Now, if the device is cracked through one of its client software (NATs don't prevent that), then it could start up a rogue server, while if it were behind a NAT it couldn't. That's no worse for the machine itself (it's hosed anyway), but you could argue that's worse for the rest of the network.
I think it's not. Botnets are annoying and dangerous when they act as clients. Spam, DDoS, automatic attacks are all client behaviour. Even if you want server behaviour, connections don't have to be initiated from the outside. The compromised device just have to know the relevant IP, and initiate the connexion itself.
Finally, if you want to block incoming connections anyway, a plain firewall is cleaner. At least FTP will work.
The goal of some botnets is to set up servers for software distribution or to host phishing sites. You can't characterize botnets activity as simply client behavior.
Thanks to UPnP being enabled on most modern consumer routers you can't even count on the NAT protecting you from having a unauthorized server.
Having end-devices NOT be servers is ignoring the fact that the UI for many home devices is delivered over a embedded web server. This is becoming more commonplace over time.
Ultimately you need a firewall that controls inbound and outbound traffic.