Probably a variety of reasons. Here's one.
There was something I saw on my local PBS station that was about security and the electrical grid. They talked to some manager of a major power plant who had a phone app that could monitor that plant over the internet and pretty much completely control it.
They talked about how this app came about. The manager decided it would be convenient so he could keep up on things when he was away at conferences and such. There were no security experts involved in writing this thing, or in analyzing what the risks were of adding outside internet access to the LANs that control systems were on. It was all as casual as you or I might make a phone app that can turn on our garage lights.
The thought that there might be some danger in the control systems being directly accessible from the internet simply did not occur to anyone.
Set thresholds on monitoring systems where the monitors trigger alarms when thresholds are outside of normal operating parameters. It's monitoring 101.
The Stuxnet attack (which as another commenter said was the real "watershed" event) managed to infect the target system even if it was air-gapped, by infecting the PC of someone that eventually connected to the private network of the target onsite.
"Remote control" certainly implies that it was connected at least indirectly to the internet, though something like a direct dial-up modem or leased line compromise could also be possible.
There are thousands of reasons someone may need to connect to a system
They most likely need remote monitoring and reporting, they can need data that needs to be periodically inserted from an outside system, they might even need remote real-time control. Any such accessibility is a possible attack vector, and "security at all costs" isn't reasonable - even if the operation is literally priceless, you still need to balance the security risks of malicious attacks versus the increased risks of downtime or faults caused by more difficult/slower monitoring and control due to the security measures you implement; a strict airgap might prevent an attack but be a contributing factor in a non-malicious accident that's just as disastrous.
It's the embedded folks, who tell that it is not made for this.
It's the manager folks, who demand that it be connected, because the IT folks told that it's is easy and innovative while the embedded folks are so old school.
Really?
If so, this is just a small minority of the embedded folks.
Think of the whole "Internet of Things" security mess, combined with a large part of "Industry 4.0". That's tons of embedded devices explicitly built to be connected to the Internet.
If it were really the developers of those embedded devices who didn't want them to have Internet connection, they would never have been in charge to build those in the first place.
The world is converging to point where everything is just an SoC capable of running a full OS and applications. IoT is just marketing taking advantage of the capability.
Just because a network interface is part of the hardware design does not make it "explicitly built" for use on the internet. On the software side 99.999% of these products are a security mess and only manage to dodge that reputation because the market is so fragmented that automated ways to bypass the security on these devices with no fine tuning involved does not yet exist.
Well of course, that's what the 10 year old vendor SDK uses, why do extra work? /s
The state of industrial/embedded security in general is so poor I'm surprised there aren't more stories like this coming out. To give a concrete example, the industrial world was using modbus since the late 1970s and when Ethernet came around in the 1980s someone thought "well let's just encapsulate modbus data in TCP" and thus was born ModbusTCP. Not a single thought was given to security.
There's millions if not billions of dollars of industrial equipment using ModbusTCP today that cannot be secured without being replaced completely. I've yet to see anyone pushing a secure protocol to replace ModbusTCP in industrial environments.
When a utility is hacked (not if) and the attackers get into the SCADA network, it's going to cause a bloodbath of epic proportions.
If you want to see how to do it right, look at slot machines. There is a crazy amount of oversight on those devices. In comparison, voting machines and our industrial infrastructure is just a huge game of grab-ass. Whatever goes, goes, until something bad happens and then people slowly learn one lesson.
Why are systems like this connected to the internet?
Because there are some things that need to be safe; some things that need to be connected to other things; and some things that need to be on the internet.Consider an automated warehouse: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAXdeqcHBp4
Internet <-> Website <-> Stock control system <-> Stock inbound station <-> Conveyor control system <-> Emergency stop monitoring system
It's possible to make such a system safe, of course. But a company making a web browser has their defences tested and their security spending validated by unceasing attack. The same resources might be hard to get in an industrial automation company if the higher-ups think "there hasn't been an attack, and they already have a firewall, a VPN and a virus scanner, whatever those are"
Some systems need to be on the internet. cool story, but, why would critical infrastructure such as this need to be is still unaddressed by your comment.
There are other systems that are used to monitor load/draw on the grid and ensure safe operation.
Things like smart meters can be connected to the public net and if compromised just cause a headache.
Your critical safety system should not be connected to public networks or at least should have strong protections.
Those numbers are looked at on aggregate to determine how much electricity needs to be produced to supply the population. They are directly tied into finance departments to generate your bill, sure, but that is an independent system from the production of electricity.
In the case of water supply, same thing. Just because I turn on my tap doesn't mean I am directly affecting the water treatment plant to treat exactly 1 more cup of water today.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_of_things#Manufacturi...
It's like they don't understand the first rule of Fight Club or something.
That's a bold statement to make for someone who, I'm assuming, has absolutely no idea what these systems are or what the company wants to do with them.
Security policy is super easy when you don't actually have to get anything done.
You're making a lot of assumptions because you're a know-it-all on the internet.
You idiots don't stop to think about if you should do something, just because you can. Internal networks with an airgap are somewhat more acceptable, but the public Internet or accessible from a device that can be pivoted to is completely unacceptable.
From the article, it sounds more like these were systems designed to protect the equipment, which they did. A loss of productivity due to equipment failing or being destroyed has an associated cost. If that cost, factoring in the probability of that event, is less than the cost of not having these things remotely accessible (however that is determined), then the math is pretty clear about what choice you make.
Even if humans are involved, that's just another cost to factor in. People get killed in work accidents all the time.
This is the problem with "security people". Their only care in life is stopping attacks, so they don't give a damn what the cost is and how it relates to the rest of the organization. We take calculated risks every single day, and if we didn't, nothing would ever get done.
People are not good at figuring out probabilities of events like being hacked - and that's assuming somebody even thought about that as a possibility, which is not at all a given in an industrial setting. The smaller factories that have clung to life here in the Midwest, for example, basically have one 'computer guy' who knows enough to keep things going.
>Even if humans are involved, that's just another cost to factor in. People get killed in work accidents all the time.
This reads like you think that people dying is acceptable risk to take. I'm going to leave it at that, lest I just call you a bunch of unpleasant names for an entire paragraph.
>This is the problem with "security people". Their only care in life is stopping attacks
It's as if that's my fucking job or something, eh?
>so they don't give a damn what the cost is and how it relates to the rest of the organization. We take calculated risks every single day, and if we didn't, nothing would ever get done
Sure we care. An airgapped internal network for this sort of thing would be an acceptable compromise for accessing something remotely. The public Internet is stupid to the point of gross irresponsibility.
Do you even listen to yourself? Do you understand the concept of "remote"?
>This reads like you think that people dying is acceptable risk to take.
Yes, clearly this is a ridiculous notion. No one ever signs up for things that carry a risk of death like driving, being a soldier, or getting shot into space.
For convenience. In business they call it "cost".
Also the PLC administrators refuse to let proper network and systems admins go near their shit. They think their stuff is better left alone from the "geeks".
As far as I can see, any safety monitoring system should be air-gapped, or, if remote control is absolutely needed, be connected via a robust physical interface, i.e a thick cable.
There is no good reason for any of these devices to have a public IP address. Physical access should be the only attack vector available when it comes to industrial sabotage.