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Re:How not to run a CA by zeveb on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:02AM (#16493024)
I agree. The CA model is broken (why should I trust a Russian to certify cia.gov?). The Web of Trust model is less broken in some ways, more in others.

I think a real solution would be something like a multi-root, score-based system (e.g. if the U.S. government, Underwriters Laboratories & ICANN all state that I'm talking to www.google.com/172.217.13.238, then I honestly probably am) — but I'm worried that it'd be way too complex for normal people.

Re:How not to run a CA by yjftsjthsd-h on Thursday March 01, 2018 @12:07PM (#16493807)
I would settle for restricting scope of CAs. As you say, cia.gov should only be signable by (at least) US CAs, but whatever.gov.ru should probably NOT be signable by any American CAs.

CAA records help with this, where available, but still leave some things to be desired.