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Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by peterwwillis on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:24PM (#16915204)
This same attack can be used to generate valid TLS certs for any website, for example using Let's Encrypt. The best part? Your target doesn't need to use Let's Encrypt at all. Anyone can use them to forge certs for any domain. Of course, this is possible with most other cert providers, but Let's Encrypt automates it.

So.... TLS certs mean jack squat if you can pull off a BGP+DNS attack. You might want to start pinning certs for your bank's website. (but not using HPKP, Google is removing it from Chrome)

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by vertex-four on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:43PM (#16915409)
The solution to this is the CAA issue record combined with DNSSEC. DNSSEC ensures that an attacker can't spoof your DNS even if they have your DNS traffic directed to them globally, and then CAA ensures that only the issuers you want can create certificates for your domain. This is a solved problem, it just requires caring about it.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by peterwwillis on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:49PM (#16915457)
CAA depends on CAs (all 650 of them) to respect it, and for all of them to implement everything perfectly (it was shown in 2017 that they don't). This also depends on DNS again, which again not everyone will do properly, so CAA requests from CAs can be hijacked. So CAA is stupid.

The client should be getting the list of authorized CAs for the domain from DNS on first connection, and/or from inside the first cert, with expiry dates. It should require that if there is a new CA, that its authorization be signed by a previous CA or cert. The client needs to verify the entire chain of authorized changes throughout history, rather than just believe any cert from any CA at any time. And there should probably be a certificate transparency pooled service which the client checks the first time they see a new chain or new root of a chain (or something, i'm making this up as I go). In the current case the domain owner may eventually figure out something's up, but the client may not, and changing BGP/revoking certs/etc are ineffective when the attack is already in play.

This is the only time you will ever see me say this, but we kind of need Blockchain here.

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by an_account_name on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @03:08PM (#16915620)
CAA support wasn't mandatory for WebPKI CAs until 2017-09-08 so it's likely that it's better supported now than it was last year.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by peterwwillis on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @06:22PM (#16917177)
Assuming every CA's support was perfect (again, 650 of them, so not likely), CAA still does not stop these attacks. Domains have to implement CAA. Most domains do not, so most domains remain vulnerable.

Even if the domain does, if either they or a CA screw anything up, they are vulnerable. The client will accept any cert signed by any CA. One rogue cert screws the security.

Compare this to if the client was verifying it using a blockchain. The blockchain provides a record that the client can verify, not only from multiple peers that share the same records, but at the sources of the original records, to verify a CA was authorized, and to verify a specific domain owner created a cert. This is a much higher barrier to attack than what CAA provides. Even if this verification were optional, it would be a much better authenticity guarantee than what clients get today.

The other thing a blockchain would provide is protection against state actors. If the FBI barges into Verisign waving a FISA warrant, they could possibly force Verisign to generate valid certs outside of the CT or CAA process. A blockchain could show the client that a cert it received was never in the blockchain. Comparing the blockchain to CT could further emphasize rogue certs.

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by tialaramex on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @08:24PM (#16917833)
How do you get 650?

I count significantly less than 100 organisations, I started with the CCADB (the database shared by Mozilla and Microsoft) for all intermediates, I cut those that aren't part of the Mozilla root programme, and then I asked for the "CA Owner" field, which avoids thinking a single owner is really several distinct entities when it isn't.

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by Rapzid on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:37PM (#16915355)
Well, they still pretty much mean the same thing. It's just that effective control of the domain temporarily changed hands.. This is a well known limitation, we just don't typically see DNS hijacked this close to the core.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by flipp3r on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:34PM (#16915309)
What's also interesting is in the comments someone stated they'd used a Godaddy certificate issued on april 7. Maybe they had access to their account, or Godaddy's internal systems?
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by perezbox on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @06:58PM (#16917405)
Hi

I'm the GM for Security Products at GoDaddy, responsible for the GoDaddy CA. I have checked with the team and do not see any certificates issued to: http://myetherwallet.com/ (including DV).

If someone has an image of what was seen, please send it to me at [email protected] so that we can investigate further.

Thanks

Tony

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by flipp3r on Wednesday April 25, 2018 @02:37AM (#16919031)
I guess the comment was unfounded. Can't seem to find anything about it with the information available now, they appear to only have used a self signed cert which users ignored.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by peterwwillis on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:41PM (#16915390)
Like I said: anyone can generate a valid cert for any domain. You don't need to hack Godaddy or anyone's account. Create a new account, hijack the target's DNS, generate a valid cert for the domain you want.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by acdha on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @03:13PM (#16915651)
> hijack the target's DNS, generate a valid cert for the domain you want.

That’s hardly “anyone” – it requires non-trivial resources and, thanks to certificate transparency, is going to be noticed and revoked relatively quickly. That further lowers the likelihood that someone capable of the attack will burn it for a limited window of access.

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by peterwwillis on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @03:26PM (#16915757)
You consider two hours a limited window? To automate capturing traffic for any domain on the internet? Just as one example, you could initiate bank transfers for everyone doing online banking at any bank. Malware sitting on desktops have been doing this instantly, automatically, using valid sessions from the client side, for like a decade. No reason they couldn't do this sitting in the middle.

On top of this, many high profile hacks in recent years involve attacking the protocols used by banks to transfer funds. Many BGP attacks in the past have attacked the networks of major payment processors as well as banks. Again, you don't need two hours, or even one hour, to pull off this attack. Give me 10 minutes and a good connection.

It is "anyone" because literally anyone can use literally any CA to create the certificate, after they begin the attack. Who has the resources to do this attack? Anyone who can read a book on BGP and get on a backbone with the right provider. At least 13 high profile BGP attacks have happened in the past decade and a half. There's 328 "possible" BGP hijacks listed on bgpstream. https://www.google.com/search?q="Possible+BGP+hijack"+site%3...

Is Joe Schmoe script kiddie going to be doing many BGP attacks? No. But that's not the attacker I'm scared of. I mean, even the current attacker burned their capability to collect a fake currency. Obviously, there is not a high bar to who will use this access once they get it.

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by acdha on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @08:20PM (#16917813)
> You consider two hours a limited window? To automate capturing traffic for any domain on the internet? Just as one example, you could initiate bank transfers for everyone doing online banking at any bank. Malware sitting on desktops have been doing this instantly, automatically, using valid sessions from the client side, for like a decade. No reason they couldn't do this sitting in the middle.

Again, I'm not saying that this isn't a big deal but that you're really downplaying the level of effort required for the worst-case scenarios. Besides the average script kiddie not being likely to compromise an ISP to send the malicious announcements, your online banking scenario would only work for the people actively logging in during those two hours to banks which don't use IP fixing, out of band confirmation or other precautions to actually transfer money (every single financial institution I use has a period measured in days with human-on-phone verification to setup a new outbound transfer target); whose security staff don't check certificate transparency logs; and you'd have to develop the code to collect credentials and run the transfer for each bank, taking care to avoid triggering key-pinning and other high visibility errors.

Malware is similar: yes, it'd suck if you could get a valid HTTPS cert for someone's automatic update service but these days those certificates are pinned and most system use signed updates which would require a separate exploit to avoid.

One thing to remember is that this is coming after a decade of everyone responsible in the tech industry trying to protect against malicious state actors. This attack is what happens all the time to people in countries with repressive governments.

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by emerged on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:56PM (#16915532)
I know precious little about how DNS / certs work, yet it took me only an hour or two to install gitlab on some random cloudserver with a valid certificate. It's sort of a joke how easy it is now.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by pbhjpbhj on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:55PM (#16915522)
It's surprising that GoDaddy allow the issuing of the cert. I'd expect them to require some proof of ownership.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by antonvs on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @03:23PM (#16915725)
They do require proof of ownership, but it's recently become common to support validation by proving that you control the domain or web site being validated so that the proof is purely electronic, e.g.: https://www.godaddy.com/help/verify-domain-ownership-html-or...

In a case like this, the attackers had sufficient control to pass those kinds of checks - although people are saying they didn't do that, and just relied on enough users clicking through the certificate warnings.

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by ceejayoz on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @03:22PM (#16915712)
That proof of ownership is generally "publish a DNS record or a file at this specific URL", both of which hijacking DNS would permit you to do.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by 24gttghh on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:38PM (#16915358)
Excuse my ignorance but how does this allow someone to forge TLS certs for a given website/domain name that already has active certs? Wouldn't they have to revoke existing certs and then get new ones during the attack to pull this off?
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by jerf on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:49PM (#16915468)
Step one: Hijack the DNS entries so they point at your site.

Step two: Obtain a certificate from Let's Encrypt using website validation.

Step three: Proxy traffic through a proxy you provide that SSL cert for and capture anything you like. In the event that a website legitimately has a higher-class Extended Validation cert or other such thing, hope users don't notice the downgrade from Extended Validation correct SSL cert to a merely correct SSL cert, which is a pretty solid hope.

Certs don't have any sort of overriding or superseding property. A given cert and its chain of signatures is either accepted because you trust the signers, or it isn't; at the time you are making that decision, you don't have access to know whether any other certs have been issued since then or anything.

One thing that comes to mind is that browsers really ought to scream if they see a domain that was previously Extendedly Verified drop down to a Let's Encrypt-level cert. Though how much good this would do in practice is hard to tell... "Hmmm, what's this about the SSL cert being less good? It still has one, right? Let's just click through this... hmm... looks like the web site I expected... must just be the computer being weird enters password"

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by 24gttghh on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:59PM (#16915561)
For some reason I thought CA's at least talked to each other to see if someone else had issued a valid cert for a given domain along the lines of owning a domain name itself through a registrar. Clearly that only works when DNS isn't being abused like this...
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by xnyanta on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @04:03PM (#16916051)
Why should websites be limited to having only one certificate?

For example, if you have a service running on multiple backed servers, you might want to have once certificate per server for all of your domains.

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by notriddle on Wednesday April 25, 2018 @12:15PM (#16922997)
That use case still wouldn't explain a domain having certs from two different CAs.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by manigandham on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @03:55PM (#16915995)
You can generate as many certificates as you want for a given name. There is no master list of all the live certificates out there and there are no checks for existing certificates when generating new ones (otherwise we'd never be able to renew certs until the old ones expire, resulting in downtime).
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by libeclipse on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:45PM (#16915434)
You can have multiple certificates for a single host.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by evgen on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:49PM (#16915461)
The new, fake cert just has to validate for your phish/drove-by/cred-jacking site that is mimicing a real site. You are not planning a long-term take-over but just to make sure the new site passes checks by your victims.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by zerocrates on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:45PM (#16915432)
You don't need to revoke existing certificates to generate/forge new ones.
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by ohiovr on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @02:58PM (#16915553)
I noticed this while setting up some hobby servers that as long as my ip agreed with dns I could get a cert from lets encrypt.