This implication is basically correct, actually. Sure, not every machine needs to be a server, but every people should have at least one. Everyone should have his own mail server. Every blogger should have his own web server. And so on. It's just a matter of basic civil liberties, like privacy and free speech, which currently aren't fully enabled, because most people don't have the amount of control they should have.
If we let giant NAT routers spread further, such control will be effectively impossible. Even for computer nerds. Even for owners of a freedom box[1].
As a side note, the correct response for security is not using giant NAT routers. It's getting rid of Windows.
If IP addresses were truly and in principle a right, then surely everyone would also be entitled to an ASN and the right to publish their IP address on the provider of their choosing. But they aren't; it costs hundreds of thousands of dollars to go from a standing start to default-less full peer.
Without peering, the IP address is just a totem. You think it matters, but it doesn't; you've simply been licensed to speak on the Internet by your ISP.
That doesn't really bother me, but it should bother you, if you take your principles seriously. IPv6 isn't going to solve that problem (IPv6 does not magically end BGP RIB bloat). But overlay networks, which don't care whether they're running on top of IPv4, CLNP, IPX, or IPv6, do solve it.
I know nothing about overlay networks. I need to dig further before I update my beliefs.
I want that about as much as I want my own personal DVD press, oil well, glass factory, operating theatre, coffee bean plantation and lawyer. (Although if my own mail server was as profitable as my own oil well, maybe...).
I reckon relying on a friend is very close to ideal. But not strictly so.
For an otherwise reasonable comment, I have to say: What a load of bull.
The only machine I have ever gotten hacked was a Linux machine, since practically all attacks flowing on the net are Linux attacks.
I run a mixed environment of Windows and Linux and have zero issues, despite my entire LAN being exposed to the internet via IPv6 (obviously firewalled though).
Windows itself isn't insecure. It's a very nice and secure platform. Locked down, there are no problems at all. Users aer insecure. They are the problem.
If Linux had near the same marketshare as Windows, they would require access to install whatever new and fancy thing which came around, would have to be locked up, and voila, Linux would be ridden with all the same problems Windows have now.
As far as reclaiming large A blocks is concerned, I read somewhere that we are exhausting addresses equivalent to an A-class block in 5 weeks. Easy to see that we are going to need a long-term solution anyhow.
The security isn't really provided by NAT, it's provided by the firewall; yes, a stateful protecting the entire end-user network is desirable, but NAT isn't really required for that to function effectively.
Even security-by-obscurity in case of a NAT router is doubtful, unless it's fronting a relatively big network. For home networks, the address of the network is identifying enough. By monitoring traffic you can even guess how big the network is.
Wikipedia and Google seem to confirm that IPsec is mandatory for IPv6 hosts, but how many hosts are really going to support it? I'm pretty sure I can turn on IPv6 on my Linux boxes a lot easier than I can turn on IPsec (step 1: figure out which implementation to install, step 2: figure out byzantine configurations, ...). I think my OS X box has IPv6 turned on out of the box, but I wasn't aware it'd do IPsec without being lovingly configured.
Like multicast and a better solution for portable IP space, I feel like mandatory IPsec will be just another purely theoretical benefit of IPv6. (Which is not to say that I'm not extremely interested in its highest profile promise: more address space.)
Now, if the device is cracked through one of its client software (NATs don't prevent that), then it could start up a rogue server, while if it were behind a NAT it couldn't. That's no worse for the machine itself (it's hosed anyway), but you could argue that's worse for the rest of the network.
I think it's not. Botnets are annoying and dangerous when they act as clients. Spam, DDoS, automatic attacks are all client behaviour. Even if you want server behaviour, connections don't have to be initiated from the outside. The compromised device just have to know the relevant IP, and initiate the connexion itself.
Finally, if you want to block incoming connections anyway, a plain firewall is cleaner. At least FTP will work.
The goal of some botnets is to set up servers for software distribution or to host phishing sites. You can't characterize botnets activity as simply client behavior.
Thanks to UPnP being enabled on most modern consumer routers you can't even count on the NAT protecting you from having a unauthorized server.
Having end-devices NOT be servers is ignoring the fact that the UI for many home devices is delivered over a embedded web server. This is becoming more commonplace over time.
Ultimately you need a firewall that controls inbound and outbound traffic.
Note that legacy holders don't pay fees on their massive /8s.
Ahem. Are you, perhaps, basing this on Windows XP from several years ago instead of Windows 7? Because 7 (and 2008 R2 Server) have pretty comprehensive looking firewalling.
This is obviously not the case. NAT (Network Address Translation) techniques can hide thousands of devices behind one IP address. In fact, for security reasons, it's advisable to not have every device directly on the internet. I have an ADSL modem/router at home with NAT, which makes substandard firewall solutions as what is provided by Windows pretty much unnecessary.
So perhaps we simply need to reclaim large blocks (particularly those universities and companies that have large A blocks of ~16 million addresses) and save IP addresses for each machine for ISPs, servers and those that actually need them.
Of course that's hard to mandate but like many things you can solve it with market forces: charge people who have more than, say, 128 IP addresses on a scale such that the most economic thing to do is transition away from that and give up their addresses.