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Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tptacek on Friday November 10, 2017 @03:27PM (#15672696)
Encryption wouldn't have mattered here. To a pretty good first approximation, none of the "encryption" done at scale at any Fortune 500 company in the US is more than a speed bump for attackers. Unless you're using moon math --- nobody is --- enterprise backend encryption is hamstrung by the fact that you're keeping the data because automated business processes need to use it, which means automated systems need to decrypt it.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by schoen on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:41PM (#15673290)
This is an excellent point, but you can also envision attack scenarios in which only parts of a distributed system are compromised. In that case, the inability of some systems to read the data that they store could be a benefit because the systems that are compromised are not absolutely guaranteed to be the same systems that possess the keys.

One nice example of this which I once saw in a real system is that a system that collects credit card numbers from the public might not need to be able to read those numbers after they're recorded, if the charges are going to be made by a later batch process. So the credit card number receiving system can use a public key to encrypt the incoming data in such a way that the batch processor will later be able to decrypt it. In this case, there is certainly a machine that has the capacity to read the data, but it's not the same machine that stores the data or that is exposed to connections from the general public. (But that paradigm is a lot easier for the case of offline batch processing, which is mostly different from the applications that you were describing... but wherever a system has a component like this, it may be possible to reduce the window of exposure with this pattern.)

Another example is that a database server might be compromised via a different vector from its clients. If some database fields were encrypted, the impact of a database-only compromise would be reduced.

Edit: elsewhere in this thread someone points out that your argument may be meant to be more specific to this breach, and I think it's most likely right with respect to this particular incident.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by patio11 on Saturday November 11, 2017 @04:17AM (#15675595)
For some color here, the Fermi estimate for number of unique consequential writes Equifax will make in a day is about ~1 billion and the number of "pull that entire file, please" is in the tens of millions.

All the data is hot data. That's what Equifax exists at all. There are multiple internal services which can cause "pull that entire file." If you lose any of them, your data store doesn't matter; there goes the ball game.

Someone's about to say "But rate limiting!" and not understand that Bank of America can ask for 10 million files at a time. (One cron job talking to a another cron job, etc etc, will fetch an update to a substantial fraction of all of their customers to update their internal records for underwriting. A larger recurring use case is "Refresh the soft pull on everyone in our marketing funnel whose pull is stale." Note that that is a sizable portion of the adult population.)

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by girvo on Friday November 10, 2017 @06:40PM (#15674026)
We’re using spooky moon math (semi-homomorphic encryption in a rather restricted case, mind you) for exactly this reason for the 4 biggest companies in a huge industry here in Australia. These companies are starting to understand why it might be needed, which is super exciting. And hell, even if the prototype gets killed, it’s been fun as hell to work on.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tinco on Saturday November 11, 2017 @06:03AM (#15675847)
What kind of operations are you able to do on the data?
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by girvo on Saturday November 11, 2017 @09:44AM (#15676543)
Solely addition on integers, currently. I’m having a lot of fun exploring pattern matching with semi-homomorphic encryption for the larger project, though I have my reservations, but it’s hopefully possible.

One of the more interesting bits of the project is that soft-real-time is not a requirement, so some simpler, slower and older algorithms become feasible (interactive ZKPs, even fully-HE systems perhaps). A very specific use case has allowed for the possibility. But it’s amazing to work on :)

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by reza_n on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:05PM (#15673033)
We have an encryption scheme where all user data has its own unique user based key. So compromising 1 user key only lets you have access to that user data and that key has access to nothing else. Your statement is correct when you said that automated systems which need access to all data will inevitably lead to mass decryption and compromise. In the system described above, there is no way for an automated system (or anything) to have access to all keys and therefor no system or person can access all data.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by kabdib on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:16PM (#15673116)
How does this help if you've got an API that decrypts for you?

It's possible that you've protected the data at rest, but if some 'get' operation is just going to serve it up, what is the effective difference?

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by SomeStupidPoint on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:45PM (#15673714)
You may have rate monitoring on the decryption requests, watching the traffic flow to the servers fronting your encrypted store.

An attacker is forced to either exfiltrate the data slowly (so the surge isn't noticed) or alert ops monitoring that the decryption service is unusually active.

Defense in depth raises the difficulty in going unnoticed and raises the time it takes to succeed.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by reza_n on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:22PM (#15673154)
The get operation provides parts of the key used to decrypt the data you are after. No key, no data.

Edit: the key comes from the user, its not stored anywhere on a server. The key can optionally never leave the user's device.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by usaphp on Friday November 10, 2017 @10:23PM (#15674836)
> Edit: the key comes from the user, its not stored anywhere on a server. The key can optionally never leave the user's device.

Does it mean if user loses his key - he wont be able to get access to his data?

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by rhizome on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:53PM (#15673374)
If someone drains your db, do they get the keys along with it?
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by kabdib on Friday November 10, 2017 @10:14PM (#15674809)
I guess you can have a key-per-row, or key-per-partition, and throttle and monitor access to that key. This isn't going to make operations like database indexing or joins very happy, so you're probably limited to payload-level data; hard to judge if that's okay since I don't know the requirements for the schema.

This presupposes you know what you're doing, security-wise, on your network, and with your backups, and with temporary data on servers. All of your interior traffic is encrypted, right? Right.

It doesn't sound like Equifax was even on the map.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by vehementi on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:11PM (#15673487)
No, of course you would not store those keys in that database.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by SAI_Peregrinus on Friday November 10, 2017 @10:57PM (#15674925)
Remember that the users in this case are the banks. Their data wasn't what got leaked. Product data got leaked.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by lmkg on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:37PM (#15673659)
My understanding is that many businesses choose to encrypt their data because many laws requiring disclosure of data breaches have an exception for encrypted data (few of these laws have a good definition of 'encrypted'). Businesses are encrypting in a way that legally mitigates the PR risk, and not particularly paying attention to the actual security risks.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tialaramex on Saturday November 11, 2017 @07:34AM (#15676084)
One good thing you get out of encryption at rest is that when some fool loses the backup tapes, or sells old servers to a "certified" recycling business that turns out to just put them on eBay without wiping anything, you may still be fine. So long as the keys weren't on the same tapes/ old servers.

It's small, but it is something.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by lawnchair_larry on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:12PM (#15673495)
It wouldn't have mattered, but they should absolutely still be doing it to mitigate exposure through loss of physical disks, and this question should be an easy yes.

The other reason to do it, frankly, is because when you end up in the news, this is the first thing everyone asks. It's easier to say yes than to "no, but..." and explain why this is a dumb question to ask (as you are trying to do here, with a far more technical audience).

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tptacek on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:38PM (#15673670)
I mostly agree, but my concern is that this is not the perspective most people, including practitioners, are bringing to the discussion when they talk about "encryption". They mean, "if you had encrypted, this data never would have been exfiltrated in a breach". Which, of course, is false.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by mannykannot on Saturday November 11, 2017 @09:53AM (#15676576)
Fair enough, but I think we should be careful not to encourage the replacement of this perspective with one that says Equifax (and other collectors of sensitive data) could not be expected to do / have done better. I was quite surprised (though I probably should not have been) by the number of IT people advocating that position.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by Johnny555 on Friday November 10, 2017 @03:58PM (#15672975)
Encryption wouldn't have mattered here

I think you mean "encryption wouldn't have mattered for the known attack", but there are lots of cases where encryption would help... even in cases that don't involve hacking, like hard-drive disposal.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by kakarot on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:32PM (#15673243)
Isn't that what he means by specifying "here"?
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by da_chicken on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:07PM (#15673458)
Well, that depends. If the attackers gain complete control of the automated application, they can potentially decrypt the entire system (or, at least, the parts that application has access to). If they only gain access to just the datastore, they may or may not be able to decrypt the data -- the encryption keys might not be in the datastore at all. It depends on the manner and scope of the access that's gained.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tptacek on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:36PM (#15673654)
As a general rule, if you get the database, you can assume remote code execution.

If you're a defender, I would go further and say you must assume it.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by PeterisP on Saturday November 11, 2017 @06:46AM (#15675965)
In a reasonable environment, gaining remote code execution on the database server wouldn't give you the ability to decrypt anything, the DB shouldn't have access to the decryption keys/oracle/whatever.

To get a dump you'd need to compromise two systems - a database server that has access to all the data, but in the data it stores and returns all the interesting columns are encrypted; and an app server that can decrypt data that it gets (and it has the keys only for the columns that this app server actually needs to use, if you have different classes of confidential data) but can't get all the data from the database freely, only a predefined subset in a limited and logged manner controlled by the database system.

Granted, if the attackers can get RCE on one of those systems then it's likely that with some effort they can get the other system as well in a similar manner, but still it's an useful defense in depth.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by emidln on Friday November 10, 2017 @06:33PM (#15674003)
I'm trying to imagine a scenario where data is stored encrypted in the db and then decrypted in the app server (I've seen this in a bunch of random PHP apps over the years). A SQLi might be able to dump encrypted data or escalate to execution on the database (from which you could pivot back to the app server), but just the SQLi doesn't necessarily expose the encrypted data.

See the example vulnerable web service here: https://gist.github.com/emidln/a43b9fee4fc55273106c4b850f6b4...

Is the assumption that control over the db can pivot back to the server or that if there are basic issues with db access that there must be other exploitable issues (probably a fair assumption)?

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tptacek on Friday November 10, 2017 @07:30PM (#15674257)
SQLI -> RCE -> Recover key or access to oracle function -> data.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by da_chicken on Saturday November 11, 2017 @04:13PM (#15678236)
No, I still disagree. An attacker could compromise the backup system, or access the file system and duplicate the database at the file level, or just steal a disk. Both Oracle and Microsoft SQL Server support transparent disk encryption to protect against precisely this type of attack.

> If you're a defender, I would go further and say you must assume it.

The assumptions you make when reacting to a known compromise are wildly different than what access an attacker actually has and what they might be able to do.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by zBard on Friday November 10, 2017 @08:52PM (#15674561)
I am not sure if thats necessarily true - a lot of folks are using cloud databases/datastores (Azure, S3 etc). Getting access to that is a different problem than remote code execution. Unless I am misunderstanding something, or you are specifically talking about on-site databases.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tptacek on Friday November 10, 2017 @09:22PM (#15674649)
"Encryption" in cloud data stores (like KMS) is really just an expression of permissions; it's systems security, not cryptographic security. If you don't have permission to access a resource on another server, yes, you've protected that resource --- but you don't need cryptography to express that.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by zBard on Friday November 10, 2017 @09:41PM (#15674709)
Since you mentioned KMS, S3 has ACL mechanisms, along with separate mechanisms to encrypt at rest using KMS, or any client based key. On cloud based stores, you can't basically guarantee systems security against the cloud provider or intrusions in their system, and for sensitive data need to encrypt it from your side.

In general I am not sure if we wish to conflate systems security and cryptographic security - cryptographic security ideally should guard against system security failures. Although in practice I grant you that broad system failures which expose crypto secrets (code execution would fall into that) would lead to crypto failures as well.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by wonderous on Friday November 10, 2017 @03:59PM (#15672986)
What is moon math?
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tptacek on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:05PM (#15673447)
Anything where the underlying math hasn't been proven at Amazon/Apple/Google scale, and/or isn't available in production-ready form in open-source software, and/or is heavily patented.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by kmill on Saturday November 11, 2017 @12:51AM (#15675180)
Is "moon math" a term of art?

Just a couple days ago, I heard a mathematician call a certain complicated knot invariant "space math" because of how out there the approach was, but that was idiosyncratic.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by saulrh on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:10PM (#15673070)
Presumably whiz-bang space-age cryptostuff, homomorphic encryption and differential privacy et. al.. Things that'd be spectacular if you found them in a startup two years from now, much less in an enterprise that hasn't done any core tech upgrades since 2005.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by skosch on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:07PM (#15673040)
Thank you for bringing sense into the discussion. I don't know how many times I've been asked "but will our data be encrypted on your server, in case someone hacks it?" and I need to explain this basic concept to otherwise intelligent people. It's like demanding that the driver's side door in a car must have a child lock installed.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by technion on Saturday November 11, 2017 @06:33PM (#15678781)
I'm interested in a genuine discussion about how to answer that. For all the commonsense explanations you could give like that ones in this thread, all a client tends to hear is "anyone can hack it".

For all the horrible stuff ups Equifax management has had, it sounds like congress would be substantively happier with them if they said "yes our SAN has an FDE feature". The media would certainly be kinder to them.

I'm in two minds about rolling something objectively pointless just so I can address these sorts of concerns.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by sova on Friday November 10, 2017 @03:44PM (#15672830)
You mean because the data is used in a readable form at some point or another, a compromise would have resulted either way? Can't say I'm sold, my friend.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tptacek on Friday November 10, 2017 @03:51PM (#15672923)
Yes: because the point of encryption is to protect you from a compromise in your server (that's what happened at Equifax), but for the server to be able to use the data, it has to have have some means of getting plaintext access to it. Once you've lost your server to an attacker, you've lost control of that mechanism as well.

This is a problem even with HSM designs; in real-world systems, HSMs usually just present an oracle interface to data. The hope is that with sufficient monitoring, you can use the oracle to buy time for defenders to detect a compromise before all your data is exfiltrated.

I think most penetration testers have the experience of owning up a server and going on the brief treasure hunt for the static key stored somewhere on the filesystem.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by sova on Saturday November 11, 2017 @07:51PM (#15679063)
Most people use encryption in the following way for passwords: user provides input, input is hashed, hash is stored, future attempts to log in are hashed and compared. This is very secure. Server compromised? No problem, all they get is a bunch of hashed stuff. Hashing is the main business of a bureau of any sort of public data. That is the business in 2017. If personal data were kept as fuzzy hashes that required partial knowledge to decrypt, systems would be more robust and information would be better protected. It is not a new idea, just an oft overlooked one.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by dredmorbius on Friday November 10, 2017 @07:06PM (#15674164)
What is "HSM" in this context?

Among probable hits, "hierarchical storage management" and "hardware security module".

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by thristian on Friday November 10, 2017 @08:07PM (#15674407)
Hardware Security Module, a device that stores a private key in a way that cannot be easily extracted. When your application needs to decrypt something, it sends a request over the network to the HSM, which decrypts it and returns the plaintext.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tptacek on Friday November 10, 2017 @07:45PM (#15674318)
Hardware security module.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by nitwit005 on Saturday November 11, 2017 @01:18AM (#15675227)
The point of encryption is often just to prevent people from walking off with hard disks and getting at the data. Remember that companies often have backups managed by 3rd parties.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by itissid on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:55PM (#15673781)
Once you have remote code execution with privilege escalation on box Z, no amount of encryption can save at least box Z
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by adrr on Friday November 10, 2017 @07:14PM (#15674199)
Encryption would have reduced the damage if encryption was done right. There's no reason for a front-end system to have access to SSN and with modern secure storage like Vault you can grant encryption(Write) and decryption(Read) rights specific to each app on your platform.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by bskap on Friday November 10, 2017 @08:30PM (#15674490)
Having separate read and write permissions is entirely orthogonal to having encryption. That certainly would help (assuming the compromised system didn't need to have read permissions), but you don't need encryption to implement that and adding encryption doesn't imply that you've done it.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tptacek on Friday November 10, 2017 @07:56PM (#15674372)
Vault is designed for application configuration secrets, not for at-scale storage of raw business data.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by slackpad on Friday November 10, 2017 @09:35PM (#15674693)
The transit backend can be used to encrypt more general business data - https://www.hashicorp.com/blog/transparent-data-encryption-i....
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by justicezyx on Friday November 10, 2017 @07:35PM (#15674279)
Why encryption wont help?

Is it because the keys are easily comprimisable, or stolen?

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by AnimalMuppet on Friday November 10, 2017 @08:15PM (#15674433)
Because the attacker is in a position to query the database. That (probably) means that they have compromised one of the machines that can legitimately query the database. But if that machine can query the database, and the data in the database is encrypted, then that machine must be able to decrypt it, or else it can't use it. So the keys must be on the machine - and the attacker has compromised that machine. Or else, that machine has authorization to send requests to some other machine that is the decrypting authority - and the attackers, by having compromised that machine, have gained the ability to send requests for decryption.

TL;DR: If a machine can actually use the data in the database, it has to be able to get the data in a decrypted form. If an attacker compromises that machine, the attacker can also get the data in decrypted form.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by mseebach on Saturday November 11, 2017 @05:07AM (#15675693)
All the best locks in the world doesn't help one iota if your attack is to get the janitor to open the gate for you.

The compromised component at Equifax was the running application which is built to retrieve data from the database - it knows how to log in to the database and do whatever decryption is required to retrieve data. You don't particularly need to compromise passwords or encryption keys or whatever, because the application will just use them for you.

Encryption protects against compromising the server itself either physically or at the OS level, which is not nothing, but also doesn't help if you have an underpaid janitor with a gambling problem with all the keys in his pocket guarding the loading bays out back.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by sanmon3186 on Saturday November 11, 2017 @09:08AM (#15676397)
>none of the "encryption" done at scale at any Fortune 500 company in the US is more than a speed bump for attackers.

So why Fortune 500 companies only? I am just trying to understand what this has to do with the scale of a company.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by walshemj on Friday November 10, 2017 @06:22PM (#15673942)
Simples use HSM's and use proper physical security
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by Blazespinnaker on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:14PM (#15673517)
It's called defense in depth. Google the term, it's a useful mechanism for real security.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tptacek on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:37PM (#15673661)
If that's true, why encrypt just once? Why not three times, and then add a rot14 just to be safe? Every millimeter of depth counts!
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by schoen on Friday November 10, 2017 @06:11PM (#15673881)
I don't think this answer is fair. If the encryption is deployed to ensure that only a subset of systems that process or transmit sensitive information can understand it, the attack surface that results in disclosure of the information has been reduced.

Elsewhere in this thread you said that a compromise of a database is likely associated with a compromise of systems that access that database, but this is not necessary true if the platforms and administration of these systems are very heterogeneous (say, different operating systems), and in any case it doesn't make it not an application of defense in depth. (Suppose that 90% of attacks that penetrate the database also penetrate the client; now this use of encryption has managed to beneficially mitigate 10% of these attacks.)

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by philipwhiuk on Friday November 10, 2017 @06:09PM (#15673864)
Because encrypting once adds noticeable depth against straightforward attacks. Encrypting multiple times adds practically nothing.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by tptacek on Friday November 10, 2017 @07:47PM (#15674327)
The problem is that encrypting once in a conventional database design does not add noticeable depth. The server needs to be able to decrypt automatically in order to function. Whatever the server does to decrypt, the attacker will do too.

It helps here to understand two things:

1. When we talk about protecting servers with encryption, we're stipulating attackers with RCE. That was the case with the Equifax attacker and is routinely the case in real-world applications.

2. SQLI, the app-layer non-RCE attack that gives you direct access to raw database rows (ie: the one non-RCE case in which you'd get access to the data we're encrypting) almost always equates to RCE anyways.

There are real designs that involve cryptography that mitigate these problems. They fall into two buckets:

1. HSM/Crypto "oracle" schemes that are backed by intensive staffing and monitoring. Yes: nobody disagrees that Equifax should have had a serious security team doing serious monitoring. But: if it had that, it wouldn't have had this breach, which involved a published critical framework vulnerability. In other words: in bucket 1, "encryption" isn't helping you, "better security team" is.

2. Moon math schemes. I'm all for moon math, but when people say "phwat!? Equifax worn't even encrypticated?", they do not as a rule have a particular moon math scheme in mind (or, likely, an appreciation for what it means to be the first at-scale deployment of a new moon math scheme).

I am not mounting an argument that people shouldn't encrypt things. Hard drives do get lost. I'm just saying that as an operational security mitigation, encryption isn't doing what 99.99% of developers think it's doing in this scenario.

(by the way, I can't take credit for the term "moon math" but it is super useful)

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by Blazespinnaker on Sunday November 12, 2017 @04:43PM (#15682786)
Lol, if you don't encrypt what keeps some employee from just walking in and stealing the hard drives? Insider attacks are huge, learn this in sec 101. RCE is your area, I am sure, but you are missing a huge category of trivial attacks if you don't encrypt.