of building private toll roads -- with the added bonus of providing funds to improve public transportation.