This is an absolutely egregious rookie error. I wouldn't touch the Signal desktop app with a 10 foot pole after seeing that commit.
> const expected: string = "Hello<br><script>alert('evil');</script>World!";
(Meaning they actually changed a line that had "<script>alert('evil')</script>" and didn't notice.)
I have seen this before though, with some folks removing path sanitisation code I added several years prior to fix a CVE. So it's not uncommon (it also got merged, so when I found out and fixed it I added a very large and scary comment to stop people from doing it again).
Uhm... that's a really rookie mistake to make. Like, one of the very basics of jQuery usage. I'm not exactly sure what to think about it after seeing this commit you linked...
A mistake that seems like it could've been caught in a code review!
Still, when you ship an app with a relatively strict Content Security Policy as Signal did (including using script-src 'self'), you don't really expect a simple XSS vulnerability to lead to RCE, but it turns out that policy doesn't really do much in an Electron app.
> The Signal devs thought $.html() does some kind of escaping
I mean, it does do a kind of escaping. If you assign javascript to innerHTML directly, it won't execute. jQuery specifically checks whether you're adding a script tag, and if so, it takes the extra step to execute it for you.
Yes, but most engineers would look at that last element and say "what on earth is going on here", where $.html() being dangerous is something that engineers who don't usually work on web might not know about. You're right about blaming the DOM spec, but there's no actual reason for signal desktop to interact with that poorly designed spec except that they chose electron as a framework.
The Signal devs thought $.html() does some kind of escaping: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Desktop/commit/9d41b8616... (this commit made something that was easy to exploit into something that was even easier to exploit).
To be honest, I'd lay more blame on the authors of the DOM spec making innerHTML a setter than on Electron, and jQuery exposing this misfeature even more with $.html(), teaching an army of web developers to do the wrong thing. We've all seen numerous (XSS) vulnerabilities in all kinds of websites, browser extensions, Electron apps, etc resulting from this API, tho in Electron apps it gets particularly devastating as often you'd get code execution not just in a sandboxed website but full code execution under the current user credentials in the system.