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Re:How not to run a CA by cup-of-tea on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:15AM (#16492612)
SSL is fundamentally broken. Web-of-trust is the only real way to do security.
Re:How not to run a CA by greenhouse_gas on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:30AM (#16492714)
It's not. It's actually worse.

You're assuming that random people on the internet are going to collectively be more secure than CAs, which is obviously not the case.

Imagine you get an email signed by the IRS, and which is trusted by people A1, A2 and A3, who are trusted by people B1, B2, and B3 ... who are trusted by Z1, Z2, and Z3, who are fully trusted by you.

Should be reliable, right?

But while Z1, Z2 and Z3 may keep all OPSEC rules, you have no guarantee that they verified that Y1, Y2 and Y3 did. And even if they did, you have no guarantee that ...

And even if you did, can you guarantee that no one there got any malware, which signed off on a bunch of fake certs?

Re:How not to run a CA by cup-of-tea on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:53AM (#16492915)
All you've told me is you don't understand web-of-trust.
Re:How not to run a CA by simonw on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:58AM (#16492964)
Could you help us out by explaining what this comment is misunderstanding?
Re:How not to run a CA by cup-of-tea on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:26AM (#16493320)
You wouldn't trust a chain that long with something that sensitive. WOT gives you the ability to have different tiers of trust. If you verified the identity yourself then you can trust it completely. If you accept people verifiying identities on your behalf then you can choose exactly who you trust (ie. not everyone). It not only makes the delegation explicit, it gives you much more fine grained control about how much you can trust a given identity.

I'm not saying WOT solves all of our problems. It only makes it slightly better than verifying every key yourself. But it's better than the CA model because you can make it work for you.

Re:How not to run a CA by dpark on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:43AM (#16493527)
Yeah, web of trust gives me the option to manually decide, every time, if the chain(s) of trust looks "good enough" for me to trust the other party. There are two problems with this:

1. This is a ton of work and a lot of guesswork even for educated individuals. I end up looking at either explicit chains of trust (I trust Bob and he trusts Alice and she says that this is definitely my bank's website) or some random value an algorithm spits out that tries to convey how "trusted" an entity is based on how many paths there are to it and how short they are. In either case, it's a manual decision that will often feel arbitrary.

2. Laypersons are completely fucked. No way my grandmother can reasonably decide who to trust this way.

If web of trust ever becomes widespread somehow, I guarantee you a month later Google and Apple and Microsoft will become the de facto CAs because everyone will just look to them in the web of trust and see if one of them vouches for their banking website.

Re:How not to run a CA by u801e on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:54AM (#16493663)
> I guarantee you a month later Google and Apple and Microsoft will become the de facto CAs

Except that none of those companies bother verifying one's identity if you're not actually paying for their services.

> and see if one of them vouches for their banking website.

In that scenario, could I not just verify the bank's public key when I'm physically in one of their branch locations while opening an account? They could also verify my public key at the same time. That would allow for a direct line of trust. The same could apply to any company one deals with.

Re:How not to run a CA by dpark on Thursday March 01, 2018 @12:14PM (#16493899)
> Except that none of those companies bother verifying one's identity if you're not actually paying for their services.

I'm sure in this scenario, those companies will be delighted to step fully into the role of CA including accepting money for identity vouching.

> In that scenario, could I not just verify the bank's public key when I'm physically in one of their branch locations while opening an account? They could also verify my public key at the same time. That would allow for a direct line of trust. The same could apply to any company one deals with.

No. The same couldn't apply to any company. My primary bank is online only. And how many times have you actually walked into an Amazon office? Or Paypal? Are people in Ohio supposed to fly to San Jose to get Paypal's public key when they create an account? Or are we going to wait for the post office to deliver a physical copy of Paypal's public key (and we'll just trust that whole transaction couldn't be compromised). Physical key exchange is simply not practical in most cases.

Re:How not to run a CA by u801e on Thursday March 01, 2018 @12:52PM (#16494342)
It probably could apply to some that I locally deal with. But you're correct in saying that it's not practical for companies that don't have local branches.
Re:How not to run a CA by greenhouse_gas on Thursday March 01, 2018 @12:16PM (#16493933)
>In that scenario, could I not just verify the bank's public key when I'm physically in one of their branch locations while opening an account? They could also verify my public key at the same time. That would allow for a direct line of trust. The same could apply to any company one deals with.

You could? Would your grandmother? Would you fly to Mountain View to get Google's? And then turn around and fly to Washington DC to get the IRS's? And then turn around and fly to who knows where to get HN's? And then tell them to keep customer staff ready to assist you to install their public keys?

And what about personal blogs that don't want to be MITM?

Re:How not to run a CA by cup-of-tea on Thursday March 01, 2018 @02:40PM (#16495420)
> Laypersons are completely fucked. No way my grandmother can reasonably decide who to trust this way.

Can your grandmother trust you? Or maybe you're not prepared to keep her secure so you just tell her "trust Google, grandma".

Re:How not to run a CA by dpark on Thursday March 01, 2018 @03:02PM (#16495645)
No, my grandmother cannot trust me to verify every site she might want to visit. How am I supposed to know if random blog is legit? Or for that matter random bank?

The fact that I have to answer this tells me that you haven't though through the implications of web of trust very far.

Re:How not to run a CA by TheCoreh on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:11AM (#16493149)
From my understanding, the example posted is an unlikely degenerate case where the whole "web of trust" between you and another peer consists of three separate parallel paths.
Re:How not to run a CA by cntlzw on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:29AM (#16492705)
SSL is not fundamentally broken. The server authentication process is. Besides what does web-of-trust add? The client usually does not authenticate himself to the server. How should a client share "hey, I trust this server" with others?
Re:How not to run a CA by _jal on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:03AM (#16493034)
Real-world SSL is broken above a risk threshold. There are far too many trusted CAs that have repeatedly demonstrated incompetence and all of them are beholden to governments. (There are far too many, period, or in the alternative far too few.) If you have high assurance requirements, SSL with commercial CAs can't be trusted.

We have natural experiments showing that WoT, at least as implemented, doesn't scale. I hate that humans don't seem to be able to make it work, but that's reality for you.

Yes, I am a security pessimist.

Re:How not to run a CA by nfoz on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:40AM (#16492785)
I think the real sentiment here is: good PKI is an unsolved (and perhaps unsolvable) problem.
Re:How not to run a CA by zeveb on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:02AM (#16493024)
I agree. The CA model is broken (why should I trust a Russian to certify cia.gov?). The Web of Trust model is less broken in some ways, more in others.

I think a real solution would be something like a multi-root, score-based system (e.g. if the U.S. government, Underwriters Laboratories & ICANN all state that I'm talking to www.google.com/172.217.13.238, then I honestly probably am) — but I'm worried that it'd be way too complex for normal people.

Re:How not to run a CA by yjftsjthsd-h on Thursday March 01, 2018 @12:07PM (#16493807)
I would settle for restricting scope of CAs. As you say, cia.gov should only be signable by (at least) US CAs, but whatever.gov.ru should probably NOT be signable by any American CAs.

CAA records help with this, where available, but still leave some things to be desired.

Re:How not to run a CA by cup-of-tea on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:57AM (#16492948)
True. But at least web-of-trust gives you the ability to do something you are comfortable with.
Re:How not to run a CA by dpark on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:02AM (#16493021)
If by "something you are comfortable with" you mean "reject web of trust". Trust is not transitive, which is the problem with web of trust. I trust a set of people. I do not necessarily trust the people those people trust.
Re:How not to run a CA by cup-of-tea on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:08AM (#16493099)
If you reject the web of trust then you're saying you trust nobody (except yourself). Do you really not know anybody you trust to verify identities on your behalf? (That's a trick question because you trust the CAs).
Re:How not to run a CA by dpark on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:20AM (#16493242)
I specifically said that I do trust a set of people. Do you imagine that my small set of trusted people will personally vouch for the authenticity of millions of certs so that I can use the web? Of course not. You imagine instead that I'll trust the next set of people and so on, and that all this transitive trust will let me trust my bank's website. But I don't trust all those random people, which leads to a clear rejection of web of trust.
Re:How not to run a CA by cup-of-tea on Thursday March 01, 2018 @02:35PM (#16495370)
But you trust the CAs right now. If we used a web of trust system, you could still trust those CAs and nobody else. That's your model that you say isn't broken. You can be happy with that. I'll be happy with trusting people that I trust.
Re:How not to run a CA by dpark on Thursday March 01, 2018 @03:04PM (#16495662)
You propose a world where CAs still exist and all the infrastructure to support them exists, and realistically everyone continues to rely on them. But in parallel, everyone will build this web of trust system so that you can prefer it when it's convenient. That seems real plausible.
Re:How not to run a CA by zaarn on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:21AM (#16493261)
There is levels of trust.

While I maybe trust someone to be a real person after I've met them in real life and ate their spaghetti to give me back the 10$ they borrowed, I wouldn't trust them to verify the identity of the IRS for me.

The current solution is that we have some third parties which follow strict rules defined by themselves and browser vendors. Everyone involved has a very good incentive to remain trustworthy, otherwise they'd be out of business.

Sadly this doesn't prevent bottomfeeders like Trustico, StartTLS and others to leech of the system while some are genuinely interested in securing everyone's communication (see LE)

The Web of Trust only works if your trust in someone is binary and understandable to a computer, otherwise the browser might tell you "This website is 35.218% Trustworthy".

HTTPS trust must be binary. Either the cert is trusted or it isn't.

It's even more fun; GPG is considering to abandon the WoT. They're switching to TOFU instead, the first time you see a key it's trustworthy, similar to SSH.

Re:How not to run a CA by greenhouse_gas on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:59AM (#16493729)
>They're switching to TOFU instead, the first time you see a key it's trustworthy, similar to SSH.

Which is horrible unless your first connection to a server is trustworthy or you have an out-of-band way to verify keys (which is why it works in SSH, and can't work on the web).

Re:How not to run a CA by zaarn on Friday March 02, 2018 @03:35AM (#16499981)
Exactly. SSH Connections are usually towards servers you have setup so verifying the keys is easy. Even then there is little concern since most of it happens in the local area network anyway.

For PGP/GPG I feel like that TOFU is what most people are doing anyways, this change will only formalize the 0.90-quantile behaviour.

Re:How not to run a CA by cup-of-tea on Friday March 02, 2018 @04:48AM (#16500251)
> For PGP/GPG I feel like that TOFU is what most people are doing anyways, this change will only formalize the 0.90-quantile behaviour.

Yes, probably. Key signing parties used to be a thing. I was able to find one that happened in London in 2014 (no idea how many keys were signed, though). Unfortunately people are not aware of the concept of trust and especially of the fact they delegate trust to these third party CAs. It's just not a proper way to do security.

The TOFU model is the best thing if you actually verify the keys out-of-band. Web of trust is the best way I'm aware of to enable in-band verification. I don't claim that it will actually work in practice. But that's fine. All it means is you can't actually do in-band verification in practice. I think most people here are beginning with the assumption that in-band verification is possible and then criticising WOT for its practical shortcomings which is ridiculous.

Re:How not to run a CA by cratermoon on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:20AM (#16493243)
Trust is not a binary all or nothing state. I might trust a good friend to keep a secret about my finances generally, but I wouldn't trust that friend with my ATM card and pin.
Re:How not to run a CA by Spooky23 on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:45AM (#16492841)
The only thing I trust less than a CA is an army of Russian troll bots.
Re:How not to run a CA by RKearney on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:25AM (#16492677)
Yes, SSL has been broken for some time. That's why TLS was introduced nearly 20 years ago.
Re:How not to run a CA by dpark on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:56AM (#16492942)
You presumably got downvoted for being pedantic here, but I think your pedantry is reasonable. If someone's going say "X is fundamentally broken", they should know what X is actually called. Referring to TLS as SSL reeks of amateur hour and shallow knowledge[1], and is a mistake on par with referring to Javascript as Java.

[1] This is the sort of lazy mistake I would make, because I'm not a security expert.

Re:How not to run a CA by jlgaddis on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:27AM (#16493323)
Yes, technically it's TLS, not SSL.

TLS, however, is an "evolution" of SSL and many, many people still use this nomenclature. It doesn't "reek of amateur hour and shallow knowledge", it's just a holdover from the past.

We all know and understand what others are referring to when they say "SSL". It's like when I tell the girlfriend I'm going to go on a "bike ride". She understands that I mean I'm going for a ride on my Harley, a motorcycle, and not an actual bicycle.

Or last weekend, when a friend asked me, "Hey, could you move your car so <other person> can get out?". While I could have stood there arguing with him or correcting him (since my car was actually at home, in my driveway), I instead went out and moved my truck so that the other guest could leave.

This excessive, unwarranted pedantry is annoying as hell. You may be "technically correct" but you make everyone around you dislike you.

Re:How not to run a CA by dpark on Thursday March 01, 2018 @12:07PM (#16493811)
Your examples are not really comparable, mostly because of context. If someone at a party mentions SSL casually and you feel the need to explain that SSL is dead and they are really talking about TLS, you're just annoying. If someone presents themselves as an expert and says that SSL is "fundamentally broken", it's pretty reasonable to question their expertise. Especially when they actually aren't even talking about TLS but about CAs and PKI.

To make an absolute statement about the fundamental soundness of PKI and then use completely the wrong term? Come on. Can you imagine a real expert doing this and not at least recognize their own mistake? Don't talk about "fundamental flaws" when you don't know the difference between SSL and TLS and PKI. This is very much like someone trying to criticize the design of TCP/IP and not knowing the difference between an IP address and a MAC address.

Re:How not to run a CA by Tijdreiziger on Thursday March 01, 2018 @12:36PM (#16494163)
> It's like when I tell the girlfriend I'm going to go on a "bike ride". She understands that I mean I'm going for a ride on my Harley, a motorcycle, and not an actual bicycle.

Try saying this in the Netherlands (or, presumably, Denmark). Everyone would be surprised when you bring out your motorcycle instead of your bike (i.e., bicycle).

Re:How not to run a CA by zaarn on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:26AM (#16493313)
While not a security expert, I frequently refer to TLS as SSL, mostly when I talk about encrypted connections in general rather than specific protocol versions.

It's not quite as bad as calling JS Java or vice versa, it's more like saying Java and then saying Java 1.2 and Java 1.8 and so forth.

Re:How not to run a CA by yjftsjthsd-h on Thursday March 01, 2018 @12:08PM (#16493827)
Or better yet, it's like calling it Java 8 and then someone says you don't know what you're talking about because it's technically Java 1.8.
Re:How not to run a CA by cup-of-tea on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:58AM (#16492961)
The first line of the blog post calls it SSL. It's irrelevant to what I said because I'm talking about the public key infrastructure.
Re:How not to run a CA by dpark on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:05AM (#16493064)
The blog author is also not a security expert.

And I understand that your real criticism was with PKI. That makes it even worse that you called it SSL. Again, I feel like you're showing your lack of expertise in this area. I'm not an expert at all in this area and yet even I can recognize that you're playing armchair security expert.

Re:How not to run a CA by peterwwillis on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:22AM (#16493266)
SSL/TLS are just protocols, they aren't infrastructure. There's a lot of moving parts in the infrastructure that are not these protocols. The protocols work pretty well.