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Re:Hackers invade safety system, halt plant operations in ‘w... by Kurtz79 on Friday December 15, 2017 @05:27AM (#15930869)
If I'm not mistaken, there is no mention in the article that the system was actually connected to the Internet.

The Stuxnet attack (which as another commenter said was the real "watershed" event) managed to infect the target system even if it was air-gapped, by infecting the PC of someone that eventually connected to the private network of the target onsite.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet#Windows_infection

Re:Hackers invade safety system, halt plant operations in ‘w... by ams6110 on Friday December 15, 2017 @08:38AM (#15931684)
The article says "In the incident, hackers used sophisticated malware to take remote control of a workstation running a Schneider Electric Triconex safety shutdown system"

"Remote control" certainly implies that it was connected at least indirectly to the internet, though something like a direct dial-up modem or leased line compromise could also be possible.

Re:Hackers invade safety system, halt plant operations in ‘w... by mcgarnagle on Friday December 15, 2017 @07:09AM (#15931237)
Okay, then really the comment should be renamed to why is critical infrastructure allow to be tampered with. Say this infection was brought in via hardware or bluetooth exploitation or wifi exploitation. None of those attack vectors should ever be accessible. No human working there should ever be able to "by accident" infect the system.
Re:Hackers invade safety system, halt plant operations in ‘w... by tueo23094 on Friday December 15, 2017 @07:41AM (#15931345)
That's nice in theory, but perhaps you have to change the logic of that SIS. Perhaps some parts need to be decommissioned, or added to. A security hot patch is needed or a backup taken.

There are thousands of reasons someone may need to connect to a system

Re:Hackers invade safety system, halt plant operations in ‘w... by PeterisP on Friday December 15, 2017 @10:52AM (#15932620)
Why do you assume that none of those attack vectors should ever be accessible? It's reasonable to assume that the systems need to exchange data with external systems on a daily basis, possibly on a real-time basis.

They most likely need remote monitoring and reporting, they can need data that needs to be periodically inserted from an outside system, they might even need remote real-time control. Any such accessibility is a possible attack vector, and "security at all costs" isn't reasonable - even if the operation is literally priceless, you still need to balance the security risks of malicious attacks versus the increased risks of downtime or faults caused by more difficult/slower monitoring and control due to the security measures you implement; a strict airgap might prevent an attack but be a contributing factor in a non-malicious accident that's just as disastrous.

Re:Hackers invade safety system, halt plant operations in ‘w... by freeflight on Friday December 15, 2017 @02:34PM (#15934371)
Stuxnet propagated itself, on a pretty wide scale, through a BadUsb exploit to bypass the Iranian air-gap.