Remember that the things that are said to matter the most in real estate are "location, location, and location".
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/magazine/28FOB-onlanguage...
Housing developments and their costs of construction and their suitability for a particular site and their aesthetic appeal to an area and the demand curve that they face there and their utility connection options and the other regulations that they will be subject to apart from permit approval are all different in different places, so a developer's level enthusiasm for building a particular project in one city or another, or one neighborhood or another, is very unlikely to be exactly transferable...
You might say that the auction mechanism would nonetheless take account of this because the developer would only bid amounts that would lead to profitability literally anywhere, but I don't think such amounts exist. ("Cool, the 50-story apartment building concept has been approved for construction on a vacant lot with no existing utility connections 5 km from the nearest other building and 30 km from the nearest bus stop! Let's go build it!")
For example developers could make the conditions so tight that only one location met all the requirements pushing up the cost since that community would know this was the only site and so hold off bidding. Alternatively, the developer could set the conditions broadly so that more communities would bid lowering the cost.
The nice thing about this is the friendlier the developer makes the proposal to a community the lower the price they will have pay. The community gets development that maximises their returns while the developer is encouraged to create community friendly developments.
And, what's more, how eager would they be to be seen to be thinking this way in a public bid? One thing that comes to mind is that some developers might not want to publicly specify some of the features that actually matter to them, for example things about neighborhood incomes, crime rates, homelessness, or other neighborhood demographics. Still, developers may feel that these things will significantly affect the suitability of a site to a profitable project, but not want to deal with the public relations aspects of spelling out their reasoning.
I'm not sure how strong an argument that is against your proposal, but maybe developers would consider it pretty fundamental.
Edit: Also, it's amusing to think about people trying to quantify aesthetic fit. "We want to build this development in a place that McMansion Hell thinks is overall pretty tacky, but not super tacky." "We want to build this development in a place with an average of 12 architectural classiness points, but in any case not more than 17 classiness points."
In practice this proposal would work best when land owners and communities work together to put together potential sites that meet developers needs.
I think developers will hate this idea because instead of the whole surplus going to them and their corrupt buddies in government, it will have to be shared with the local community. Since the bid will be public there is no way to payoff someone in the planning department to get approval for your development. Of course from my perspective this is a feature not a bug.
I would think if there were a lot of developers and a lot of parcels, an alternative is that there would be more supply-side competition for housing and then better-quality housing would be more affordable overall. Do you see factors preventing this outcome from being likely?
The end result is everyone should win - communities get the development that want, landowners get a higher price, and the honest developers can compete with the corrupt. The only losers are the corrupt.
I am, perhaps, a bit of NIMBY. I'm willing to accept that some of my concerns are not in the public interest. I don't want an apartment building in my neighborhood because of the impacts on street parking, traffic, noise, etc. All of those things negatively affect me, and so I take a lot of convincing.
But another issue is that developers have a history of claiming they will ameliorate these issues by improving infrastructure, such as adding underground parking, upgrading sewers, building sound barriers, etc and then do not. Or they exploit loopholes to avoid their obligations. An example where I live is that new developments are required to have sidewalks. Developers simply tell homeowners they are required to build the sidewalk within 2 years which, of course, doesn't happen. 5 years later, the city goes in an builds them and applies specials to the home and everyone is unhappy except the developer, who walked away from the project long ago.
Sometimes its seems that cities are so beholden to developers that they can get away with anything.
Why would existing residents ever agree to new development if they have to pay for it? (Either through taxes to upgrade infrastructure, or by needing to deal with insufficient infrastructure that doesn't get improved as needed) Maybe instead of directly performing the upgrades, developers should be paying extra to the government (either lump sum, or over N years) because in theory the government can then do a few large upgrades rather than developers doing many small ones, but the cost of new capacity should really be the responsibility of the people who need it (developers/new residents).
As to why people would agree to new development—they shouldn’t be allowed to veto it. They should get to decide what level of infrastructure the government will provide to the community. But omce they do that, theh shouldn’t get to discriminate against new residents by forcing those residents to pay a disproportionate share of the common infrastructure.
Part of the problem of this proposal is that you are treating everyone equally in this scenario, but not all development is equal. A single family dwelling creates a different impact than an apartment building. It requires different sewers, road frontage and utilities. Its cost is different. What you are proposing encourages expensive development. If a person pays the same whether they build high density housing or a McMansion, what motivation is there to actually solve the housing problem? If residents can't veto development, and communities can't put limits on it, you're left with very few tools to actually resolve important issues like urban sprawl that got us into this mess in the first place.
If you propose levying different taxes based on the type of development, then we're back around to where we started: shifting the burden of infrastructure to the owners and developers that are utilizing it.
Additionally, I would argue that's not how taxes work at all. There are many "use" based taxes: utilities, sales tax, special assessments, gas tax, toll roads, and so on.
EDIT: Additionally, when you say "proportionate share", I think many would argue that's what charging developers and new residents for new infrastructure is. They benefit from the new infrastructure, thus they pay for it.
Everyone that comprises the tax base that pays for the relevant infrastructure. In this case, state and local government.
> A single family dwelling creates a different impact than an apartment building. It requires different sewers, road frontage and utilities. Its cost is different. What you are proposing encourages expensive development.
On a per tax unit basis, apartments create much lower infrastructure cost that single family homes. An condo building with 100 units requires more sewer and road infrastructure than a single family home. But it’s got 100x the number of taxable units, and requires far less than 100x the infrastructure of a single family home.
> If a person pays the same whether they build high density housing or a McMansion, what motivation is there to actually solve the housing problem?
There is a natural incentive to build high density units in response to rising real estate prices, because you can make much more revenue per unit land. The market, unsurprisingly, provides the right incentives.
> If residents can't veto development, and communities can't put limits on it, you're left with very few tools to actually resolve important issues like urban sprawl that got us into this mess in the first place.
Urban sprawl was caused by existing residents legally requiring sprawl. For example, in my county, it’s illegal to build a house in most areas on less than 1/3 of an acre. I live in a pre-zoning law neighborhood where the lots are 1/5 that size. Even with the variances grandfathered in, a local developer had to fight for years to build three new houses conforming to the existing lot plan.
> Additionally, I would argue that's not how taxes work at all. There are many "use" based taxes: utilities, sales tax, special assessments, gas tax, toll roads, and so on.
Having a use-based tax that everyone pays is quite different than forcing new residents to foot the entire bill for shared infrastructure.
> EDIT: Additionally, when you say "proportionate share", I think many would argue that's what charging developers and new residents for new infrastructure is. They benefit from the new infrastructure, thus they pay for it.
Those people would be wrong. For example, people in my dense pre-zoning neighborhood pay our “proportionate share” for shared sewer mains and county roads. But 50 houses in my neighborhood pay about the same in taxes as 50 houses in a less dense area, but it cost the county way less to build sewer and road infrastructure to our 50 houses than to 50 houses in a less dense area.
For better or worse, our tax system is not built on paying proportionate to use. If it were, your point might be valid, but as I said, then new residents would get to avoid paying for a lot of other things they never used. If you charged new residents for the new infrastructure they require, then it’s not fair to make them pay for teachers and other public employees that retired before the new residents moved there. I’d take that deal in a heartbeat.
I also take issue with your use of the term "shared infrastructure". If you view all infrastructure as shared, then the existing infrastructure is being used "for free" by new residents, its costs having been payed for by previous residents. In your proposal the costs are loaded onto existing residents who payed for both old and new infrastructure, as opposed to new residents who only pay for the new. This would seem to balance out whatever new residents are paying in for "things they never used".
EDIT: I should address your point about urban sprawl. I would think that as long as it is cheap to build new, the incentive to infill cities is low. Developers and buyers will prefer new, and that creates a number of negative externalities beyond housing shortages. New construction is obviously necessary, but we need to find ways to align the incentives of developers and communities. I actually think we're off the mark here talking about new residents, since only residents that buy new are saddled with the extra burden. New residents that opt to infill existing neighborhoods do not. Perhaps the better option is to place the burden on the developers, but offer residents other incentives (such as property tax relief on new construction).
It's curious to me that so many people complain about gentrification in terms of destroying the nature of an existing community, but then we also have so many complaints about zoning laws that are designed to protect the visible characteristics of communities.
Rayiner's point is that current tax payers won't pay more, because new residents result in a higher tax base in the first place.
In California with Prop 13 and widespread rent control, this is especially true.
I feel like in California this devaluation argument is not really about economics but rather a proxy for making a case that might not be too politically correct when laid out as it is.
I disagree. The house might be worth less but the plot of land it is sitting on is worth a lot to a developer who wants to build a similar complex there.
The problem is that this doesn't work in practice for individual homeowners. It would only work if all the homeowners who own those "plots" required by that developer are willing/able to sell at once, and that happens approximately never.
Moreover, the value of the house isn't just important at the time of sale but also at times such as mortgage refinances. A drop (or lesser gain) in value can have real negative financial consequences well before any sale.
Perhaps it’s not like that everywhere. But from that background, it seems reasonable for the developer to pay for upgrades.
And to clarify, by new installations I mean paying for half a mile or more of infrastructure. Not a hookup, but running new stuff for a good distance.
Consider San Francisco’s mission bay. UCSF is a bad neighbor - they have large unfriendly buildings that create a dangerous street environment. The adjacent residential isn’t a lot better. Lots of parking garages, no effective street level housing, no effective businesses. There is no legitimate reasons for someone to be hanging around after dark.
I also lived near the Castro and lived thru 5 large apartment infill developments. Only one produced useful ground level business (Whole Foods). All the others had their retail space sit empty for years, Years! This is in an existing neighborhood that has a strong history of mixed retail and residential.
Not to mention that during the construction (1-3 years depending) the sites are the very definition of bad neighbors. They suck away street parking, they cause noise and air pollution (new concrete work causes plenty of air pollution), make it difficult to get around the area.
As an existing resident the upsides are minimal (no effective new business, the new ones tend to be expensive, doesn’t cater to existing residents) and the downsides are guaranteed.
I'm excited to see the new Pier 70 development, and I wouldn't have bought if I didn't think the new development was going to be anything other than a nice way to make the central waterfront accessible again and some sorely needed housing. How could I be a NIMBY when the area doesn't even have a grocery store yet?
You know what isn't a livable neighborhood? The Sunset, with its rows and rows of ticky-tackies with ugly little yards in the back. Give me Mission Bay over that pastel low-rise concrete jungle any day of the week.
Also, be prepared for your neighborhood to be overrun on event nights at the new Warriors building and 83+ Giants home games each year. April and May will include both Warriors and Giants games simultaneously at times. Get home early, or stay out late.
You mean, imposes large costs on landlords and home owners. Residents are made better off if they're renters.
Anyone living there, regardless of if they own or rent, is affected by the changes. People currently there bear the burden, people who come in after reap the benefits.
Besides, in California, new owners and renters hugely subsidize the existing ones, because of Prop 13 and rent control.
It sucked. The resulting construction added no flavor to the neighborhood. It was generic and boring looking apartments, no business space, no communal or common space.
If development in the area is a good thing, then the value accrues to the property, which benefits the landlord, leading to increased rents. The renter has to decide if the benefits from the development are worth the increased rent, and this will vary by person.
A 1-3% increase in available units probably won't do anything but change local neighborhood prices, but a city adding 10%+ in units everywhere is going to drop their average rent costs
Today, a big factor driving up rents is the amount of money coming into "hip" areas, seeking profits proportionate to it's investment. I can't see how this scheme wouldn't simply increase the problem - while trampling people ordinary intuition concerning property.
The ideal situation imo is to have certain areas where very high density is the only use and other areas where low density is standard. Here the market would dictate an overall increase in density while relatively reducing the cost of buying land.
Your solution is to effectively steal the rights of the owners of the land (by taking away their ability to control density) without compensation and hand a windfall to developers. How do you think we ended up in the current NIMBYism situation?
With your "reverse auction" approach, the would-be builder has to spend money on both out-bidding others who who'd prefer other uses AND has to spend on the actual cost of building, so two/double costs.
Your solution is to effectively steal the rights of the owners of the land.
My approach modifies the rights of title holders. It's no more stealing than more other measures (such zoning) because it happens in the bounds of the right. Indeed, I am simply proposing extra-aggressive zoning to encourage density. Moreover, your approach also modifies land-holder rights. I mean, landholder have never had unconditional control of their land, that control has devolved to the state or the sovereign all the way back to medieval times and before.
Yes they will have to share some of their profits with the community, but it is better for everyone than the current approach of fight it out through the courts or paying off some corrupt officials.
Your proposal is to take away the rights of the titleholders to achieve the outcome you want (more development in certain locations). While totally non-democratic, this approach is doomed to fail as it is the reason the current development paralysis has occurred. Start taking away the rights of people and surprise, surprise they fight back. Let's instead find an approach where everyone wins.
No, that's exactly what I'm objecting to. The more bidders in an auction, the higher the price, the high the price, the larger the cost of development. This effectively a device to impose an extra tax on people choosing one land use over another.
The whole of NIMBY is a (supposed) community of home owners able to stop development. The story told for this safe streets and "community feeling" but the actual aim and result higher home values at the expense of a bizarrely distorted market.
Today, "the community", other property owners, toss money into legal devices to stop development using environmental impact other ad-hoc methods to stop one property owner from using their property as they wish. In a lot of ways, this confused scheme is codifying this disaster.
What I'd advocate is instead rationalizing the zoning process so the health of an entire region is considered. Have much more definite guidelines about what and where developers can build, remove the million had now infesting development.
The public are the real owners of the land.
The housing crisis is regional; the benefits from development extend far beyond the neighborhood or even municipality in question -- reducing housing prices all over the map. So you can't expect a negotiation between the developers and the community to account for that external benefit, and you're left with a tragedy of the commons where each community wants more housing supply, just not here.
The current approach is designed to maximise conflict and minimise community benefit. Let’s think about creating a system that minimises conflict and maximises community benefit.
I have been surprised how many people have voted it down here. The primary post has been up and down like a yo-yo over the last 24 hours. I would really like to know why.
I will try to write it up in more detail on my blog.
Developers can bid what they are willing to pay a community for development approval of what they want to build and the communities can compete against each other to win the development. The amount the developer is willing to pay rises each month and the first community to say yes gets the development.
This way rather than all the surplus going to the developer and all the costs to the community, both sides benefit. Win-win.
Edit. Since it has come up a few times in the comments you can cover the location issue via the developer's bid requirement documentation. For example, they could say they need conditions x, y, & z for any site and only communities with sites that meet those conditions can bid. The developer can make the conditions as narrow or broad as they like (all the way from only one site in state meeting the conditions to thousands of sites). It will be in the interest of the developer to keep the conditions broad since the more flexible they can be the more communities will compete for the development and the lower the cost to them.
0. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_auction